Hume on Skeptical Arguments

Abstract

The paper is divided into two parts: the first deals with kinds of skeptical arguments, and the second with uses of skeptical arguments. In the first part, it shows that Hume distinguishes mainly two kinds of skeptical arguments: there are popular, weak skeptical arguments, and philosophical, strong skeptical arguments. The weaker skeptical arguments are mainly derived from ancient skepticism, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, whereas the stronger skeptical arguments are derived from modern philosophy, especially from Hume’s own empirical science of human nature. In the second part, it shows the difference, as Hume understands it, between Academic (or mitigated) skepticism and Pyrrhonism (or excessive) skepticism. This ancient distinction serves Hume’s own purposes. What is the difference between Academic scepticism and Pyrrhonism as they are construed by Hume? The difference lies in the use each form of skepticism makes of skeptical arguments. There can be two uses of the same skeptical arguments. One can use them to suspend judgment. This is the Pyrrhonian use. But one can also use the same arguments for other purposes, such as changing our attitude towards knowledge and affirming or restricting the scope of our inquiries. This is the Academic use of skeptical arguments. Two considerations are crucial for a skeptic to reach this Academic stance: the realization that these skeptical arguments admit no answer and the awareness that nature has implanted in us certain faculties and beliefs that resist the force of skepticism, which is devastating in relation to all other beliefs.