Abstract

IntroductionCentral Asia's importance to the United States is growing. In 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asians that in the area is of paramount importance and vital national interest.1 Yet today U.S. interests in the region face attacks from three sides: Russia and China, the Taliban and their supporters, and the authoritarian misrule of Central Asian governments. Worse yet, some local governments might fail, adding to these threats. Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress in 2006,Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and widening socio-economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible, case central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.2Negroponte's successor, Vice Admiral (Ret.) J. Michael McConnell, was even more pessimistic in his 2007 testimony:There is no guarantee that elite and societal turmoil across Central Asia will stay within the confines of existing autocratic systems. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival political factions, clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to a dramatic expansion of terrroist and criminal activity along the lines of a failed state.3Neither is this merely an American perception. When Turkmenistan's dictator, Sapirmurat Niyazov, suddently died on December 21, 2006, the local media openly expressed speculation and anxiety over Turkmenistan's and Central Asia's future.4While some attacks on U.S. policy are or were unavoidable, others stem from shortcomings in policy that gave these adversaries opportunities to attack it to their own advantage. This article addresses these deficiencies and makes recommendations for extricating America from its present difficulties.U.S. interests in Central Asia are primarily strategic. They derive first from Central Asia's proximity to Russia, Iran, and China.5 Indeed,The United States and the West in general find themselves increasingly dependent on the continued stability and development of the Central Eurasian region. The United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan, and its engagement there and in Central Asian states is a long-term endeavor. The future of this region has a considerable bearing on the development of the Global War on Terrorism and in general on U.S. security interests in Eurasia; the maintenance of access to airspace and territory in the heart of Asia; the development of alternative sources of energy; and the furthering of freedom and democratic development.6Hence Russia and China view any U.S. presence in Central Asia as a standing challenge, if not threat, to their vital interests. Those interests are inherently imperial, entailing Central Asian states' diminished sovereignty. Therefore America's paramount objective under the Clinton and Bush administrations has been to uphold these states' integrity, independence, sovereignty, and security against Russo-Chinese efforts to dominate them and circumscribe their freedom.7 As Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lorne Craner stated in 2004,The primary strategic goal of the United States in Central Asia is to see the development of independent, democratic, and stable states, committed to the kind of political and economic reform that is essential to modern societies and on the path to integration and to the world economy. The strategy that we follow is based on simultaneous pursuit of three related goals. The first of these goals is security. Our counterterrorism cooperation bolsters the sovereignty and independence of these states and provides them with the stability needed to undertake the reforms that are in their long-term interest. …

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