A groat's worth more on Moore's assertion

Abstract

'Moore's Proof' (ANALYSIS, March 1965) Mr. Macleod correctly points out that in 'I know that here is a hand' (ANALYSIS, June 1964) oscillate between regarding A-knowing as awareness of an object and as awareness that something is the case. As he says, should throughout have taken the latter view, which parallels the assertion, 'I know that here is a hand'. could then indeed have shown that the assertion, 'I know (A-know) that here is a hand', is philosophically pointless. All should have had to do is note, as Macleod does, that 'whenever I am aware that is substituted for I know that without change of meaning, a justified claim to knowledge (i.e. A-knowledge) of p is incompatible with the falsity of p' (op. cit. p. 157). Because this is something as well known to other philosophers as to Macleod and myself, and because it is equally well-known that where 'p' is 'here is a hand', the truth of p in ordinary use implies the existence of a material hand and hence of an external world, it must be supposed that when philosophers come to hear a proof of the external world they have already found reason to doubt or reject the truth of the assertion, as ordinarily understood, 'I know (A-know) that here is a hand'. Otherwise, they should have no interest in and see no point in a proof of an external world. Thus, to the very extent that there is any point to a proof of an external world there can be no point to someone's asserting before a philosophical audience, 'I know (A-know) that here is a hand'.