Reviewed by: Experimenting at the Boundaries of Life: Organic Vitality in Germany around 1800 by Joan Steigerwald Jocelyn Holland Joan Steigerwald, Experimenting at the Boundaries of Life: Organic Vitality in Germany around 1800 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2019). Pp. 472. $55.00 cloth. Given that the focus of this book is an area of intellectual debate fraught with uncertainty, confusion, and—as is often stated—"blurred boundaries," Experimenting at the Boundaries of Life is remarkable for its clear elucidation of such an unfocused epistemological terrain. Steigerwald shows in great detail how life, both as a positive concept and in its distinction from non-life, eludes definition for the numerous scientists and philosophers who devoted their attention to it during the decades surrounding 1800. In readings grounded in the numerous letters, journal articles, experimental records, essays and philosophical treatises that responded in various ways to the problem of life as "organic vitality," Steigerwald affirms four key points, which form the cornerstones of her project. The first is that scientific experiments were essential to the debates about how to define organic life. Steigerwald writes that it was "through engagements with organic bodies and vital processes with shifting instruments and methods, that the domain of organic vitality was first suggested and subsequently shaped," adding that this was particularly the case in the German context (6). The next point concerns the importance of tools, not only for shaping "subject apprehension" but also because "the object of inquiry was folded into the apparatus of experiments" (9). The third point, one that is of particular importance for its impact on the conceptual register of this study, is that a perception of "epistemic limits" or "boundaries of knowledge" (11). This perception, Steigerwald underscores, was influential for experimental practices and philosophical analyses, and also for German Romanticism's critiques on the distinction between appearance and representation. A fourth point emphasizes the importance of figurative language and acts of the imagination. Collectively, these four points also help substantiate a broader, historical argument that questions Michel Foucault's famous assertion that the new nineteenth century science of biology represented a radical transition away the eighteenth century, and that "life itself did not exist" prior to then (15). Steigerwald's chapter on biology, by contrast, wishes to demonstrate "that texts introducing biology as a science do not mark a new epistemic formation reflecting a rupture with the eighteenth century but, rather, enact an ongoing process of transition" (38). Steigerwald wryly comments in her acknowledgements that both historians of science and those more interested in philosophy and theory will find something to like—and to dislike—in her study, given that the readings run the gamut from more those more grounded in empirical detail, such as the discussion of late-eighteenth [End Page 753] century experimental cultures, and those which trace philosophical arguments, such as Kant's and Schelling's. Her justification for casting such a wide net—that the range of arguments is itself a reflection of a particular historical situation—is persuasive, because to leave out one side or the other is to risk leaving half of the story untold. That said, the momentum of the project as a whole does seem to be one which moves from the empirical to the philosophical, as can be witnessed by what happens with the notion of "boundary concepts." The extreme variability as to which particular boundaries are relevant for an inquiry into organic vitality around 1800 is stunning. In just the first two chapters, the boundaries in question range from the distinction between organic and inorganic life, the distinctions between different physical "forces" such as sensibility and irritability, and the polyp as a singular creature occupying a "border zone" between the animal and the vegetable (in Chapter 1) to the boundaries of human cognition, of knowledge, and the "conditions and boundaries of what constituted natural science" (in Chapter 2). Steigerwald observes that, for all these differences, there is a palpable interconnection: Kant's interest in cutting-edge theories such as Blumenbach's experimentally-grounded notion of a "life force" feeds into his philosophical writings on human reasoning and understanding. Another point of connection between the empirically-grounded and more philosophically oriented...
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