Abstract
Wittgenstein's response to the problems associated with rule following and Davidson's treatment of the conditions necessary for interpretability and communication are interestingly related to each in providing arguments for an indispensable social dimension of language. But where the Wittgensteinian practice view takes us to agreement of judgment and action among practitioners, the Davidsonian interpretivist conception takes us to a relation of mutual recognition between speaker and hearer. This paper argues that Davidson is forced, by virtue of commitments internal to his methodology of interpretation and the challenge raised by the paradox of interpretation argument, to accommodate key features of the practice view. Charity proves to be Wittgensteinian agreement in judgment and the triangulation argument supports a community view of rule following at bedrock level.
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