ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ОНТОЛОГИЯ СУЖДЕНИЯ И ОТРИЦАНИЯ

Abstract

In the present article we consider the phenomenological conception of judgement and negation in relation to the origin of scientific objectivation. Basing on the later works of Edmund Husserl and on earlier as well as fundamental-ontological period of Martin Heidegger’s thought, analysis of onto-logical status and cognitive value of negative judgements is undertaken. Thus, our investigation addressing the issue of logic as Wissenschaftlehre, goes on to consider the question of the necessary modalization of judgement as manifestation of the scientist’s critical attitude to the world. We set forth the topicalization of judgement in traditional logic understood as the science of science. Through pointing out the intentionality of judgemental activity, we carry out a problematization of negative judgements. At first, our research addresses Heidegger’s fundamental ontology for the clarification of the relation between negation and Nothing, as well as the thesis of ontological difference and the existentials of anxiety (Angst) and being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein). Attention is also paid to the early academic work of the German thinker where the hermeneutics of negation reaches the originally bimodal character of the copula. After that, this sense-investigation continues within the framework of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, according to which the origin of judgement in the form “S is not P” is shown to lie in the reality of experience. Both the secondary intentional character of negation and the fundamentality of the normal perception and, consequently, of affirmation is proved. We demonstrate the impossibility of finding out the pre-predicative root for double negation and the proximity of the potential conclusions to the non-classic intuitionist logic. Finally, we make an attempt to explicate the results in the given context of the philosophical foundations of scientific knowledge.