Wittgenstein's Views Research Articles

WITTGENSTEIN ON ACCORD*

Abstract: The paper deals with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the power of occurrent mental states to sort objects or states of affairs as in accord or in conflict with them, as presented in the rule‐following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I shall argue first that the readings advanced by Saul Kripke and John McDowell fail to provide a satisfactory construal of Wittgenstein's treatment of a platonist account of this phenomenon, according to which the sorting power of occurrent mental states is to be explained by reference to the mind's ability to grasp universals. I contend that the argument that Kripke extracts from Wittgenstein's discussion doesn’t succeed in undermining the platonist position. Then I argue that McDowell's reading exhibits a more serious shortcoming: the position that he ascribes to Wittgenstein is indistinguishable from the platonist account. Then I put forward a proposal as to how to articulate the relationship between Wittgenstein's views and the platonist position.

Sense and Simplicity: Wittgenstein's Argument for Simple Objects

AbstractThis paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analysable.1

Response to Phillips

In this response to D. Z. Phillips's critique of my interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of magic and ritual, I counter Phillips's claim that I have misrepresented the Wittgensteinian view of ritual, consider the instrumentalist dimension of the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, offer some objections to Phillips's expressivist view that a ritual ‘says itself’, and detect obscurantism in his approach to the study of religion.

Wittgenstein and Nonsense: Psychologism, Kantianism, and the Habitus

This paper is a critical examination of Wittgenstein's view of the limits of intelligibility. In it I criticize standard analytic readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of transcendental or behaviourist theses in epistemology; and I propose an alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein's view as a social contextualism that transcends the false dichotomy between Kantianism and psychologism. I argue that this social contextualism is strikingly similar to the social account of epistemic practices developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein's and Bourdieu's view and an analysis of the notion of habitus , I try to show how social contextualism can account for the distinction between sense and nonsense without falling into transcendental constructivism or social behaviourism.

World and Life as One: Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought

This book explores in detail the relation between ontology and ethics in the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, notably the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and, to a lesser extent, the Notebooks 1914-1916. Self-contained and requiring no prior knowledge of Wittgenstein's thought, it is the first book-length argument that his views on ethics decisively shaped his ontological and semantic thought. The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of the Tractatus is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic doctrines: the tractarian world is the world as it appears in language and thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the Tractatus can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we interact with reality. Although detailed studies of Wittgenstein's ontology and ethics exist, this book is the first thorough investigation of the relationship between them. As an introduction to Wittgenstein, it sheds new light on an important aspect of his early thought.

Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians

James Conant, a proponent of the ‘New American Wittgenstein’, has argued that the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein is wholly mistaken in respect of Wittgenstein's critique of metaphysics and the attendant conception of nonsense. The standard interpretation, Conant holds, misascribes to Wittgenstein Carnapian views on the illegitimacy of metaphysical utterances, on logical syntax and grammar, and on the nature of nonsense. Against this account, I demonstrate that (i) Carnap is misrepresented; (ii) the so–called standard interpretation (in so far as I have contributed to it) is misrepresented; (iii) Wittgenstein's views, early and late, are misrepresented. I clarify Wittgenstein's conception of logical syntax and of the nonsense that results from transgressing it.

Three concepts of suffering.

This paper has three main aims. The first is to provide a critical assessment of two rival concepts of suffering, that proposed by Cassell and that proposed in this journal by van Hooft. The second aim of the paper is to sketch a more plausible concept of suffering, one which derives from a Wittgensteinian view of linguistic meaning. This more plausible concept is labeled an 'intuitive concept'. The third aim is to assess the prospects for scientific understanding of suffering.

'Self' and the Problem of Consciousness

'Self' and the Problem of Consciousness

How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus?

Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. The Tractatus, despite making significant advances on the logical doctrines of Frege and Russell, is essentially a derivative work—Wittgenstein, as he elsewhere acknowledges, provided a fertile soil in which the original seeds of other peoples' thought grew in a unique way. In a play of mine, published in Philosophy (1999), Wittgenstein fails a tough viva on the Tractatus because he fails to properly support some of the weak arguments in the work and because of his inadequate acknowledgment of sources. The present paper further explores some of the antecedents of Wittgenstein's early views and answers some criticisms of the play.

Seeing Pains

P.M.S. Hacker, recounting some of Wittgenstein's views, says (Hacker 1996, pl34): [T]he pervasive conception of behaviour that has informed philosophical psychology for the last three centuries has misrepresented human behaviour as 'bare bodily movement', from which it is supposed we infer, by analogy or inference to best explanation, the inner state and so on from which the behaviour might be thought to arise ... But we see the pain in a person's face hear the glee in his chortles, perceive the affection in the looks and gestures of lovers. In this paper I explain how this can be, before meeting several objections.

Logic after Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, I attempt to show that a valuable account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility raises the question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Taking Wittgenstein's rejection of Tractarian conceptions seriously, logic is relativised to language-games in general and, perhaps, localised to particular language-games. Looking at logic in this way opens up the possibility of uncovering inferential structures distinct from those which form the traditional logical-epistemological dichotomy. Here I outline a formal logical framework consistent with all of the foregoing points in terms of which analogues of inferential structures (traditional and non-traditional) can be constructed. Taking third-person ascriptions of psychological predicates as a testcase, I try to show that the formal framework (a system of formal dialogue) has a flexibility which augurs well for future logical investigations into linguistic practices without presupposing knowledge of the kinds of inferential structures which such investigations might reveal. Hence, my claim that the system in question represents logic after (the later) Wittgenstein.

On Intellectual Innovation and the Methodology of the History of Ideas

Mark Bevir's Logic of the History of Ideas is discussed, focusing on the problematic of intellectual innovation. Sharing Bevir's anti-foundationalist position and his Wittgensteinian view of language, the article criticizes the overly rationalistic and individualist bias in his proposed logic for the history of ideas. It is further argued that Bevir's critique of contextualism is unconvincing because it is based on a far too crude view of the actual practice of historians of ideas.

Wittgenstein and Davidson on the Sociality of Language

Wittgenstein's response to the problems associated with rule following and Davidson's treatment of the conditions necessary for interpretability and communication are interestingly related to each in providing arguments for an indispensable social dimension of language. But where the Wittgensteinian practice view takes us to agreement of judgment and action among practitioners, the Davidsonian interpretivist conception takes us to a relation of mutual recognition between speaker and hearer. This paper argues that Davidson is forced, by virtue of commitments internal to his methodology of interpretation and the challenge raised by the paradox of interpretation argument, to accommodate key features of the practice view. Charity proves to be Wittgensteinian agreement in judgment and the triangulation argument supports a community view of rule following at bedrock level.

Intuitionism, Meaning Theory and Cognition

Michael Dummett has interpreted and expounded upon intuitionism under the influence of Wittgensteinian views on language, meaning and cognition. I argue against the application of some of these views to intuitionism and point to shortcomings in Dummett's approach. The alternative I propose makes use of recent, post-Wittgensteinian views in the philosophy of mind, meaning and language. These views are associated with the claim that human cognition exhibits intentionality and with related ideas in philosophical psychology. Intuitionism holds that mathematical constructions are mental processes or objects. Constructions are, in the first instance, forms of consciousness or possible experience of a particular type. As such, they must be understood in terms of the concept of intentionality. This view has a historical basis in the literature on intuitionism. In a famous 1931 lecture Heyting in fact identifies constructions with fulfilled or fulfillable mathematical intentions. I consider some of the consequences of this identification and contrast them with Dummett's views on intuitionism.

Review article. Common sense: a middle way between formalism and post-structuralism?

John Coates's The Claims of Common Sense argues that common-sense philosophy is central to Cambridge economics and philosophy, and represents a viable middle way between formalism and post-structuralism. This paper concentrates on the opposition between common sense and formalism. The latter is explained in terms of Quine's formal semantics and neoclassical axiomatic choice theory, which share a critique of ordinary language, a commitment to logical determinacy, a functionalist view of mind, and the idea of ontology driven by logic. Coates's common-sense Cambridge alternative is explained in terms of Wittgenstein's and Keynes's views on vagueness.

Wittgensteino estetikos samprata

Straipsnyje analizuojama L. Wittgensteino estetikos samprata ankstyvuoju ir vėlyvuoju jo kūrybos laikotarpiu. Parodoma, kad estetikos sampratai L. Wittgensteino kalbos koncepcija reikšminga tuo, kad tiek ankstyvuoju, tiek vėlyvuoju periodu jai yra pajungiamos visos, taip pat ir estetinės, problemos. Ankstyvajam L. Wittgensteinui etika, estetika, kaip ir mistika, yra tai, ko prasminga kalba išreikšti neįmanoma, todėl apie tai reikia tylėti. Etika ir estetika atsiduria už kalbos, o etinis ir estetinis subjekto santykis išveda už pasaulio ribų. Estetinės problemos vėlyvojoje L. Wittgensteino filosofijoje turi ne mistikos, o kalbinių žaidimų statusą. Estetiką filosofas atriboja nuo mokslo: estetinio išgyvenimo patyrimo neįmanoma nei išmokyti, nei išmokti. Aptariama kalbos žaidimų ir gyvenimo formos samprata bei žodžio prasmės apibrėžtis L. Wittgensteino „Filosofiniuose tyrinėjimuose“. Estetinis išgyvenimas visada lieka estetinio kalbos žaidimo neverbaliniame kontekste. Estetinių išgyvenimų atveju būtent mimika, kinestetiniai pojūčiai yra adekvatesnė tokio išgyvenimo išraiška. Reikšmingi estetikos elementai yra estetinės reakcijos – pasitenkinimas ar nepasitenkinimas, komfortas ar diskomfortas.

Was William Shakespeare an Eighteenth‐Century Geographer? Constructing Histories of Geographical Knowledge

A Wittgensteinian view of language and meaning is employed in a modified approach to the historiography of geography which steers between socio‐economic approaches and the scepticism engendered by post‐structuralist theories of language, so enabling connections between geography and humanism to be explored. The contextual history which flows from this method is exemplified by an analysis of eighteenth‐century editions of Shakespeare and the approaches they adopted to discussing Shakespeare's knowledge of geography and the natural world. The early eighteenth century edited Shakespeare in the light of subsequent knowledge of nature, thus removing him from historical context and rendering him as an eighteenth century geographer. By contrast, later editions, starting with Samuel Johnson's (1765), attempted to recover the geographical knowledge Shakespeare could have possessed in the Tudor period. The two editorial projects are related back to the religious, natural philosophical and historical beliefs of the editors. Individual intellects, the history of textuality and the shifting affiliations of geography in the division of knowledge need to be addressed more closely in future work on the history of geography.

Huang on Wittgenstein on religious epistemology

Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a ‘reflective equilibrium’ with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different ‘forms of life’. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the evidence indicates that Wittgenstein's view of religious beliefs is a form of foundationalism, not coherentism.

Anger and Chess

In this essay I take what I think of as a Wittgensteinian look at emotions. I do not mean by this that I am going to explain Wittgenstein's view of emotions. His primary claims are negative; emotions are neither states nor processes. Nevertheless, keeping in mind his negative claims, along with the reasons and illustrations he gives in support of them, I hope to say something positive and interesting about emotions. My project is also Wittgensteinian in the sense that I take seriously his claim that philosophers should focus on descriptions, rather than on explanations. I am not sure that philosophy can offer no useful explanations, but I am sure that philosophers should do more describing than they usually do before attempting their explanations. In keeping with this perspective, I will begin by looking at a situation in which a person gets angry, and consider what we might say about the sorts of descriptions that are appropriate in that situation.

Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument and Children's Understanding of the Mind

A theoretical statement about children's understanding of the mind is derived from Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein argued that understanding the mind is a process embedded in acquiring the rules governing the use of linguistic expressions about the mind. These rules are publicly agreed upon and, therefore, separable from one's subjective phenomenological experiences. The implications of this argument for theories which hold that children's understanding of the mind is based upon introspective insight (simulation view) and those which hold that understanding the mind is based upon the acquisition of a theory (theory view) are discussed. Developmental evidence illustrating Wittgenstein's private language argument and its differences from the simulation and theory views is presented. Points of compatibility between the theory view and Wittgenstein's private language argument are discussed. The paper closes by framing Wittgenstein's view in the broader context of children's linguistic and conceptual development and discussing the implications of these relations for future research.