Antirealism/realism of Wittgenstein's language-game idea

Heda Festini

doi:10.15291/radovifpsp.2404

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s language-game idea allews/us te find out both, antirealistic and realistic tendencies, what is required te abanden classification an realistic and antirealistic (constructivistic, instrumentalistic) approaches in semantics and methodology of science/that originated in discussions on the philosophy of mathematics. Using some relevant commentators of Wittgenstein’s works (Dummett, Baker, Hintikka, Kiripke. C. Wright etc.) a broader notion of realism will be obtained using the following questions: A. human reality: natural history or forms of life (behaviour, practice, training, customs and institutions — language-games and correct use), B. new objectivity: community, agreement (criterion - following rules), C. the new nuance in the nation of truth: justification, verification (proof as an method of verification). The results of the analysis will be the impontant for a new criterion of realism such as: the general notion of reality, objectivity as intersubjectivity and the nuances in the notion of truth.With the new criterion we have the following map of realism: 1. F-rege-Tarski-Carnap truth-conditional realism, 2. Frege-Wittgenstein justification/verificatdonist realism, 3. Frege-Wittgenstein-Hintikka verificationist/falsificationist realism.The possibility of Frege-Wittgenstein-Dummett neoveificationist realism is open to further research.

Highlights

Wittgenstein’s language-game idea allew s/us te find ou t both, antireali stic and realistic tendencies, w hat is required te abanden classification an realistic and ant irealistic appro aches in sem antics an d methodol ogy of science/that originated in dis cussions on the philosophy of mathematics
It seems that it is important to organize the survey around three questions which were basic for Wittgenstein: A. human reality: natural history or forms of life, B. new objectivity: community, agreement, C. the new nuance in the notion of truth: justification, verification
Surveying C. question we obtain as preferable for Wittgenstein VII map 1) I, 2) a), 2) II d), that is to say: 'the justification in general is specified in suitable language-game, the verification as the method Bor the sense of the proposition is different in the relation to neopositivistic notion and the proof is a specific method of verification about which W ittgenstein’s conception is synthetic, not completely intuitionistic, nonradical conventionalist and is antiempirist

Summary

FESTINI

IX map W ittgenstein’s realism (interpretations): 1) a) the connection of the grammatical systems, or language-games with reality, its place in the forms of life, or world, or life we live, or what we do Even in TLP (6..1625), as said Hintikka, Wittgenstein thought that the sentence does not reflect teh structure of reality, it is a starting-point for certain picture construction (1969:42, 43, 51—52) This is a comment on IX map 2) is, in addition, clearly asking 3) characterisation. Adding other research results (Festini 1987:19), we have the following map of realism: 1) Frege-Tarski-Carnap truth-conditional realism, 2) Frege-Wittgenstein justificaition/verifioationist realism, 3) Frege-W ittgenstein-Hintikka verificationisit/falsificationist realism. 9. BogenJ., 1972, »W ittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language«, London New. Ytork, Routladge and Kegan Paul. DummettM., 1959 b, »W ittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics«, in: see ref.no.15), pp.

FESTIN I