Abstract
For many decision-makers, precision guided weapons represent what the aerial bomber promised the early air power idealists in the 1930s—a technological solution to difficult wars without the risk of casualties. In 1995, NATO used its air power to bring an end to the war in Bosnia and tried again in 1999 to use bombs to end the conflict in Kosovo. The failure to bring about a quick cessation of the fighting using air power was in part due to misinterpreting the war in Bosnia, as well as misunderstanding, in general, when and where air power is effective.
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