A Composite Detection Method for Direct GPS Deception Attack

Abstract

On account of the GPS initial technology limitations, it is vulnerable to interference, deception and other security attacks; GPS is widely used. If it is attacked, it will bring very serious consequences. Due to the problem of cost, civil GPS seldom considers how to defend against security attack. Therefore, it is necessary to study a fast and efficient GPS deception signal detection method to resist the attack. By improving the existing detection methods of GPS deception signal, a composite detection method of GPS deception signal is proposed. Based on DOA detection, the detection of signal propagation time difference is added, and the existence of GPS deception signal is judged synthetically according to whether the signal angle of arrival and the signal propagation time difference exceed the threshold value of real signal. The improved method improves the detection efficiency by reducing the calculation times of the signal angle of arrival. By reducing the number of detection signals to improve the detection accuracy of signal propagation time difference when there are more detection signals and less deception signals, thus ensuring the accuracy of composite detection. And subsequent simulation experiments successfully detected direct GPS deception signals, which verified the feasibility of this method for rapid detection of direct deception signals.