Abstract
This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt, and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both comparative constitutional law and international law are largely ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests ways to reinforce democracy against these threats while acknowledging the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of comparative constitutional law and international law might best be leveraged to protect new democracies.
Highlights
Este artigo identifica um fenômeno cada vez mais importante: o uso de mecanismos de mudança constitucional para corroer a ordem democrática
Alguns dos mecanismos mais citados na literatura - como a concepção alemã de democracia militante e a doutrina das emendas constitucionais inconstitucionais - são difíceis de implantar contra a ameaça do constitucionalismo abusivo ou facilmente evitáveis por esses atores autoritários
This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order
Summary
Definirei a prática do constitucionalismo abusivo e o situarei nos recentes avanços das teorias constitucional e governamental, explicando porque o constitucionalismo está sendo usado com bastante frequência para enfraquecer a democracia. Em contraste com as práticas passadas, quando os regimes autoritários eram geralmente formados por meio de golpe militar ou outros meios inconstitucionais, os pretensos autocratas agora têm incentivos significativos para parecerem cumprir as regras constitucionais[8]. Eles estão cada vez mais usando dos mecanismos de emenda e substituição constitucionais como ferramentas para ajudá-los a construir uma ordem jurídica mais autoritária. Finalmente, sintetizarei os resultados dos estudos de caso a fim de explicar a importância do constitucionalismo para todos esses esforços[10]
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