Abstract
Hsueh M. Qu's research book begins with two central problems in Hume scholarship: (1) What is the relation between scepticism and naturalism? (2) What is the relation between the first book of the Treatise (THN) and the first Enquiry (EHU)? His premise is that by answering the second question, the first question will be answered as well. Before Norman Kemp Smith published his famous pair of articles on Hume's naturalism in 1905, the arch-sceptical Reid-Beattie interpretation was the mainstream view. Qu notes that as late as in 1875, T. H. Green's and T. H. Grose's editions of Hume's philosophical writings portrayed him as an extreme sceptic. (It would have been interesting to hear more about this edition, as the reader is provided only a sketch of Hume scholarship before the twentieth century.) A 100 years after Kemp Smith's contribution, contemporary Hume scholars like Don Garrett deal with the same issue: What is the precise relation between scepticism and naturalism? Can the two somehow coexist? Hume establishes a foundational science of human nature, as Miren Boehm has convincingly argued, yet his scepticism seems to undermine such an endeavour.
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