Chapter 8 - A Reasonable Contextualism (or, Austin Reprised)

Abstract

This chapter discusses the relation between Austin's views and epistemological skepticism. Along with a desire to describe the varying standards actually used ordinarily ascribing knowledge, contextualism is also motivated by a desire to offer a satisfying response to skepticism. It is argued by many contemporary contextualists (such as Cohen, DeRose, and Lewis) that their epistemology allows to hold that many of the “ordinary” knowledge ascriptions are true, while simultaneously doing justice to the supposed power of skeptical arguments. This salience mechanism offers what looks like a simple account of the effect of skeptical arguments. On the one hand, skeptical arguments certainly appear to create wide-ranging doubts in the minds of many of those who entertain them—that is, such arguments do seem to destroy knowledge in their immediate vicinity. This, in turn, suggests that there may be deep limitations on what can be achieved, what can be said, by a “theory of knowledge,” at least if this means an abstract attempt to specify what is common to all knowledge attributions across all contexts.