Intentionality and Normativity

Abstract

The main theme of Steve Crowell's excellent Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger is connection between normativity and (1), a central issue in both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy, but not addressed as such by either of them. In Crowell's view, the aim of phenomenology is to grasp reality in its meaning, or sense, and he takes this question to be inseparable from that of normativity. Hence, the reader knows exactly what to expect right from the very first page: closer examination of the space of meaning in its character as a norm-governed phenomenon, and of the self or subject capable of experiencing such meaning, is the primary aim of this (1). And Crowell does exactly this in extraordinary fashion by interpreting, analysing and questioning the thoughts of Husserl and Heidegger, covering their works throughout.Today, I would like to critically discuss a few issues that come up in this engaging book. My comments and questions are organized around two main ideas, which concern (§1) the intimate connection Crowell sees holding between intentionality, meaning and normativity in thinking experiences, and (§2) the normative role of bodily forms of self-awareness in perceptual experience. I hope that my few reservations on these two issues will not prevent anyone from seeing what is essential here: Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger is a real tour de force; it is an outstanding book that anyone interested in phenomenology should read with patience and care.§1. Intentionality, Normativity and Meaning in Thinking ExperiencesThe relation holding between intentionality, normativity and meaning is the theme that ties together the thirteen essays of Crowell's book, which is why it needs to be discussed in some detail. My aim here is twofold: first, I want to stress the great merits of Crowell's approach to all these themes by reflecting a little on its historical background in Brentano. This is a topic that Crowell does not concern himself with in his book, but which is important, as it allows us to see how Husserl's creative appropriation of concept of intentionality subtly introduced a new conception of normativity at the heart of intentionality. After this, I want, secondly, to question the reach of Crowell's claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience.Stated simply, Brentano's thesis stipulates that conscious mental states are intentional states, that is to say, they have an object as their correlates. One important and underappreciated feature of characterization of intentionality is that it is normatively neutral. Contrary to the phenomenological account of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, conception of the intentional relation is not normative. To illustrate this, one might refer to what is undoubtedly the most well known passage of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, where Brentano defines mental phenomena by their intrinsic intentional nature:Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, relation to a content [Beziehung auf einen Inhalt], direction upon an object [Richtung auf einen Gegenstand] . . . or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In [re]presentation something is [re]presented, in judgments something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (PES, II, Ch. 1, §5, p. 88)It is crucial to take good note of wording in this locus classicus, which avoids any distinctively normative vocabulary. Intentionality is characterized by its direction (or orientation) toward an object (Richtung auf einen Gegenstand) or by its relation to a given content (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt). …