Abstract

This chapter analyses G. E. Moore's philosophy “Proof of an External World.” Moore claimed that he could prove that two human hands exist by raising his hands saying, “Here is one hand, and here is another.” He had earlier argued that hands, if there are such, are “things outside of us,” and hence that in proving that there are hands he will have ipso facto proved that there exist external objects. It is rather obscure just what this means or what is wrong with it. It will not do to say that he is merely “assuming what he is trying to prove,” for as Moore tightly notes, his premise does not simply state that there are external objects but rather provides some specific examples. Perhaps in some sense, his conclusion contains information already contained in the premise—it is after all a valid argument—but this can hardly be one of its flaws. Any valid argument for the existence of external objects is such that an external world skeptic cannot coherently believe the conjunction of the premises. It is a contingent psychological matter that some arguments are more obviously valid than others, and hence that one is more likely to find skeptics believing the premises of some arguments than others.

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