The political process by which Latin American elites have tried to dismantle highly interventionist states has been an important subject over the past decade. Many studies have focused attention upon the technocratic authoritarian leadership and decision-making styles of market reformers.1 At the same time, concern about the quality of Latin American democracies has been growing now that electoral processes are firmly in place. While substantial progress was made in market reforms, the deepening of democracy has been elusive. Power has not been dispersed; corruption persists or has worsened; and politics continues to be characterized by personalistic exchange relationships, lack of accountability, wide executive discretion, and absence of the rule of law.2 The legacies of political history, combined with economic crises and deepening political polarization, have produced the merger of these traditional aspects of politics with the new technocratic market reform agenda. First stage market reform was carried out in Chile during the presidency of General Pinochet (1973-1989) and in Argentina under President Carlos Menem (1989-1999).3 The most critical years in Chile were from 1974 to 1985, and the deepest and most rapid change occurred in Argentina from 1989 to 1996. These two regimes differed in fundamentally important ways. The Chilean regime was highly authoritarian not simply because the military was in power, but also because control was exercised by a president who knew how to mobilize personal power effectively. Furthermore, an essential component of the Chilean reform process involved brutal repression.4 Argentina's market reform, in contrast, was carried out under an electoral democracy in which violent state repression against regime opponents was rarely used. Nevertheless, both countries demonstrate the enormous resiliency of patrimonial political features and their integral role in the initial phase of market reform. Recent studies have framed this problem in terms of corruption, a focus that tends to downplay underlying context and power. The preoccupation with corruption has prompted calls for institutional and legal reforms to improve governance.5 However, customs, traditions, and conduct may operate independently of the organizations of the state and its formal rules and may be enormously resistant to change.6 The commonality of patrimonial features stands out in regimes that were substantially different in other respects. In Chile and Argentina neopatrimonial antielites, whose role was absolutely key in the