Abstract
Wittgenstein apparently regarded G. E. Moore's Proof of an External World as one of his finest pieces of philosophical work.1 That is an important clue for anyone who wants understand what Wittgenstein thought a satisfactory treatment of knowledge-scepticism should accomplish.2 I do not believe, though, that many of Moore's moder readers would share Wittgenstein's high regard. The greater part of the essay is devoted exasperatingly slow ruminations on what it means describe objects as external, or outside our minds or presented in space or to be met with in space. Nothing particularly consequential emerges. And the actual 'Proof-'which everyone on first reading feels blatantly begs the question-is confined the last few pages. Here is the essence of it:
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