Chapter 12 - Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge

Abstract

This chapter presents two distinct models of agent's knowledge: a causal-reliabilist model and a teleological, reasons-based account. Both approaches face a parallel difficulty about how the gap between an intention and an action gets crossed. In each case, it might seem that closing the epistemic gap requires closing the metaphysical gap between intention and action. On a causal theory, the metaphysical gap gets closed only if (1) prior intentions perfectly reliably cause their corresponding intentional actions, or (2) intentions-in-action are always embodied in the corresponding intentional actions. In each case, knowledge of an intention would suffice (on an externalist, reliabilist theory) for knowledge of the corresponding intentional action. However, the claim that prior intentions perfectly reliably give rise to actions needs further defense. Therefore, it seems as though the causal theory cannot deliver the result that agent's knowledge is anticipatory, being derived from knowledge of prior intentions.