Wittgenstein's Claim Research Articles

THE COMMUNITY VIEW REVISITED

Abstract: Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti‐theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds with the other. I argue here, first of all, that it is not possible to detheorize both (1) and (2) and still hope to say anything illuminating about the nature of language. In fact, Canfield himself does not succeed in detheorizing both (1) and (2) but ends up trivializing (1) and leaving (2) with quite a bit of theoretical content. I further argue, however, that this is getting the matter the wrong way around. Contra Canfield et al., it is only when we recognize this that we can appreciate how radical and innovative Wittgenstein's claims about language really are.

Thought, Language, and Animals

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation between thought, neurophysiology and language, and about the mental capacities of non-linguistic animals. It deals with his initial espousal and later rejection of a 'language of thought', his arguments against the idea that thought requires a medium of images or words, his reasons for resisting the encephalocentric conception of the mind which dominates contemporary philosophy of mind, his mature views about the connection between thought and language, and his remarks about animals. The aim is not just to get a clear picture of Wittgenstein's position, but also to contrast it with contemporary approaches such as those of Fodor and Searle. While rejecting some of Wittgenstein's claims about the role of the brain, I defend his basic idea, namely that the capacity for entertaining a thought is conceptually tied to the capacity for displaying that thought in behaviour, rather than to the possession of language as such or to the occurrence of specific neurophysiological phenomena.

Wittgenstein on The Standard Metre

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Wittgenstein is correct when he says of the Standard Metre stick that we can neither say that it is or is not a metre in length – despite what our intuitions may tell us to the contrary. Specifically, the paper deals with Kripke's criticism of Wittgenstein's claim in Naming And Necessity and with Salmon's attempt to arbitrate between the two views. I conclude that, not only is Wittgenstein correct, but that both Kripke and Salmon (and possibly the majority of philosophers) simply do not understand the concept of measurement.

The Tractatus, Ethics, and Authenticity

The main question that I address in the paper concerns whether examining certain aspects of Wittgenstein's Tractatus in light of early Heidegger's account of authenticity in Being and Time might help us to better understand Wittgenstein's claim that his book has an ethical aim. More specifically. I attempt to show that the change in the relationship to language that Wittgenstein is trying to effect in his reader, can be usefully understood by comparing it with Heidegger's discussion of authenticity in Division One of his book. My starting points for this examination are the interpretation of the Tractatus that has been advanced in recent years by Cora Diamond and a remark by Wittgenstein in which lie connects his own understanding of ethics with Heidegger's account of anxiety. Once I have argued that such a comparison is plausible, I show how it can resolve a problem for Diamond's approach to the book that concerns the concept of truth. Finally. I show how important differences between the Tractatus and Being and Time make clear the restricted sense in which we should understand Wittgenstein's claim that the Tractatus has an ethical aim.

THE LINGUISTIC DOCTRINE REVISITED

At present, there is an almost universal consensus that the linguistic doctrine of logical necessity is grotesque. This paper explores avenues for rehabilitating a limited version of the doctrine, according to which the special status of analytic statements like 'All vixens are female' is to be explained by reference to language. Far from being grotesque, this appeal to language has a respectable philosophical pedigree and chimes with common sense, as Quine came to realize. The problem lies in developing it in a way that avoids the powerful objections facing previous versions of the linguistic doctrine. I argue tentatively that this can be done by reconciling Wittgenstein's claim that such statements have a normative role with Carnap's concession that they are true.

Saying and Showing and the Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought

sophical doctrine is central element in his from the very outset. In the Preface the Tractatus, he stresses that the work is textbook (TLP, p.3). He describes the aim of the book as one of draw[ing] limit thought or to the expression of thoughts ( Z P , p.3). In TLP 4.112, he remarks that a philos o p h i c ~ ~ work consistskssentia~~~ of elucidations and that it not result in 'philosophical propositions'. And in the penultimate remark of the work, after characterizing his propositions as elucidations, he glosses what he means by this as follows: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them-as steps-to climb up beyond them. (He must, so speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP 6.54). It seems clear from this that, however we understand the philosophical activity of elucidation, nothing substantial-nothing that could bi viewed as philosophical answer philosophical question-should survive at the end of it. What remains unclear is exactly what the activity of elucidation amounts or what exactly its purpose is. The word suggests that something is illuminated or clarified, but are we understand this process of clarification as leading form of philosophical understanding or insight? If so, does that mean that there is kind of philosophical understanding that cannot be expressed in the form of philosophical doctrine about what is the case? The idea may strike us immediately as problematic. It seems threaten turn philosophy into something mystical or irrational. James Conant and Cora Diamond have argued very persuasively that any attempt preserve the idea that Wittgenstein intends the philosophical activity in which he is engaged lead distinctive sort of insight or understanding-one whose unsayabili ty...p recludes its being said, [but] which we can nevertheless grasp'-fails do justice the radical nature of his thought. If we take seriously Wittgenstein's claim that he eschews philosophical doctrine, then the only end of the philosophical activity in which he is engaged must, they argue, be the realization that there are no philosophical insights-expressible or otherwise-to be had:

How the Radically Interpreted Make Mistakes

Wittgenstein claims that I cannot name or classify my completely private sensations. If there are to be words for things, there must be standards for when the words apply to things. But (apparently) I cannot set up such standards all by myself for my completely private sensations. Consequently, no use of this sign “S” is ever correct or incorrect, and hence error involving the sign is impossible.

Why first language learning is not second language learning ? Wittgenstein's rejection of St. Augustine's conception of learning

The Philosophical Investigations starts with a quotation from St. Augustine on language learning. The usual reconstruction of Wittgenstein's criticism of St. Augustine's view on language focusses on meaning — that is, the picture theory which he had in common with Wittgenstein's own earlier views. This paper shows that Wittgenstein in discussing ostensive definition, understanding, and the private language argument also attacks St. Augustine's notion of learning. In recent years the Augustinian conception has been resurrected in cognitive theories postulating an innate language of thought (e.g., Fodor), making Wittgenstein's claims that this conception of learning is paradoxical very relevant.

Why We Would Not Understand a Talking Lion

One of the mostperplexing passages in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations occurs in Part Two where it is asserted: Ifa lion could talk, we could not understand him.[ This remark has been interpreted as anything from a mere comment concerning our conception of a lion to an empirical claim regarding the communicative capacities of lions and nonhumans in general to a highly speculative assertion as to the possibility of there being radical incommensurability among language-users.2 Whichever interpretation is correct, Wittgenstein's claim, if true, does not bode well for those of us who would like to assign rights to animals. Since the assignment of rights typically proceeds on the determination of interests, should it tum out that we would not understand aninlals in spite of theirpossessing language, then surely the whole task ofassigning rights to animals is hopeless. My purpose is to clarify the meaning ofWittgenstein's statement and to determine whether what he says is true. I shall argue that what has emerged as the received view on the remark is wrong. The received view (as I shall call it) interprets the remark as expressing Wittgenstein's belief that there could exist forms of life so different in nature that their

Philosophical Investigations 201: A Wittgensteinian Reply to Kripke

Philosophical Investigations 201: A Wittgensteinian Reply to Kripke DONNA M. SUMMERFIELD 1~ ACCORDING TO Saul Kripke, 1 to understand the later Wittgenstein's remarks about rule-following, we need to understand Philosophical Investigations ~ol: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." In Kripke's view, the rule-following paradox is that, for any action I perform, there is some interpretation of an expression of the rule I think I am following according to which what I do accords with the rule and another interpretation of that expression according to which what I do conflicts with the rule. To show how the paradox arises, Kripke uses the now famous example of someone who, confronted with the expression of an order, "Add 68 + 57," responds "1 ~'5." A sceptic challenges the response, claiming that, to accord with the speaker's previous intentions for the use of the plus sign, the response should have been "5," not "1 ~5," because the order-expression should be interpreted as the order to quadd, not add, the numbers 68 and 57." More generally, the sceptic's point is that, for any response made to "Add 68 + 57," there are alternative possible interpretations of the order-expression which are compatible with all possible3 evidence. Thus, the same response that is in accord with one interpretation of the order-expression is in conflict with other possible interpretations of that expression. And so there would be both accord and conflict. And so we have the paradox. Given this reading of the paradox, however, the second half of the first ' SaulKripke, Wittgensteinon Rules and PrivateLanguage (Cambridge, MA, 1982). ' To quadd is to perform the quus function,just as to add is to perform the plus function. This is the definition of the quus function: x quus y = x + y,ifx, yare lessthan 57; = 5 otherwise. Possiblerather than actuallyavailable,becauseKripke stressesthat the paradox issupposed to arise even if we take into account what only God could see by looking into the speaker's mind. [417] 418 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:3 JULY 1990 paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 2oi is puzzling: "The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here" (PI 2ol). In the first place, Wittgenstein says that there would be "neither accord nor conflict here," whereas Kripke's version makes it sound as though there is both accord and conflict here. However, Kripke undoubtedly would say that precisely becauseany action can be made out to accord with the expression of a rule (on one interpretation) and conflict with it (on other interpretations ), there is really neither accord nor conflict.4 More importantly, though, Wittgenstein claims to have answered the paradox by pointing out that, for the reason given in the if-then clause, there would be neither accord nor conflict. And yet, on Kripke's reading, this simply /s the paradox; it is not its solution. The structure of Wittgenstein's argument is quite different from the structure of Kripke's, as becomes clear if we compare a passage from Kripke with the previously cited first paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 2o1: "The sceptical argument, then, remains unanswered. There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor conflict.... -5 As this passage shows, Kripke regards "there can be neither accord, nor conflict" as a restatement of the paradoxical conclusion ("There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word" or, in Wittgenstein's words, "no course of action [can] be determined by a rule"), and he regards it as following from the premise "every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." Like Kripke, Wittgenstein regards "no course of action [can] be determined by a rule" as...

Wittgenstein's Language-games

Summary Wittgenstein's uses of “language-game” oscillate between references to simplified and imaginary models of rule-governed observable interaction, and reference to ways in which words are actually used. Reasons are offered for rejecting Wittgenstein's claim for the autonomy of language-games: use of “mini-languages “presupposes use of a full language; and mastery of conceptually related language-games. “Language-games” are not games. They might be treated as “images” in the literary critic's sense of “pictures made out of words”.

Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Ethics

Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Ethics RUSSELL B. GOODMAN IT IS NOW KNOWN that Wittgenstein found Schopenhauer's philosophy important and engaging, particularly during the time when he was thinking through the material he published in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.' I wish to pursue the connections between them here, explicating passages from the Tractatus running from 6.421 to 6.4311. I shall focus on three of Wittgenstein's claims: (1) "Ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms," but there is rather a "kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment" that "reside in the action itself" (6.422); (2) the good or bad exercise of the will alters the world's limits, not the world, so that it can be said to "wax and wane" (6.43); (3) "If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present" (6.4311). I, As Wittgenstein envisions a worldly punishment and reward, having to do with consequences attendant upon an action, so Schopenhauer isolates what he calls "temporal justice." The aim of temporal justice is to prevent crimes. It is imposed by the state and is based on human beings' egoism, promising a punishment to follow a deed the state wishes to discourage. "Temporal" because it takes time to operate, it looks forward in time, becoming "justice with regard only to the future." Schopenhauer quotes with approval the following from Seneca: "No sensible person punishes because a wrong has been done, but in order that a wrong may not be done. ''2 As Wittgenstein sees a form of reward and punishment not stretched out in time but rather immediate, residing in the noble or base action, so Schopenhauer discusses "eternal justice," which "is not dependent on human institutions, not subject to chance and deception, not uncertain, wavering and erring, but infallible, firm and certain. ''3 It does not require time for its operation; rather "the punishment must be so linked with the offense that the two are one.'" ' Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961). See G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittenstein's Tractatus (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), esp. Chap. 3; and A. Phillips Griffiths, "Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer and Ethics," in G. Vesey, ed., Understanding Wittgenstein (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 96-116.For Schopenhauer's influence on the later Wittgenstein see S. M. Engel, "Schopenhauer's Impact on Wittgenstein," Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (July, 1969):285-302; and Griffiths, "Wittgenstein and the Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume (1976), pp. 1-207 2 The World as Willand Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 1:350; hereafter cited as WWR. Ibid. ' Ibid., p. 351. [437] 438 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY What does Schopenhauer mean by this? His first explanation is none too clear; he argues immediately from the fact that the Will lies behind every appearance to the conclusion that justice is always done. ~ The missing premises are soon supplied, however. The principium individuationis, which governs the world of appearances, is not ultimate. One person appears to suffer at the hands of another; the latter may appear to go unpunished. But these individuals are ultimately (noumenally) illusions , are in reality only the one Will, so that "tormentor and tormented are one. The former is mistaken in thinking he does not share the torment, the latter in thinking he does not share the guilt." Evil action is not performed ultimately by distinct egos but is rather the Will burying its teeth in its own flesh. ~The evil man therefore suffers no less than him upon whom he practises his evil deeds. Schopenhauer's argument, then, looks like this: 1. Wrong or evil action is, phenomenally, the imposition of one will upon another. ~This appears to involve injury to one and not to the other. 2. But in reality these phenomenally separate wills are not distinct. 3. The damage done is therefore suffered as much by the perpetrator as by the victim. 4. The damage is immediate...

The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein's Claim That Meaning Is Use

The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein's Claim That Meaning Is Use