Američki realisti i rat u Bosni 1992-1995.

Abstract

While there is a significant body of literature on U.S. policy towards Bosnia in the early 1990s, the role and policy recommendations of American realists have been largely overlooked. Realism is a school of thought in international relations which holds that states are the key actors motivated by interests which seek to maximize their power and security in an anarchic world. Adherents of this worldview emphasize the pursuit of national interests and the importance of power and force in achieving it. Realists are generally opposed to military interventions where a vital national interest is not at stake. The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by analysing both realist policymakers and academics and how they responded to the war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. Several top officials of the George H. W. Bush Administration including the President, Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft were realists and this worldview shaped the US response to the outbreak of the war in Bosnia. Focused on a host of other foreign policy issues at the time, the Bush Administration was adamant not to get involved militarily in Bosnia. James Baker’s statement „We don't have a dog in that fight“ came to define the Bush Administration's Bosnia policy. Its realist outlook combined with the presidential campaign priorities in 1992 to ensure that the Western response to the war in Bosnia was handed over to the Europeans. With realist policymakers in power from the outbreak of the war in spring 1992 through early 1993, many Bosnians hoping for a Western military intervention at the time would later come to realise how far-fetched those hopes were. In addition to realist policymakers, several prominent realists in the American academia also weighed in on how the US should respond to the war in this part of Southeast Europe in the early 1990s. Academic realists published their opinions and recommended policy options in leading media outlets throughout the three-and-a-half year war. Though their worldview was not shared by the first Bill Clinton Administration, academic realists continued offering policy recommendations on Bosnia. Academic realists like Robert Pape and Michael Desch opposed the use of air power in Bosnia arguing that it would be ineffective. John Mearsheimer together with Pape called for partition of Bosnia and establishment of homogeneous states in the Balkans and arming of Bosnian Muslims. Kissinger was opposed to a military commitment to Bosnia but did not lay out specific policy recommendations. In sum, both policymakers and academics argued that there was no vital US national interest at stake in Bosnia warranting deployment of ground troops. Even after the Dayton peace talks concluded in late 1995, American realists continued weighing in on Bosnia and offering generally bleak assessments. While the majority of those recommended policy options were not implemented, realists’ views on Bosnia in the 1990s still deserve scholarly attention. Studying American realists provides an overview of how both practitioners and intellectual adherents of a key theory in international relations perceived the war and its outcome. This analysis will also provide a more nuanced understanding of the variety of American responses to the war in Bosnia.