Saying and Showing and the Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought

Abstract

sophical doctrine is central element in his from the very outset. In the Preface the Tractatus, he stresses that the work is textbook (TLP, p.3). He describes the aim of the book as one of draw[ing] limit thought or to the expression of thoughts ( Z P , p.3). In TLP 4.112, he remarks that a philos o p h i c ~ ~ work consistskssentia~~~ of elucidations and that it not result in 'philosophical propositions'. And in the penultimate remark of the work, after characterizing his propositions as elucidations, he glosses what he means by this as follows: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them-as steps-to climb up beyond them. (He must, so speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP 6.54). It seems clear from this that, however we understand the philosophical activity of elucidation, nothing substantial-nothing that could bi viewed as philosophical answer philosophical question-should survive at the end of it. What remains unclear is exactly what the activity of elucidation amounts or what exactly its purpose is. The word suggests that something is illuminated or clarified, but are we understand this process of clarification as leading form of philosophical understanding or insight? If so, does that mean that there is kind of philosophical understanding that cannot be expressed in the form of philosophical doctrine about what is the case? The idea may strike us immediately as problematic. It seems threaten turn philosophy into something mystical or irrational. James Conant and Cora Diamond have argued very persuasively that any attempt preserve the idea that Wittgenstein intends the philosophical activity in which he is engaged lead distinctive sort of insight or understanding-one whose unsayabili ty...p recludes its being said, [but] which we can nevertheless grasp'-fails do justice the radical nature of his thought. If we take seriously Wittgenstein's claim that he eschews philosophical doctrine, then the only end of the philosophical activity in which he is engaged must, they argue, be the realization that there are no philosophical insights-expressible or otherwise-to be had: