Wittgenstein's Conception Research Articles

The struggle against dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the concept of philosophy

* Acknowledgments * List of Abbreviations * Introduction 1. Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems: From One Fundamental Problem to Particular Problems * The Tractatus on philosophical problems * Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems * Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings * Tendencies and inclinations of thinking: philosophy as therapy * Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy: the contrast with the Tractatus 2. Two Conceptions of Clarification * The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis * Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's notion of logical analysis * Clarification in Wittgenstein's later philosophy 3. From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn * Philosophical theses, metaphysical philosophy, and the Tractatus * Metaphysics and conceptual investigation: the problem with metaphysics * Conceptual investigation and the problem of dogmatism * Wittgenstein's turn * The turn and the role of rules * Rules as objects of comparison * Rules, metaphysical projection, and the logic of language 4. Grammar, Meaning, and Language * Grammar, use, and meaning: the problem of the status of Wittgenstein's remarks * Wittgenstein's formulation of his conception of meaning * The concept of language: comparisons with instruments and games * Wittgenstein's development and the advantages of his mature view * Examples as centers of variation and the conception of language as a family * Avoiding dogmatism about meaning * Wittgenstein's methodological shift and analyses in terms of necessary conditions 5. The Concepts of Essence and Necessity * Constructivist readings and the arbitrariness/nonarbitrariness of grammar * Problems with constructivism * The methodological dimension of Wittgenstein's conception of essence * The nontemporality of grammatical statements * Explanations of necessity in terms of factual regularities * Wittgenstein's account of essence and necessity * Beyond theses about the source of necessity 6. Philosophical Hierarchies and the Status of Clarificatory Statements * Philosophical hierarchies and Wittgenstein's leading principle * The (alleged) necessity of accepting philosophical statements * The concept of agreement and the problem of injustice * The criteria of the correctness of grammatical remarks * Multidimensional descriptions and the new use of old dogmatic claims 7. Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Everyday Language, and Ethics * Metaphysics disguised as methodology * The historicity of philosophy * Philosophy and the everyday * Notes * Index

Language games of reciprocity

This paper attempts to explicate the meaning of reciprocate in economics. I first show using innate universal concepts that the definition of reciprocate appears to be circular. This circularity problem vanishes, however, when the context of the interaction is introduced as the inextricable link between the act of reciprocating and the intention to reciprocate. Applying Wittgenstein's concept of a language game, I also discuss the claim that social preferences have no agency. Rather, it is an individual's observable action that constitutes agency in reciprocity. My thesis is that social preferences emanate from the actions of social individuals and not vice versa.

ICTs, domestication and language-games: a Wittgensteinian approach to media uses

This article acknowledges the vital role that the Domestication Research-perspective has in media research, but criticizes it for being analytically ambiguous in its use of the central term `domestication'. By way of a contrastive set of data from an ongoing research project, we argue for a dislocation of `domestication' from the domestic and the private. Instead, we wish to retain the meaning and use of the term to acts of domesticating, i.e. processes of `taming the wild'. By connecting our arguments to Wittgenstein's concept of the `language-game', we emphasize the practical aspect of language and meaning, and how ICTs become meaningful only as parts of practical-communicative contexts. We argue that this steering towards `domestication' as contextualization highlights the universal and fundamental process of enculturation. Such a turn frees the perspective from historical and cultural specificities and thereby accentuates its analytical potential in a post-national, globalized world.

Da ruína e da conservação do mundo: o mundo como espaço discursivo e como discurso espacial

Este trabalho discute o conceito heideggeriano de mundo a partir das noções de espaço e discurso, tais como elas aparecem em Ser e tempo. Pretendemos assim pensar o mundo como espaço discursivo e como discurso espacial. Isto permitirá entender por que, como Heidegger diz em A origem da obra de arte, "a ruína de um mundo é irreversível". Pensar o mundo como discurso pode também esclarecer a definição grega do homem como animal político e discursivo, assim como o conceito wittgensteiniano de jogos de linguagem.

On Wittgenstein's Concept of 'Following a Rule' and Its Implication for the Philosophy of Mathematics

On Wittgenstein's Concept of 'Following a Rule' and Its Implication for the Philosophy of Mathematics

WORLDS OR WORDS APART? WITTGENSTEIN ON UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

AbstractIn this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible – either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a ‘doctrineless’ form of life. I offer a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the ‘content’ from religious belief and renders the religious form of life ‘incommensurable’ with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.

Assembling Reminders: Studies in the Genesis of Wittgenstein's Concept of Philosophy (review)

Assembling Reminders: Studies in the Genesis of Wittgenstein's Concept of Philosophy (review)

Language and Logical Pluralism: Some Aspects of a Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Nature of Logic

This essay examines the importance of some aspects of Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus work in the realm of discussions on the nature of logic. The first part considers a relationship between certain conceptions of language and certain positions on the nature of logical laws and logical pluralism. Supposing the rejection of mentalism in the field of meaning leads to a rejection of psychologism, it presents some alternatives different from psychologism, based on non mentalistic theories of meaning. One is the Platonistic Fregean approach to language and logic, the other is Carnap's formalist view on both topics. The second part concentrates on Wittgenstein's non mentalistic and non Platonistic proposals about language and his defense of the logical pluralism proposed by psychologists. It compares two periods on Wittgenstein's work after Tractatus -the periods of ‘calculus conception’ and ‘languange games conception’- and it shows how characteristic notions of Wittgenstein's later conception of language, like ‘use’, ‘language games’, and ‘forms of life’, work on the characterization of logic and specially on the kind of logical pluralism that the author seems to defend in his last period. In doing so, this essay offers an approach to some of the author's considerations about contradictions and the possibility of the existence of a calculus that includes them. This approach emphasizes on the idea of applicability (or use of a linguistic expression) introduced by the author in some of his last works, and in some examples of functional contradictions that can help to understand and complement that idea.

Bridge, Wall, Mirror; Coexistence and Confrontations in the Mediterranean World

This article examines three contradictory images of the Mediterranean: the “polyphonic” one of exchange, convivenza, diffusions, and cohabitation; the “cacophonic” one of conflict, incompatibility, hostility, aggression, and ethnic cleansing; and the “anthropological” one of underlying cultural complicities. Each image has had its own literary exponents, and selectively draws upon its own source examples. The author then explores some of the problems associated with each model. For example, for the first model, the notions of hybridity or metissage are criticized because they are incompatible with the logic of the religions of the book, and because the social fluidity contained in these concepts is not borne out by practices and the sentiments of group membership and identity. Whilst the author agrees that the criticisms of the Mediterranean as a uniform cultural area with static attributes and limits (the “Anthropological Mediterranean”) are justified, he nevertheless suggests what gives coherence to the Mediterranean world is not so much the evident similarities but the differences that form a system. These complementary differences, inscribed in a reciprocal field, allow us to speak of a Mediterranean system. Attempting to synthesize Freud's notion of “the narcissism of minor differences” with Wittgenstein's concept of “family resemblances”, the article suggests the image of the insupportable twin, the one who is too much like us. Everyone is defined in the Mediterranean in a game of mirrors (customs, behaviours, affiliations) with his neighbour. All neighbours are close relatives who share Abrahamic origins and their behaviour only makes sense in this relational game. The article concludes by suggesting that to approach the Mediterranean it is essential to examine both its constitutive “family resemblances” and contradictions, and to analyze the interplay of reciprocal differences that now rigidify and then relax. The article thus attempts to explain how such opposed models of “polyphony/harmony” and “cacophony/hostility” could have been constructed based upon some degree of valid (but partial) evidence, and to move beyond and synthesize them into a dynamic anthropological analytical programme.

Language games and (hi)stories: Wittgenstein, Bateson and Schapp on the role of language in therapy

PurposeIn Bateson's theory of mind, the adaptation of Russell's theory of logical types is of key importance. Korzybski represented the type‐logical difference between language and reality as the metaphorical distinction between map and territory. The confounding of logical types generates cognitive, and logical problems, which Bateson reflected in his theory of schizophrenia. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, this type‐logical distinction is of equal significance.Design/methodology/approachThe present paper, through the elucidation of the concept of language‐game and its relationship with grammar, demonstrates the proximity of Wittgenstein's and Bateson's understanding of language, which allows for a productive improvement of possible therapies of insanity.FindingsFor Bateson, schizophrenia is the attempt to escape from a pathogenic learning context, within which the map of thought has become malformed. Insanity can thus be understood as transformed grammar and can additionally be illuminated by both Wittgenstein's and Kant's conception of insanity. Wittgenstein's idea that in madness the lock is not destroyed, only altered is further reflected in connection with Bateson's theory of schizophrenia. On the basis of this conception of language, we develop an understanding of language that allows us to interpret “insanity” as deviating cognition originating in a family's system of communication.Originality/valueOn account of the “reality‐constitutive” character of language, it can be shown that “insane” thinking is based on a change of grammar. Therefore, the aim of therapy must be the change of pathological language‐games and the creation of bridges between inconsistent self‐interpretations of the patient by means of inventing new language‐games (stories).

Wittgenstein and Psychology: A Practical Guide (review)

Reviewed by: Wittgenstein and Psychology: A Practical Guide Dale Jacquette Rom Harré and Michael Tissaw . Wittgenstein and Psychology: A Practical Guide. Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. Pp. xi + 310. Paper, $34.95. Wittgenstein in his later writings comments perceptively on what he describes as the philosophical grammar of psychological terminologies in ordinary language and metaphysical theorizing about psychological phenomena. If we agree with his methodology and certain of his conclusions, then we may find it fruitful to consider how a later Wittgensteinian cognitive psychology might be developed. That seems to be the motivation behind this new study of Wittgenstein and Psychology by Rom Harré and Michael Tissaw. The book is subtitled by the authors as 'A Practical Guide,' and is divided into three main parts: Origins, Insights, Applications. Part 1 discusses contemporary psychology and its theoretical needs and offers essential historical background to Wittgenstein's later writings, including a refreshingly in-depth consideration of Wittgenstein's intellectual background in Vienna and a necessarily superficial sketch of major themes in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Part 2 offers an account of Wittgenstein's later concepts and methodology, including language games, family resemblance, the praxeological point and purpose of language games as essential to understanding meaning in rule-following for language game playing, and therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's later view of the proper role and limitations of philosophy. Part 3 examines implications of [End Page 169] Wittgenstein's ideas in their own right and in relation to modern scientific psychology in such areas as cognition, thinking and understanding, subjectivity and expression in light of Wittgenstein's private language argument, thinking about the past and future, intending, willing and acting, emotions and perception. Historians of philosophy turning to this work are likely to be surprised by some of Harré and Tissaw's interpretations. I cannot offer more than a handful of examples here, but I was struck on page 146 by the characterization of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as "positivistic." This is an attribution that runs counter to much of the commentary on Wittgenstein's early treatise, to Wittgenstein's own disavowals, to anecdotal evidence concerning his attitude toward positivism, and to many of his explicit pronouncements that the authors elsewhere rightly insist upon in understanding his disaffection for this originally Austrian scientific movement in the history of philosophy. More importantly, I found the discussion of Wittgenstein's private language argument lacking in context. The authors do not seem to regard the argument as essential to Wittgenstein's ongoing attempt in the Investigations to criticize "internal definition" by means of private naming as an alternative to the Augustinian behavioral model of ostensive language teaching that Wittgenstein attacks from the beginning of the book. This, I have always thought, is made most clear in §36, having rejected the bodily approach to meaning in Augustine's Confessions as underdetermining intended reference, and turning immediately thereafter to the potential for spirit (Geist) as a way of understanding how a name refers. When the private ostensive definition of sensations has been disposed of by the private language argument, Wittgenstein is free to develop as a third possibility a generically pragmatic theory of meaning in terms of rule-following in language games defined with respect to an implicit point and purpose, exemplified (among other places) in §567. More worrying is the impression I received that there is something missing in the authors' sense of just how the later Wittgenstein could assist practicing experimental and theoretical psychologists in their research. There are numerous examples scattered throughout the book of reputed conceptual confusions in contemporary psychology, though there is no documentation of the psychologists themselves recognizing that they are at any sort of disadvantage in this regard. Clarifying concepts used in psychology is undoubtedly a worthwhile task. Why, however, should researchers in psychology look to Wittgenstein's Investigations in particular for guidance here, especially when some historians have argued that, near the end of his life, Wittgenstein was preparing to undertake yet another philosophical revolution that would have brought him closer to some form of Platonic realism? Why not seek greater clarity for scientific psychological concepts and reasoning in the work of other philosophers interested in the problem of meaning relevant to...

Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning?

AbstractThe paper elucidates Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as devoid of theories or theses, comprehending this as an articulation of a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, it clarifies Wittgenstein's conception by using what he says about the concepts of meaning and language as an example and by developing an interpretation that purports to make plain that what Wittgenstein says about these issues does not constitute a philosophical thesis. Adopting Wittgenstein's approach, we can, arguably, have a richer view of meaning and language than a commitment to philosophical theses allows for. I conclude with remarks on the method of analysis in terms of necessary conditions.

Wittgenstein and philosophical counseling

Abstract Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients’ symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that pictures hold us captive underscores the need to help clients recognize unfounded assumptions underlying their apparent dilemmas. Finally, Wittgenstein's Socratic conception of philosophy as a means to lead an authentic life shows the value of philosophizing beyond the confines of the academy.

Grammatical Propositions

First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for both fulfil three important features of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life.

Tom Morawetz's "Robust Enterprise": Jurisprudence after Wittgenstein

I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, “criteria” and “grammar.” In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards explicating and understanding Holmes’ classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts.

The cybersemiotic model of communication: An evolutionary model of the threshold between semiosis and informational exchange

The present paper discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a transdisciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally, the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analyzed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between a cyberneticinformational and a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics, and information science is suggested in a five-levelled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy, and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information, 4) a level of sign games and 5) a level of conscious language games. These levels are then used to differentiate levels of information systems, sign and language games in human communication. In our model, Maturana and Varela's description of the logic of the living as autopoietic is accepted and expanded with Luhmann's generalization of the concept of autopoiesis to also cover psychological and socio-communicative systems. Adding a Peircian concept of semiosis to Luhmann's theory in the framework of biosemiotics enables us to view the interplay of mind and body as a sign play. I have in a previous publication (see list of references) suggested the term 'sign play' pertaining to exosemiotics processes between animals in the same species by stretching Wittgenstein's language game concept into the animal world of signs. A new concept of intrasemiotics designates the semiosis of the interpenetration between the biological and psychological autopoietic systems as Luhmann defines them in his theory. I am suggesting a cybersemiotic model to combine these approaches, defining various concepts like thought-semiotics, phenosemiotic and intrasemiotics, combining them with the already known concepts of exosemiotics, ecosemiotics, and endosemiotics into a new view of self-organizing semiotic processes in living systems. Thus a new semiotic level of description is generated, where mind-body interactions can be understood on the same description level. This is the direction suggested to work in to create a broad philosophy of information, cognitive, and communication science that makes it possible for us to see the different approaches not as mutually exclusive, but rather as mutually complementary in accepting an ontology where reality do have structures and processes, but the foundation is hyper. complex and therefore not to be reduced by any knowledge system.

Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World's Unity in its Variety (review)

Fritz Breithaupt, Richard Raatzsch, Bettina Kremberg, eds., Goethe Wittgenstein: seeing the World's Unity in its Variety. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2003.172 pp. Goethe's influence on the philosopher Ludwig is subtle indirect. In his status as canonical classic Goethe was certainly part of Wittgenstein's education, but paradoxically his most profound influence was mediated through other thinkers. It is possible to trace, for instance, the roles of Emerson William James with regard to nature, on one hand, of Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, Oswald Spengler with regard to morphology, on the other. Thus, the point of looking at parallels between Goethe Wittgenstein, writes Joachim Schulte, a leading authority one of the contributors to this volume, cannot really be the discovery of this or that identifiable influence Goethe may have had on Wittgenstein (56). Rather, the elucidation of parallels is important for grasping the character of each,expressions of certain types of attitude or temperament (56). In this the contributors to this volume are very successful. While this volume is sponsored by WittgensteinStudien, contributors also underline the modernity in much of Goethe's thought. The nine essays collected here grew out of a workshop hosted in Leipzig in Spring 2000, occasioned by the 250th anniversary of Goethe's birth the 50th anniversary of Wittgenstein's death.They build on the foundational work done by Schulte, especially in his Chor und Gesetz (Frankfurt, 1990), by M. W. Rowe, now collected in his Philosophy Literature (Aldershot, 2004). James C. Klagge focuses directly on the problem of influence, noting that never cites Goethe as an explicit influence. Nevertheless, he finds links, especially through their shared interest in the problem of causality as it relates to explanation. AIfred Nordmann also looks at causality explanation, exploring parallels with both Goethe Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. Nordmann focuses on Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy does not intervene in nature, but leaves things as they are. In a similar way Goethe's morphological approach claims no privileged access to truth, but is simply one intermediary case in a series of approaches. A number of the essays focus on Goethe's morphological method, especially as developed in the Metamorphosis of the Plants, finding affinities with several of Wittgenstein's philosophical strategies. Matthias Kross is interested in Wittgenstein's move from engineering to philosophy, pointing to the importance of Goethe's search for the Urphanomen. Fritz Breithaupt notes that both Goethe reject the notion of some deeper level or truth that underlies appearance, some Platonic idea or extra-linguistic reference. He sees an analogy between Goethe's Urphanomen Wittgenstein's concept of the languagegame: for both appearance is about and without end (89). Nikos Psarros finds an exception to this. Where various scholars have found echoes of Goethe in Wittgenstein's citation of Michael Faraday's The Chemical History of a Candle-water is one individual thing-it never changes, Psarros argues that uses the line to gloss the notion that linguistic facts are constructed by giving other rules of their use. Focusing especially on Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazier's Golden Bough? …

Enacting Competitive Wars: Competitive Activity, Language Games, and Market Consequences

Research in industrial/organization economics and strategic management defines “competitive wars” as periods of intensified competitive activity, which tend to have negative performance consequences for the warring firms. Drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of “language games,” we develop a model of competitive wars as a sociolinguistic process enacted through strategic actions, linguistic practices, and shifts in resource allocations. The model suggests that the war language game increases stakeholder involvement and enables the warring firms, oftentimes, to improve performance.

LA RELEVANCIA DE WITTGENSTEIN PARA EL PENSAMIENTO POLÍTICO

Sin pretender un recorrido exhaustivo por la propuesta wittgensteiniana, me propongo mostrar que, por su marcado carácter terapéutico, tiene también un profundo valor práctico. Sostengo en este ensayo que la concepción wittgensteiniana del filosofar nos puede proveer una nueva senda para pensar acerca de lo público. Es más, su invitación a “mirar con cuidado” contiene un fuerte impulso liberador.

What are the Bounds of Critical Rationality in Education?

Since Dilthey we have become used to thinking of reason as having a cultural and historical setting. If we take this insight seriously, then critical rationality or critical thinking can no longer be conceived of as context-free skills. This paper takes up the line of thought that is elaborated by Christopher Winch in his ‘Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim’ and seeks to explicate it by drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of ‘language games’ and on the re-evaluation of ‘thinking’ by Theodor Ballauff (a German philosopher of education who was influenced by Martin Heidegger). The overcoming of a solipsistic and idealistic conception of thinking raises questions regarding the pedagogical settings and aims, as well as the problems over the limits of critique in education. A comparison of Ballauff's and Winch's positions reinforces the sense of the significance of critique: although the role of critical rationality within education is ambiguous and precarious, the investigation of autonomy (as an educational goal) shows that critique cannot be limited in any straightforward way.