Western Policymakers Research Articles

Beyond the great firewall: EU and US responses to the China challenge in the global digital economy

ABSTRACT China’s Great Firewall was designed to control information flows to keep citizens in and the wider world out. Consequently, until recently China’s economic ascendancy was not mirrored in the global digital economy. However, China’s increasing digital footprint and championing of national technology firms present numerous economic and security challenges for the EU and US as the dominant digital powers. This paper investigates how growing perceptions of China-based threats in the digital domain have shaped EU (including Member State-level) and US policies. Two pertinent cases – Huawei (hardware provider) and TikTok (digital platform) – illustrate how threat perceptions have catalysed securitization moves to restrict Chinese firms’ roles within national digital economies. Western policymakers are increasingly concerned about China’s capacity to weaponize technologically interdependent relationships by exploiting its firms’ presence within Western networks. Yet significant differences between EU Member States’ perceptions precluded both a uniform EU-level response and more extensive transatlantic cooperation.

Impairing Globalization: The Russo-Ukrainian War, Western Economic Sanctions and Asset Seizures

The potency of economic sanctions imposed on nations depends on demand and supply adjustment possibilities. Adverse GDP impacts will be maximal when import, export, production, distribution and finance are inflexible (universal non-substitution). This paper elaborates on these conditions and quantifies the maximum GDP loss that Western sanctions could have inflicted on Russia in 2022–2023. It reports the World Bank’s predictions, contrasts them with the results and draws inferences about the efficiency of Russia’s workably competitive markets. This paper shows that Russia’s economic system exhibits moderate universal substitutability and is less vulnerable to punitive discipline than Western policymakers suppose. The likelihood that economic sanctions will compel the Kremlin to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity ceteris paribus is correspondingly low, even though war reduces Russia’s quality of existence. Western economic sanctions serve narrow geostrategic ends that are reconcilable with Pareto-efficient free trade and globalization, if precision-targeted, but as the Russo-Ukrainian war intensifies, an expanded array of novel and dubiously legal sanctions is degrading free trade, and spurring de-globalization and anti-Western coalitions. If this armed combat is prolonged, the goals of free trade and globalization could be set back for decades.

Why is the West so rotten at strategy?

Abstract Why has western foreign policy exhibited a record of sustained strategic failure, from Afghanistan to Ukraine? Why is it that despite the intellectual attention devoted to identifying the foundations of good strategy, outcomes remain so poor? This study seeks to bring a process of academic rigour to these questions. It pinpoints an inability to relate to problems proportionately as the major factor that accounts for bad strategic results and the growth of an anti-strategic predilection in policy-making. This lack of proportionality arises largely from a liberal-elite commitment to moral missions that undermine exit plans and bounded objectives. This sets in train an escalatory dynamic that inexorably spirals towards failure. Furthermore, rarely is there any accountability for predictive ineptitude or reckless advocacy, which merely entrenches the propensity towards poor strategic performance. The argument contends that these factors can all be captured within an enduring paradigm of total war, which exerts an overdetermining influence on western policy-making, pushing the formulation of strategy towards abstract goals and the unrestrained application of resources. While there are no easy answers to overcome these deep-seated problems in western strategic formulation, this article suggests that an attempt to move the idea of strategy away from ‘problem-solving’ to ‘problem-framing’ can offer the prospect of more considered policy reflection and facilitate a process of learning from mistakes rather than repeating them.

The international dimensions of the Metapolitefsi, 1974–1976: a reassessment

This article approaches the Metapolitefsi as an international event and seeks to historicize the perceptions and concepts that drove Greek and Western policy-making after the fall of the junta. Its main argument is that from 1974 to 1976 and in conjunction with domestic democratization, a parallel process developed when it came to Greece's external relations, which entailed a significant reformulation of Greek foreign policy. The year 1974, then, should be seen as an important turning point not only in Greek domestic politics but in Greece's external relations as well. These two processes were mutually reinforcing and closely interdependent.

Making amends: emotions and the western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Abstract The western response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was unprecedented. The states of the European Union, the G7 and NATO have targeted Russia with sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and furnished Ukraine with military assistance sufficient to ensure the Zelensky regime's survival. These efforts have proven insufficient to dislodge Russia from its occupation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, when launched in the aftermath of the invasion, they were seen (and often justified as) as bold, innovative, and steadfast—a necessary response to a grievous act. What explains this response? In this article we argue that the answer lies in the emotions of guilt and shame for past actions and mistakes in the West's dealings with Russia and Ukraine. Informed by a qualitative discourse analysis of key speeches, statements and interviews with leading western policy-makers (past and present), we regard these two emotions—expressed as apologies and the acknowledgment of mistakes—as important drivers of policy. This article contributes to the bourgeoning literature on emotions in world politics. In addition to offering a coherent explanation of the West's unprecedented response our argument has policy implications. While the admission of wrongdoing is laudable, it can lead to actors overcompensating, resulting in further mistakes and policy failures. Fast-tracking Ukraine into the European Union would be one such error.

Russo–Ukrainian war: Limits of Western economic sanctions

AbstractThe potency of economic sanctions imposed on nations depends on demand and supply adjustment possibilities. Adverse GDP impacts will be maximal when import, export, production, distribution and finance are inflexible (universal non-substitution). This paper elaborates these conditions, and quantifies the maximum GDP loss that Western sanctions could have inflicted on Russia in 2022–2023. It reports the World Bank's predictions, contrasts them with results and draws inferences about the efficiency of Russia's workably competitive markets. The paper shows that Russia's economic system exhibits moderate universal substitutability and is less vulnerable to punitive discipline than Western policymakers suppose. The likelihood that the Kremlin will restore Ukraine's territorial integrity, ceteris paribus, is correspondingly low. The authors also observe that unintended adverse side effects from sanctions and counter-sanctions were excessive because policymakers chose to maximize GDP-damage to Russia instead of optimizing Western and third-party net benefits. Given moderate substitutability, Western policymakers can switch to smart net benefit maximizing sanctions that enhance Western and third-party welfare without significantly bolstering Russia's military industrial productivity and war-waging capabilities by retaining embargoes on weapons, technology and critical components, while selectively softening other restrictions. Smart sanctions might facilitate a negotiated settlement of the Russo–Ukrainian war.

Russia's war on everybody and what it means for you; The Russia conundrum: how the West fell for Putin's power gambit—and how to fix it

The two books under review were published at a time when all eyes were on Russia's war in Ukraine. Yet the authors wrote most of the chapters before the war began in February 2022. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine further confirms some of the key assessments and conclusions that can be found in Russia's war on everybody and The Russia conundrum. Western countries have only recently been forced to start rethinking their policies towards Moscow. Yet both authors provide a longer-term nuanced and complex overview of how Russia has been waging war against the West for decades—albeit without rolling tanks on western soil—and the extent to which the West has greatly underestimated the threat. The war in Ukraine is the most brutal and direct manifestation of Vladimir Putin's intentions. Yet, Keir Giles clearly demonstrates that Russia has been waging a war against everybody, defining ‘its own security through being able to do damage to other countries’ (p. xvi). For decades, the West has found it incredibly difficult to respond to undeclared attacks from Moscow. Hence, operating below the threshold, Russia has quietly become everyone's problem. Giles convincingly argues that every segment of a society can fall within Moscow's interest. With a wealth of examples, the author unpacks the Russian strategy to divide and rule: Moscow exploits vulnerable and sensitive issues to inflame hatred and deepen societal divisions in the West, and ultimately to shake the bloc's unity and resilience in the face of a common threat. According to Giles, closing off such vulnerabilities may limit Russia's manoeuvring and ability both to confuse western policy-makers and to take advantage of their confusion to inflict harm.

Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime

ABSTRACT Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality.

Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options

Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This article examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for an uncertain future.

Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options

Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This article examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means” to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on “hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for an uncertain future.

Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia in Early 2022?

With signs of Russia’s aggressive intentions mounting since Fall 2021, Ukraine and NATO allies criticised Germany for not sufficiently contributing to Western efforts at deterring a Russian invasion. The article evaluates this claim by applying deterrence theory and using congruence analysis on foundational policy documents, expert literature and interviews of Russian and Western policymakers. It establishes that states contribute to collective extended deterrence the more they have the capabilities to harm assets that are highly valued by the revisionist and the more the revisionist has reasons to believe that these capabilities would be used if it enacted aggression. The article then evaluates Germany’s potential deterrence contributions, establishing that Germany’s vast arms industry and economic clout allowed it to significantly threaten the Russian regime through economic destabilisation and prospects of high-casualty fighting. It then gauges Germany’s actual deterrence contributions, finding them to have been significantly smaller: Germany deliberately avoided military threats and deliveries of arms to Ukraine. And while Germany did early on threaten to use its significant economic clout against Russia, it remained vague and non-committal over core issues of Russian economic interests, such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. The results provide and inform further hypotheses on the causes of German behaviour and indirect influences on deterrence against Russia. They also urge reconsiderations of strategic thinking in Berlin and elsewhere.

International Relations in the Anthropocene

International Relations in the Anthropocene

China’s Model of Managing the Financial System

Abstract China’s economic model involves regular and intensive government interventions in financial markets, while Western policymakers often refrain from substantial interventions outside crisis periods. We develop a theoretical framework to rationalize the approaches of both China and the West to managing the financial system as being optimal given the differences in their respective economies. In this framework, a government leans against trading of noise traders but at the expense of introducing policy noise to the market. Our welfare analysis shows that under certain underlying economic conditions, the optimal government policy induces a government-centric equilibrium, in which government intervention is so intensive that all investors choose to acquire private information about policy noise rather than fundamentals. This policy regime characterizes China’s approach with financial stability prioritized over other policy objectives.

Understanding “Sectarianism”: Sunni-Shiʿa Relations in the Modern Arab World

Understanding “Sectarianism”: Sunni-Shiʿa Relations in the Modern Arab World

The Elements of the China Challenge: Reading the Trump Administration’s China Policy Testament

Between 2017 and 2021 Donald Trump’s administration published over a dozen strategic documents on China among which The Elements of the China Challenge seems to stand out as it outlines a longer perspective and sketches a wider framework for US policy towards China. This paper attempts to examine the major assumptions of The Elements, arguing that by putting forward an anti-imperialist rhetoric, the American policy-makers want to emphasize the systemic differences with China, the importance of which have long been underplayed by Western policy-makers who have given precedence to economic considerations. However, the analysis also gives weight to the argument that the strong ideological appeal in The Elements is also intended to mobilize the American allies, anchor them to the leader of the “free world,” and reduce their tendencies to cooperate with China, including in 5G technology as in the case of Central and Eastern Europe.

Bahrain's transnational Arab Spring: repression, oil and human rights activism

Abstract Studies of the Middle East following the Arab Spring have concluded that ‘repression works’, especially in the oil- and gas-rich countries of the Gulf. Drawing on primary materials collected during fieldwork trips to Bahrain, the United States and Britain, this article nuances the ‘repression effect’ by tracing the emergence of a transnational Bahraini opposition, mapping the relationships and joint activities between domestic and exiled Bahraini groups, international NGOs and western policy-makers. It finds that even in the context of domestic repression and continuing ideological divides within Bahrain's opposition, transnational networks have not only sustained opposition organizations, but also maintained access to foreign policy-makers, producing repeated criticisms of the Bahraini regime and legal challenges to ruling elites who visit western states. The successes of this advocacy are modest: while it has not drastically reshaped the domestic state–society relationship, it has created significant costs for the Bahraini regime and damaged Bahrain's international brand. As a result, state and opposition networks now compete for influence over western policy-makers: international ‘arenas of advocacy’—such as the UK parliament, US Congress, UNHRC and European Parliament—have now become ‘arenas of contestation’, as state and opposition narratives of Bahraini politics, filtered through western policy-makers, play out during debates over foreign policy towards Bahrain. The article positions transnational activism as a direct outcome of the ‘repression effect’, highlighting ongoing contests for influence between state and society occurring in international and transnational spaces, even as the domestic scope for opposition mobilization remains highly restricted.

Genuine Pacifism or Soviet Infiltration? Allied Responses to West German Rearmament Protests, 1950–52

Abstract This article examines the reactions of British and U.S. officials to the wave of anti-rearmament protests which erupted in West Germany in the early 1950s. It examines the discourse generated by these officials to argue that the West German protests were either encouraged or condemned by different diplomatic figures. Most officials blamed the Soviet Union for the dissent in Germany and called for widespread concessions to the German government to better calm the situation. Some officials, however, supported the protests and protesters and looked to use the demonstrations to argue for increased contact with the Soviet Union and a thawing of the Cold War. A lasting impact of this discussion was that the image of the German people began to change in the eyes of Western policy makers- with old stereotypes from the Second World War beginning to give way to a new appraisal of Germans as activists and pacifists.

Тень санкций: стратегические последствия различий в санкционной политике США и России

Economic sanctions have been the defining feature of the relationship between Russia and the U.S. / EU since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, and both Moscow and Washington appear to accept that sanctions will remain in place indefinitely. This persistence of sanctions presents a paradox: Western policy makers have repeatedly increased the breadth and depth of these sanctions, despite little evidence that the sanctions have ‘worked’ to achieve their explicit and tangible objectives. This paper examines the nature and origin of this paradox using a multi-dimensional examination of Russian and US actions and discourse since the first imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in March 2014. This analysis exposes fundamental differences over how the two sides perceive the appropriateness and strategic context of these sanctions, which reflect a basic difference in worldviews between Moscow and Washington. These contending worldviews potentially compound burdens of uncertainty and costly signaling in sanctions between the U.S. and Russia, which also introduces cross-domain risks that can defy efforts to fine-tune the imposition of costs. If not redressed, this dynamic can derail efforts at strategic reengagement, if not inadvertently elevate prospects for dangerous escalation.

Revenge as policy

The forced landing of a passenger plane in Belarus at the end of May 2021, served the arrest of a journalist who was critical of the regime. This step was in line with the repressive measures that have been imposed by the government in Belarus for months. The apparatus of violence is disseminating fear and horror, with people being sentenced in political trials on a daily basis. Moscow holds a protective hand over the regime, which has driven Belarus to complete dependence on Russia. Western policymakers face a dilemma.

Back with a Vengeance: The Return of Rough and Tumble Geopolitics

Too many Western policymakers in the United States and across the European Union still remain attached to an “end of history” worldview, which has somewhat blinded them to the resurgence of great power politics. For the past decade or so, the unipolar world has been breaking apart due to various centrifugal geopolitical trends. The COVID-19 pandemic did not cause these trends, but is accelerating them. A leaderless, multipolar world on the cusp of de-globalization and the onset of a cold war between the United States and the People's Republic of China is a recipe for skyrocketing unpredictability and increased instability. This article traces the origins of these trends and provides a framework to analyze the political trajectories and geopolitical (and ethical) consequences thereof.