Xi Jinping Research Articles

Qin Gang’s disappearance and shifts in party–state relations in China’s foreign policymaking

The June 2023 disappearance of China’s then-foreign minister Qin Gang for unknown reasons has caused speculation internationally about the country’s domestic political dynamics and about the party–state relations in foreign policy. Notably, the Chinese Communist Party has been more active internationally since President Xi Jinping began his third term in office in 2022 via organisations including the International Liaison Department and United Front Work Department.

Decoding Xi Jinping's 3.0 Team: Changes in Political and Military Leadership

Decoding Xi Jinping's 3.0 Team: Changes in Political and Military Leadership

The Evolution of American Contemporary China Studies: Coming Full Circle?

ABSTRACT In the nearly 75 years that the People’s Republic of China has been in existence, the field of contemporary China studies in the United States has developed and evolved through six distinguishable ‘generations’ of scholarship. The evolving social science scholarly analyses of contemporary China have paralleled the changes in the PRC itself over time, but they have also reflected paradigmatic changes in scholarly disciplines in the United States. Other stimuli which have also impacted the field include domestic politics in America and shifts in US-China relations. This article traces the evolution of field (as observed and interpreted by the author); it concludes that while the field is generally very healthy, diverse, and enjoys great breadth and depth of knowledge, it faces significant new challenges for source material and research in Xi Jinping’s China.

Anticolonialism as a Guiding Principle of Chinese Foreign Policy

This article explores the ideology of anticolonialism as a guiding principle in the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It highlights the close association of anticolonialism with decolonialism, anti-imperialism, and the Nonaligned Movement, emphasizing their importance throughout the history of the PRC. While the current Chinese leadership may not emphasize anticolonial rhetoric as frequently as during the Mao Zedong era (1950–1970s), the core essence of Chinese foreign policy remains unchanged. China acknowledges its former semi-colonial status and aligns its policies with the interests of developing countries, seeking cooperation to protect its own interests amidst potential superpower pressures. Recent initiatives by Xi Jinping, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the concept of a “Community with a shared future for mankind,” demonstrate a universal character that extends beyond developing countries. Authored by scholars from Russia and China, this article aims to familiarize the international audience with China’s official discourse on its semi-colonial past, anticolonialism, and decolonization. The authors also highlight the potential for cooperation between Russia and China based on their shared perspectives on these issues. Understanding China’s foreign policy principles provides valuable insights into its historical context and contemporary approach to international relations.

Rethinking nationalistic history in China: Towards a multicultural Chinese identity

In China, the central government enjoys paramount authority in (re)writing national history, and its interpretation is promoted through various channels to shape people's national identity. Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has promoted a nationalistic history to promote a Han‐dominant Chinese identity. This nationalistic approach to Chinese history stands in contrast to China's multicultural society and the government's affirmation of multicultural aims as the core values and future goals of the nation. It was expected that the government would rethink and revise nationalistic history to recognize diverse groups and accommodate their needs in the Xi Jinping era. However, this paper shows that the current government continues to emphasize a version of national history that encourages a nationalistic sentiment and discourse. This approach to Chinese history risks strengthening xenophobic sentiments and behaviour in China, and could become coercive for Chinese people who hold different interpretations or expect a more comprehensive interpretation of national history. I argue that a critical multicultural approach can help develop a more inclusive and balanced national history and identity in China.

Central–Local Relations in China: A Case Study of Heilongjiang's GMO Ban

AbstractThis study contributes to the research on central–local relations in China by examining local dynamics and defiance. Drawing on the case of a provincial government's defiance against a central policy – Heilongjiang province's 2016 ban on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – this study shows that despite the unprecedented recentralization push in recent years, local defiance still exists and persists. In addition, this study finds that the Heilongjiang provincial government managed to reduce potential political backlash by feeding the public distrust of GMOs, exploiting the internal divide and central ambiguity over GMOs and, more importantly, skilfully framing its GMO ban as part of its efforts to implement Xi Jinping's Green Development Concept.

American Discourses on China's Motivations for Naval Development under Xi Jinping

This article examines the security and defense discourse in the United States on China's ambitious naval development in the Asia‐Pacific region. American scholars and experts highlight four motivations for Chinese naval development: (1) the consolidation of China's territorial sovereignty; (2) the feasibility of A2/AD strategy; (3) the protection of China's overseas interests; and (4) leadership endorsement. Xi Jinping has increased the quality and quantity of China's naval capabilities and attempted to enhance his prestige by portraying himself as the driving force behind the development of China's powerful navy. Since then, the United States has not merely watched China's naval development but has considered China's navy a rival force. There are multiple ongoing debates regarding the purpose of China's naval development, including whether China aims to challenge US maritime supremacy. Some scholars are focused on China's territorial and strategic motivation, inferring the aim of posing a direct threat to US national security, but China posits that its purpose for naval development is not to confront US maritime hegemony. Some believe that the Chinese navy is not capable of doing so, and others explain that China is not aiming for a military crusade capable of causing a power transition, but rather focusing on the expansion of maritime interests.

A Xinderella Story: Turning the Chinese Dream Into China’s Master Narrative

The China Story, also known as Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, is widely accepted as the central narrative for the leadership’s ideological and political legitimacy-building efforts. Despite its significance and the widespread attention it has received in the decade since its inception, surprisingly little literature has examined the Chinese Dream through the lens of narrative theory. This article seeks to close this gap by offering a structural narratological analysis of the China Story. It illuminates how the narrative comprises policy-oriented rhetorical frames that form overarching themes that direct party-state actions and support Xi Jinping’s status as the ‘core’ leader. The paper argues that as a ‘master narrative’, it seeks to provide a spiritual foundation and a compelling vision of a strong, prosperous, and unified China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

Prodvizhenie i postroenie «diplomatii krupnoj derzhavy s kitajskoj specifikoj» v Aziatsko-Tihookeanskom regione v novuyu epohu (2013–2023 gg.)

This article explores the specifics of China's diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) during the leadership of Xi Jinping. The author concludes that major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era lies in China's promotion of its own vision of regional and global development, which is China's response to the emerging challenges of security and stable development in the APR and the need to strengthen China's role and status in the region as a driver of peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Fuzzy assessment and improvement path of green finance quality in “Belt and Road”: Survey evidence from China

The “One Belt and One Road” is a major strategic deployment proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, and it is important to study the construction of green financial system under the “One Belt and One Road” initiative, especially the quality assessment of green finance to promote high-quality economic development along the route. At the same time, green finance and green “Belt and Road” have become a hot academic topic in the world. In this study, firstly, on the basis of the existing research on green finance, focusing on the evaluation of economic quality of green finance, we innovatively draw on the quality function deployment theory in marketing to logically transform our research ideas and propose a combined comprehensive evaluation method based on the hierarchical analysis (AHP) and entropy method in fuzzy mathematical theory, which makes up for the traditional single fuzzy evaluation method’s influence on the evaluation results. This method makes up for the shortcomings of the traditional single fuzzy evaluation method to evaluate the results of subjective or objective weighting results. In this study, we apply this method to the assessment of the quality of green finance development in “One Belt, One Road”, and it is important that we construct a system of “One Belt, One Road” green finance quality assessment indicators, including one primary indicator, four secondary indicators and 12 tertiary indicators. It is worth noting that our indicator system is different from the traditional quality system of financial quality assessment in that we take green factors into account in the construction of the tertiary indicators, and then use this assessment method to calculate and rank the weights (importance) of the 12 tertiary indicators, taking the actual situation in China as an example. More importantly, our study not only extends the academic research results of economic quality evaluation, but also combines quantitative research with qualitative analysis to propose three targeted countermeasures for the development of green finance in the countries along the Belt and Road. This study can also provide theoretical support for the quality assessment of green finance in countries along the Belt and Road, and promote the high-quality development of green finance in countries along the Belt and Road.

Risk, political security and extra-judicial penality under Xi

In authoritarian regimes, risk tends to be politically positioned to reflect the ruling party's interests, needs and priorities. In this article, I focus on the People's Republic of China (China) as a case study to isolate the issue of risk, and more specifically, analyse why risk is framed as a political tenet, what becomes the evidence of such risk, and how it relates to the country's legal approach to maintaining political stability in the Xi Jinping era. This article critically scrutinizes the latest political dynamics and police practices to argue that China has formulated an extra-judicial penal jurisprudence through what I call ‘forward-leaning’ policing (前倾式警务) against those who are perceived to present a threat of political harm. By using data on 2226 cyber-dissident cases during 2014–2021, my analysis points to this ‘warrior style’ policing being an intensified application of coercive police actions, which is heavily weighted towards incarceration as the main approach to addressing political dissent, especially through administrative detention. In doing so, the judicial process that traditionally determines conviction and sentencing is either circumvented or reduced to symbolic significance.

Inequality Based on Power and Capital is Becoming Unsolvable in China: Integrating Culture and Comprehensive Wealth to Approach a Power–Capital Economy

This study assesses China’s power–capital economy model, linking it to cultural tightness and comprehensive wealth. The analysis indicates that cultural tightness interacts with the power–capital economy, and unequal distribution of diverse tangible and intangible wealth might result from differences in cultural capital. Power–capital-based inequality widened during the reign of Xi Jinping. Of note, the worsened inequality would be unsolvable because of the political power or government-led power–capital-based inequality. Viewed from the comprehensive wealth framework (CWF) perspective, enhancing a power–capital economy would not contribute to sustainability because the system might contribute to unequal distribution of comprehensive wealth between advantaged and disadvantaged groups regarding power capital.

A Study on Fuzzy Words in Chinese Diplomatic Discourse

This paper discusses the use of time-fuzzy words and frequency-fuzzy words in President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic speeches, and analyzes the fuzziness of the words “long-term” and “continuous”, which are frequently used in the time-fuzzy words and frequency-fuzzy words. Meanwhile, it discusses the pragmatic function of these two words based on specific corpus of diplomatic speeches. According to the study, it is found that the use of fuzzy words in diplomatic speech is typical and representative, which is of vital importance to the writing of political-style writing and political communication. In political language writing, the pragmatic function of fuzzy words cannot be replaced by precise words. However, the use of fuzzy words requires certain rules and regulations, such as grasping the ambiguity degree of fuzzy words and combining fuzzy words with precise words. Otherwise, the political discourse will look like stereotyped and rigid, resulting in a negative impact of fake and inane political discourse language.

How the "Rise of Great Power" Restrains Bilateral Trade Flows: Evidence from China and its Trading Partners

Abstract: This article employs the gravity model of trade to examine how political relations have impacted international trade in the Chinese context, specifically by incorporating discussion of China's political relations with its major trading partners. Using data from China's trading partners obtained between 1990 and 2019, the article uses the generalised method of moments (GMM) and lagged vector autoregression (VAR) model to investigate whether the associated geopolitical risks appear to be temporary or enduring. Empirical results have shown that political conflicts present lagged effects (three months later) on China's exports to other countries and total trade volume with other countries, but have instantaneous effects on China's imports from other countries. Additionally, Chinese President Xi Jinping has much greater political influence on trade compared to his two predecessors (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao). Such an increased level of power is due to a diplomatic policy shift in which the nation has moved away from "keeping a low profile" (taoguang yanghui) to focus on the "rise of great power" (daguo jueqi). The escalation of political tension between China and its major trading partners will continue to have negative impacts on trade until hegemony is fully realised.

George W. Bush’s post-9/11 East Asia policy: enabling China’s contemporary assertiveness

It is commonly argued that China’s foreign policy and behaviour have become increasingly assertive since Xi Jinping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This strategic transformation is seen as paving the way for a direct confrontation between China and the USA since the Trump presidency. Drawing on the logic of international order-building, however, this article argues that the groundwork for this strategic change was laid when Hu Jintao was leading the CCP and that what made it possible was George W. Bush’s China and East Asia policy after 9/11. Bush’s subsequent reduced interest in East Asia enabled China to fill the void left by an absence of US presence and influence in the region. This article asserts that American policy-makers may need to ponder what their order-building project to weaken and exclude an illiberal China should include.

Xi Jinping’s dialectic and chinese modernisation: theory, features and practice

Xi Jinping’s dialectic and chinese modernisation: theory, features and practice

КНР и борьба за дискурсивную гегемонию:роль стратегических нарративов

Power in international relations implies not only the possession of outstanding material resources, but also the ability to proposeand popularize attractive ideas, values, and norms and thus control discourse. Scholars note that during the presidencyof Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has joined the struggle for discursive hegemony. This change in China’sforeign policy requires systematic study, for which the concept of a strategic narrative has analytical value. As defined byA. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin and L. Roselle, strategic narratives “are a means for political actors to construct a sharedmeaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.”This article provides an overview of strategic narratives as a conceptual lens to study international relations, summarizesthe existing research of strategic narratives in general and regarding the Chinese case in particular, and suggestsdirections for future studies. The core idea of Chinese strategic narratives is that the PRC is a new type of great power that iscapable of changing the existing unjust and conflict-prone world order. At the same time, China does not propose to radicallyrevise the international system – it portrays the world as divided into great powers and the rest. Overall, China’s strategicnarratives are characterized by a duality that reflects the complexity of China’s foreign policy interests and its attempt toexpand the field of opportunity. Aimed to support different agendas, narratives include references both to the “century ofhumiliation” and the more recent successful experience of China’s modernization. The content of the narratives suggeststhat China is mainly trying to attract the developing countries of the Global South and thus form its own group of followers.However, there is significant variation in communication processes, namely the formation, projection, and reception ofChina’s strategic narratives. The study of this variation, as well as the analysis of the effectiveness of Chinese narratives, isa promising direction for future research.

Getting China Right

Under Xi Jinping, China puts regime security and a revived ideology, ‘Xi Thought’, at the core of its foreign policy. This distorts how ‘national interest’ is calculated and impedes China from behaving in the way neoclassical realism suggests a rising superpower would behave. Xi adheres to a China-first approach. The United States and its partners could respond more effectively to China’s conduct in three main ways. Firstly, they could stop framing their competition with China as one of democracy versus authoritarianism, as this has limited appeal for the Global South. Secondly, insofar as Xi’s approach is often not conducive to his stated goals for his ‘China dream’, the US could allow him to undermine them himself. Finally, the US could adopt a foreign policy of putting the interests of the global community first, as it effectively did during the Cold War, such that America’s allies would be more willing to support the United States over China in a crisis, and other countries less prone to taking sides against the US.

Europe’s China Problem: How Not to Feed Beijing’s Military–Civil Fusion

This essay explores the question of restricting China’s access to European dual-use technology. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is transforming China into a techno-security state. The country’s innovation-driven development strategy and strengthened push for military–civil fusion, fuelled by powerful industrial policies, have made technology exchanges with China a challenging policy issue in Europe. The issue is not only a bilateral one with China – it constitutes a challenge for the management of the transatlantic alliance as well, given that US intervention has at times been a decisive factor shaping European policies vis-à-vis China, mostly through targeted action regarding specific issues of technology transfers. The European Union has developed a toolbox of defensive instruments in the past five years to address asymmetries and imbalances in EU–China trade and investment relations, providing European decision-makers with the instruments to manage technology transfers to China. This toolbox still needs to be perfected, however. The EU is only now starting to develop a political narrative linking China’s military build-up, its powerful industrial and innovation policies, and Xi’s vision for Chinese leadership in world affairs. In the absence of a shared European vision, technology transfers will remain a sporadic irritant in transatlantic relations.

The Dilemma and Path of China's Sports Management System in the New Era

Strong in sports is strong in China, and the country's prosperity is the prosperity of sports. Sports carry the dream of national strength and national revitalization, which is not only the rightful meaning of national strength, but also an important part of people's healthy and happy life. Since the 18th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China, General Secretary Xi Jinping has made a series of important speeches on sports reform and development, a series of important instructions and comments. China's sports management framework has been basically built, the sports management mechanism has been improved, and the legalization has been developed. Although China has achieved a lot of success in sports governance, there are still problems that need to be addressed, such as the conflict between administration and sports management, the imperfection of the relevant sports legislation system, and the lack of methods of using modern technology. This paper will sort out the development of sports governance in China, focus on the analysis of its problems. Finally, explore some reasonable paths to promote the development of sports in China in response to the existing problems.