Language games and (hi)stories: Wittgenstein, Bateson and Schapp on the role of language in therapy

Abstract

PurposeIn Bateson's theory of mind, the adaptation of Russell's theory of logical types is of key importance. Korzybski represented the type‐logical difference between language and reality as the metaphorical distinction between map and territory. The confounding of logical types generates cognitive, and logical problems, which Bateson reflected in his theory of schizophrenia. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, this type‐logical distinction is of equal significance.Design/methodology/approachThe present paper, through the elucidation of the concept of language‐game and its relationship with grammar, demonstrates the proximity of Wittgenstein's and Bateson's understanding of language, which allows for a productive improvement of possible therapies of insanity.FindingsFor Bateson, schizophrenia is the attempt to escape from a pathogenic learning context, within which the map of thought has become malformed. Insanity can thus be understood as transformed grammar and can additionally be illuminated by both Wittgenstein's and Kant's conception of insanity. Wittgenstein's idea that in madness the lock is not destroyed, only altered is further reflected in connection with Bateson's theory of schizophrenia. On the basis of this conception of language, we develop an understanding of language that allows us to interpret “insanity” as deviating cognition originating in a family's system of communication.Originality/valueOn account of the “reality‐constitutive” character of language, it can be shown that “insane” thinking is based on a change of grammar. Therefore, the aim of therapy must be the change of pathological language‐games and the creation of bridges between inconsistent self‐interpretations of the patient by means of inventing new language‐games (stories).