Are only mental phenomena intentional?

Abstract

It's a familiar suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental. The suggestion is typically spelled out and supported in terms of the following claim, which we may dub ‘Brentano's thesis’ (Brentano 1874/1973: 89): Brentano's thesis: All and only mental phenomena are intentional. An influential objection to Brentano's thesis is that intentionality isn't necessary to mentality, since bodily sensations, or moods, or other states of mind regarded as ‘qualitative’, are not intentional. Over the last decade, a number of philosophers, including Tim Crane (1998, 2001) and Michael Tye (1995, 2000), have sought to rebut this objection, presenting several interesting and powerful considerations in favour of an intentional view of qualitative states. Such arguments are central to Crane's (2001) recent sustained defence of Brentano's thesis. While much ink has been lavished on the necessity of intentionality to mentality, little attention has been devoted to...