Artistic Convention and the Issue of Truth in Art

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of truth in the arts, i.e., whether, and in what sense, works of art, or certain works of art, can be said to express something either true or false. What I offer here is a partial defense of the view that at least some works of art are (or contain, convey, etc., something which is) either true or false, or what I shall simply call the I speak of a partial defense as being offered because due to the scope of the topic I confine my discussion to criticism of part of a common argument against the truth-in-art view. This argument runs something as follows: Something can be said to be either true or false only if it can be said to have meaning and, more specifically, meaning that is referential in kind rather than, for example, emotive. Something can be said to have such meaning only if conventions obtain that give it a fairly definite reference. No such conventions obtain for works of art. Therefore, works of art cannot be said to be either true or false.1