Westphalian Order Research Articles

AMERICAN POLICY OF INTERVENTIONISM: AN OVERVIEW

Interventionism lacks any proper definition. It is a broad term used for non-defensive proactive policy undertaken by any nation-state to manipulate an economy or society. The most common applications of the term are for economic intervention when a state intervenes in its own economy, or for foreign intervention when a state intervenes in the affairs of another nation as part of its foreign policy. Ever since the Westphalian order of 1644, which accepted the concept of the sovereignty of nation-states on their territory, with no role for external agents in domestic structures, sovereignty has never truly been violable, but in early 20th century the social purpose of the use of force began to expand and marked a new idealism in the use of war. It produced mixed opinions of critics and generated a wide discourse on whether it is a ‘mask’ to some surreptitious motives, or is a ‘Just Intent’in real world terms

The Collective Imagination and the Limitations for the Tianxia to Replace the Westphalian World Order

The collective political imagination establishes world orders that define how political communities interact. The relative power of the West allowed the introduction of the first global world order, known as the Westphalian. However, the increasing relative power of the People’s Republic of China allows it to promote an alternative world order vision, which is the result of its political imagination. Zhao Tingyang’s re-imagined hierarchic Tianxia order is seen as a challenger to the Westphalian order. This paper analyzes whether the Tianxia order can replace the Westphalian, considering the contemporary global political environment. The discussion is based on Jeffrey Legro’s theory of collective ideas and foreign policy change, applying it to world order replacement analysis. The findings suggest that the Tianxia has significant limitations in replacing the Westphalian world order. The Westphalian order orthodoxy remains strong. The order is also adaptable, capable of including hierarchical elements. Despite the increase of the PRC’s relative power and its greater capabilities to shape norms with domestic support, continuity usually prevails, so the habit of sovereignty prevails over hierarchical order. Finally, the article argues that the Tianxia order is not resilient to the anarchic-competitive element of human nature.

Independent States: A Perspective from International Relations

According to the nature of the Westphalian system, the independent state is the central actor in international relations. However, the discipline has not developed theoretical approaches regarding the independence process, which is considered more a concern of the international law and the political interests of state actors. Then, in this article, the issue of independence is analyzed as a basic step for political entities to access statehood, becoming a basisfor understanding the role of the independent state in the Westphalian order. It is necessary to observe the variations in the conception of independence, especially regarding self-determination and recognition principle, acknowledging the existence of deep changes in the international system. This principle has had greater relevance since the 1990s due to the disintegration processes of some countries, particularly the case of Kosovo. Taiwan is also a relevant experience. Another key point is the weakening process of the state, with the appearance of variants that question the status and existence of the state actor. At the end of this paper, a brief reference is made to the Latin and Central American experience, which shows particularities since the 19th century.

The European Composite Administration Facing the Challenges of Migration

In classical theoretical reflections on international reality, one of the leading paradigms is the belief that the Westphalian order based on sovereign states has evolved into a diverse network of interdependent actors. From a legal perspective, a network such as this has the character of multi-level normative linkages. Legislation with varying degrees of impact in terms of its binding force is enacted within a number of parallel consultative bodies. Within the EU this network takes on a concretised, institutional normative dimension, the so-called European Composite Administration which is evident in specific areas such as cyber security, asylum and migration policies, energy, and financial market regulation. In the European Union, decentralised agencies play a leading role in a such compound bureaucracy. They are one of the main instruments in the European system for harmonising regulation and practices in specific areas of EU activity. In a crisis situation there is an increasing tendency to modify their powers. Within the European Composite Administration, bodies such as EASO, the agency responsible for migration and asylum policies, play a key coordinating role between the Member States. The crisis legitimises institutional changes, by expanding the catalogue of regulatory agencies’ competencies. While practitioners, especially in individual offices in the Member States, may find such processes acceptable in relation to the ideal of effi cient and effective administration, these phenomena may be regarded as worrying from the point of view of control over a growing complex integrated administrative apparatus.

Regional Orders, Geopolitics, and the Future of International Law

Abstract This article argues that the old international law of empires, greater spaces, and regional orders did not disappear with the creation of the United Nations. While revisionist histories of international law have complicated the claim that a Westphalian order of independent states completely replaced a world of more varied political forms in the mid-seventeenth century, international lawyers nonetheless largely accept that such a transformation did take place at some point. The state is treated as the normative political subject of international law, and any move away from the geography of statehood as the foundation of the international legal system is seen as novel, exceptional, or illegal. The narrative that the state has become the primary political subject and spatial form of international law masks the persistence of regional orders as a core feature of the contemporary legal system. This article shows that international lawyers have been engaged in justifying, making sense of, narrating, and assembling regional orders for at least the past century. It explores the rival regionalisms promoted during the inter-war period, the struggles over regional orders during the early decades of decolonization, the expansive vision of regional orders consolidated in the early post-Cold War decades by the United States and its allies, and the regional ambitions of China in the twenty-first century. It analyses how regional orders are assembled and resisted through international law, what values are proclaimed to justify different forms of regional ordering, whose interests are represented, and the relation between grand narratives and technical transactions in that legal work. The article concludes that bringing the concept of regional orders to the foreground can open up a new and timely set of questions about politics, representation, and the future of international law.

Independent States: A Perspective from International Relations

According to the nature of the Westphalian system, the independent state is the central actor in international relations; however, the discipline has not developed theoretical approaches regarding the independence process which is considered more a concern of the international law and the political interests of state actors. Then, in this article, the issue of independence is analyzed as a basic step for political entities to access the statehood becoming this a basis for understanding the role of the independent State in the Westphalian order. Acknowledging the existence of deep changes in the international system, it is necessary to observe the variations in the conception of independence, especially regarding self-determination and recognition principle. This principle has greater relevance since the 1990s due to the disintegration processes of some countries, being Kosovo one of the main cases. Taiwan is also a relevant experience. Another key point is the weakening process of the state, with the appearance of variants that question the status and existence of the state actor. At the end of this paper, a brief reference is made to the Latin and Central American experience, which show particularities since the 19th century.

(R)evolution of the Axiology of Human Rights, Political Freedom and Security as a Determinant of UN Pragmatism

The state, under the Westphalian order, was both the creator and product of international law which determined its position as the central actor of this system. The norms of international law defined the normative content of the internal security regime, where state security was identical with security as such in international relations. The reality that laid the foundation for this logical syllogism has been subject to gradual transformation that had its climax in the early decades of the 21st century. The states, previously holding monopoly of using force in international relations, which allowed for prevention of wars by means of intergovernmental agreements or maintenance of peace through institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, lost their exclusive authority to use force. Stipulating ‘non-war’ by means of an (intergovernmental) international treaty became impossible since the non-state actors who apply force pursue counter-systemic goals and reject the international (and internal) order based on the rule of law. The state sovereignty, whose significant albeit not exclusive referent was autocracy and total power, has been transformed from the title of claim to cease the violation by the state into the personal right to protection (vested in an individual or minority/people/mankind in general). International law, which did not constitute a system until as late as the second half of the 20th century, not only obtained such character relatively quickly, but also has been subject to constitutionalization. The inherent unity of the international law as the common legal system of the international community is subject, along with this community, to fundamental divergence: into the law governing (internal) relationships between members of the, transatlantic, security community, which form a normatively and institutionally interrelated selfcontained regime on the one hand, and the international law that governs the relations between the countries of the Western Hemisphere and other subjects of the international law on the other hand. These factors determine the shift of the security paradigm: new actors, new normative content, different binding effect of the norms and, above all, new rules. The new paradigm of security in the international law dimension correlates with the shift in metaphors that build concepts significant to the international law such as state, sovereignty, security, and international treaty. These transformations set the stage for the legitimization of actions taken by the subjects of legal protection in the international law dimension.

The Ottoman Empire and Europe from the late Westphalian order to the Crimean system: the ’Eastern Question’ Revisited

The ‘Eastern Question’ is one of the most controversial and persistent subjects in the history of international relations. This article looks at two aspects in the evolution of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The first one focuses on the importance of the 18th century in the emergence of the ’Eastern Question’. The second one emphasizes on several episodes that may reopen the debate on the origins of the Crimean War. Our research is an attempt to demonstrate that the ’Eastern Question’ was only a piece of a larger puzzle. The more Russia was influential in world politics, the more her contribution became valuable for the stability of the international system. The idea to challenge in the early 1850’s the heritage of the 18th century in world politics (meaning to marginalize Russia in European affairs), did not serve on the long run neither to the security of the Ottoman Empire, neither to the ’new multilateralism’ put forward by Napoleon III.

Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections onInternational Organization

AbstractAsInternational Organizationcommemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects; and how external threats combine with these internal dynamics to render the LIO more fragile than ever before. This introduction begins by defining and clarifying what is “liberal,” “international,” and “orderly” about the LIO. It then discusses some central challenges to the LIO, illustrated by the contributors to this issue as well as other sources. Finally, we reflect on the analytical lessons we have learned—or should learn—as the study of the LIO, represented by scholarship inInternational Organization, has sometimes overlooked or marginalized dynamics that now appear central to the functioning, and dysfunction, of the order itself.

Alternative Political Projects of Territoriality and Governance during the Syrian War: The Caliphate Vs Democratic Confederalism

ABSTRACT Following the Arab Spring and the Syrian war, two non-state actors, the Islamic State (IS; also known as ISIS or ISIL) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), deployed their political projects of the caliphate and democratic confederalism, respectively, amid rising geopolitical interest in the Middle East. Beyond mobilising people on the battleground in Syria, these political projects led to comprehensive debates about the future of the Westphalian order of sovereignty, territoriality, and the state in the region, as well as the viability of the ideals of political and cultural pluralism. This article compares the potential of these projects. First, it explores whether these actors challenge the older forms of the state, territoriality, and sovereignty, or whether they reproduce them. Then, it discusses whether the political organisation and governance models of these two non-state actors have the capacity to solve the problems of democratic representation and cultural pluralism in the region. Finally, the potential impact of these projects is discussed by examining whether they could serve as a model or inspiration for new political ideas and arrangements in the region.

Some Remarks on the Eurocentricism and Imperialism in the Construction of International Law

The modern international law is considered an offshoot of European intellectual contributions as its basic foundation is deeply imbued with the political and social upheavals took place in European history. As an example, the Westphalian order emerged in the culmination of thirty years war in 1648 was regarded as the most pivotal mile stone in modern history of international law. Yet the European domination and its intellectual contribution to the development of international law systematically excluded non-European nations from international law and its protection, which finally paved the path to use international law in the 19th century as a tool of legitimizing the colonial expansion. This paper seeks to trace the historiography of modern international law and its dubious nature of disdaining non-Europeans and their civilizational thinking. Furthermore, this paper argues how European historical encounters carved the map of international law from a vantage point, which gave an utter prominence upon the European intellectual monopoly. The results emerge from this paper will strongly suggest the need of an alternative scholarship to unveil the history of international law.

Sovereignty Re-postulation: the Theatricality of Statist–National Sovereignty Wrestling in Taiwan

Abstract Statehood and sovereignty have been mutually implicating in the Westphalian international order. The spatially characteristic tenet of sovereignty has not been questioned, which collaterally fortifies the one-nation/one-state formula prescribed in modern sovereignty. However, fissures inhered in this nation-state formula are discernible, particularly when the conventional statist sovereignty has remained indefinite and inchoate. Taiwan’s statist sovereignty has been overshadowed by its undetermined statehood and indefinite territorial domain. Intriguingly, once the rigidity of statist sovereignty is lifted, the development of national sovereignty becomes irrepressible. Reinvention of national sovereignty is informed by both universal values and case-specific particularity. For the former, individualism, multiculturalism, and self-determination serve exemplary cases. For the latter, the particularity is mostly presented in the wrestling between statist and national sovereignty. Taiwan’s constitutional jurisprudence serves to verify the universal, as well as the particular development of Taiwan’s national sovereignty. However, dangers loom large, in that identity reconfiguration has been cultivated collaterally, which brings about not only a sophisticated Taiwanese consciousness, but also a more uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations.

The Deatnu Agreement: a contemporary wall of settler colonialism

ABSTRACT The Deatnu River, located in Northern Scandinavia in the heart of Sápmi, is often regarded as one of the finest salmon rivers in Europe. In the 1751 Strömstad Peace Accord, the Deatnu river was made into an international boundary, becoming one of the oldest political borders in Europe. Since 1873, salmon fishing in the Deatnu River has been regulated by bilateral agreements negotiated between Norway and Finland. The most recent agreement was reached in 2017, in spite of a very strong, uniform opposition of the local population, Sámi and non–Sámi alike. This article considers the nature, effects and objectives of the 2017 Deatnu Agreement in the context of an international boundary. I suggest that the 2017 Deatnu Agreement is a figurative wall erected by the states of Norway and Finland in the context of the post–Westphalian order. The 'post–Westphalian order' is characterized by the erection of walls to define nation–state boundaries. Drawing on Elizabeth Strakosch' analysis of policy as a key strategy of settle colonialism and Lorenzo Veracini's concept of transfer, the article considers how this figurative wall is intended to target the Sámi people and how it is an emblem of Nordic settler colonialism.

What if china's path of development becomes a model for african countries

A long time ago, the theory of development was, implicitly or even explicitly, linked to Western society. However, such a vision of the world made it difficult to grasp other possible paths of organization, change or development. We summarized and brought everything back to Westphalian order. We accused others of refusing otherness when we ourselves were the first to refuse it. It was even unacceptable to talk about development without reference to the West. Could we today have the courage to admit that it is because of this refusal of otherness that the West, by its excessive esteem of superiority, has given itself the luxury of colonizing certain countries of the South. Didn't Alain Peyrefitte point out in his book entitled "The immobile Empire" that “the confrontation between the industrialized countries and the Third World _ or between North and South, was tainted at the outset by colonial conquest, which inflicted intolerable damage on the soul of the colonized peoples and often aroused a sense of guilt among the colonizers for their acts of plunder, once the intoxication of domination had passed". Also, this refusal of otherness has led the West to develop universal thoughts, universal models, universal programs, universal visions, even universal orders. And the societies that do not meet the criteria for these ready-to-wear are automatically banned from the restricted circle of great powers and qualified, as the case may be, the Rogue states, the Failed state, the States of the axis of Evil, etc. Samir AMIN remarkably clarifies this situation in these terms.

The Decoupling of the Nation and the State: Constitutionalizing Transnational Nationhood, Cross-Border Connectivity, Diaspora, and “National” Identity-Affiliation in Asia and Beyond

AbstractSince the first Asian Law and Society Conference (ALSA) was held at the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2016, a number of special sessions have been organized to focus on the deconstruction of the Westphalian transnational order based on the concept of the “nation-state.”1 This dominant hegemony was predicated on the congruence of the geo-territorial boundaries of both the state and the nation, as well as the “assumed integration” of state-defined “citizenship” and another distinctly layered “membership” based on culture, ethnic, religious, and indigenous affiliations. The “nation-state” ideology has thus masked a history of tensions and conflicts, often manifested in the form of oppression, persecution, and genocide directed at the nation and its peoples by the state and its predatory institutions. Our studies have shown that such conflicts between the nation and the state have been observed in multiple regions in Asia, including Kashmir in India; Moro and Islamic communities of Mindanao in the Philippines; Karen, Kachin, and other autonomous nations in Myanmar; West Papua, Aceh, Kalimantan, South Moluccas, Minahasa, and Riau in Indonesia; Kurds in multiple state systems of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran; and Palestine in Israel, among many other culturally autonomous nucleated communities in Asia and across the world.2 The phrase “the nation and the state” was specifically chosen to distinguish and highlight the unique conflictual histories of two geo-political entities and to provide a fundamentally differing interpretation of history, geography, the role of law, and global affairs from the perspectives of nation peoples, rather than from that of the state or international organizations, as traditional analyses do. The Westphalian “nation-state” hegemony led to the inviolability of the state’s sovereign control over the nation and peoples within a state-delimited territory. The state then began to engage in another predatory project: to strengthen and extend its international influence over other states and, thus, the nations within these states, by adopting new constitutional provisions to offer cross-border “citizenship” to diasporic “ethnic-nationals” and descendants of “ex-migrants” who now inhabit foreign states. The nations have similarly capitalized on constitutional activism by erecting their own Constitutions to explore collaboration with other nations, as well as diasporic populations of their own, in order to carve out a path toward the nations’ independence within, and even beyond, the respective state systems. The “constitutional” activism sought by the state and the nation has become an important political vehicle with which to engage in possible collaboration with diasporic “ethno-nationals” and ex-migrant communities, in order to further assert political influence and strengthen trans-border politics of the state and the nation. Three articles included in this issue investigate such constitutional activism of cross-border politics and transnational collaborations in Asia, the Americas, Europe, and other regions across the globe.

The Deatnu Agreement: A Contemporary Wall of Settler Colonialism

The Deatnu River, located in Northern Scandinavia in the heart of Sapmi, is often regarded as one of the finest salmon rivers in Europe. In the 1751 Stromstad Peace Accord, the Deatnu river was made into an international boundary, becoming one of the oldest political borders in Europe. Since 1873, salmon fishing in the Deatnu River has been regulated by bilateral agreements negotiated between Norway and Finland. The most recent agreement was reached in 2017, in spite of a very strong, uniform opposition of the local population, Sami and non–Sami alike. This article considers the nature, effects and objectives of the 2017 Deatnu Agreement in the context of an international boundary. I suggest that the 2017 Deatnu Agreement is a figurative wall erected by the states of Norway and Finland in the context of the post–Westphalian order. The 'post–Westphalian order' is characterized by the erection of walls to define nation–state boundaries. Drawing on Elizabeth Strakosch' analysis of policy as a key strategy of settle colonialism and Lorenzo Veracini's concept of transfer, the article considers how this figurative wall is intended to target the Sami people and how it is an emblem of Nordic settler colonialism.

Evolution of the Westphalian Order under the Influence of the World Wars: Historical and International Relations Aspects

Evolution of the Westphalian Order under the Influence of the World Wars: Historical and International Relations Aspects

Preliminary Notes towards a Soteriological Analysis of Museums

This article investigates the potentials of the concept of soteriology in museology. It is claimed that modern museum politics and policy can be analyzed as a soteriology built around the idea that culture is a means to promote peace, and that it can offer salvation from the inhumane horrors of World War II. The UN in general, and UNESCO in particular, played key roles as soteriological institutions after WWII, akin to that of the modern nation-state in the Westphalian order after the so-called Wars of Religion of the 17th century. The soteriological element in the nation-state is the nation, in UNESCO it is culture and heritage. Building on this as a premise the text explores the museological potentials of the concept of soteriology.

International Order in Historical East Asia: Tribute and Hierarchy Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism

AbstractIR theorizing about international order has been profoundly, perhaps exclusively, shaped by the Western experiences of the Westphalian order and often assumes that the Western experience can be generalized to all orders. Recent scholarship on historical East Asian orders challenges these notions. The fundamental organizing principle in historical East Asia was hierarchy, not sovereign equality. The region was characterized by hegemony, not balance of power. This emerging research program has direct implications for enduring questions about the relative importance of cultural and material factors in both international orders and their influence on behavior—for describing and explaining patterns of war and peace across time and space, for understanding East Asia as a region made up of more than just China, and for more usefully comparing East Asia, Europe, and other regions of the world.

The Schengen Area as an illustration of the Late Westphalian order

Klasycznymi elementami tworzącymi przestrzeń międzynarodową są podmioty państwowe, suwerenność, terytorium, prawo międzynarodowe i pochodne tych elementów zakorzenione w ładzie wesfalskim. Ich zwornikiem są granice, które porządkują przestrzeń międzynarodową, a zmiany ich położenia, struktury czy zasad przekraczania pociągają za sobą ogromne konsekwencje dla porządku politycznego. Wyznaczniki ładu późnowesfalskiego, którymi są: zmienność, niepewność i pluralizm możliwości, burzą w pewnym wymiarze wypracowane mechanizmy funkcjonowania tych elementów. Zmiany zasad i możliwości funkcjonowania państw w środowisku międzynarodowym powodują często deficyt mechanizmów reakcji na nie i pojawiający się efekt zaskoczenia. Zmianom ulega również istota granic, do których zaliczymy: redefinicję podziału wnętrza państwa i środowiska zewnętrznego, zastępowanie percepcji granicy w kategoriach bariery na rzecz pomostu oraz rozszerzenie praktyk kontroli granic o koncepcję zarządzania granicami. Strefa Schengen urzeczywistnia porządek późnowestfalski, redefiniując pojęcie środowiska wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego, granic państwowych i granic zewnętrznych oraz jest przejawem zmienności, niepewności i sprzeczności. Strefa ewoluowała w wymiarze terytorialnym i prawnym, przechodząc przez fazy wprowadzenia, wzrostu i dojrzałości oraz schyłku, który nie oznacza upadku strefy Schengen, ale niepewność co do uwarunkowań jej działania i jest przejawem koncepcji o „niezdecydowaniu” granic. Obecna faza może stać się punktem zwrotnym w kierunku konwersji strefy Schengen, niosąc ze sobą nowe rozwiązania.