Abstract
The article describes the solution of a bimatric game between a security administrator and an attacking attacker in two stages. At the first stage, it is proposed to apply optimality criteria that take into account the price of the game, and at the second stage, criteria that take into account the risks of the players. This approach helps to find the best strategy to protect against malicious attacks among strategies with the same price of the game.
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