Western Policymakers Research Articles

Appendix I: List of members, NAM and the G-77

The Non-Aligned Movement is the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, comprising more than two-thirds of the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet, the movement is often misunderstood by Western scholars and policymakers, who typically fail to appreciate the diversity of views among its 120 members and 17 observer states. This Adelphi explores the structures and politics within NAM, and stresses the potential for greater engagement between NAM members and the West in mitigating many of the most pressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism challenges. Its thorough examination of how NAM business is conducted, along with an analysis of how prominent members or groups of members have sought to dominate it for their own purposes, offers invaluable insight ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and as NAM approaches a possible watershed moment inthe movement's history: the assumption by Iran of the chairmanship in mid-2012.

Appendix II: Prior Non–Aligned Movement heads of state or government summits

The Non-Aligned Movement is the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, comprising more than two-thirds of the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet, the movement is often misunderstood by Western scholars and policymakers, who typically fail to appreciate the diversity of views among its 120 members and 17 observer states. This Adelphi explores the structures and politics within NAM, and stresses the potential for greater engagement between NAM members and the West in mitigating many of the most pressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism challenges. Its thorough examination of how NAM business is conducted, along with an analysis of how prominent members or groups of members have sought to dominate it for their own purposes, offers invaluable insight ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and as NAM approaches a possible watershed moment inthe movement's history: the assumption by Iran of the chairmanship in mid-2012.

Chapter Two: NAM, nuclear non-proliferation and the 2010 NPT Review Conference

The Non-Aligned Movement is the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, comprising more than two-thirds of the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet, the movement is often misunderstood by Western scholars and policymakers, who typically fail to appreciate the diversity of views among its 120 members and 17 observer states. This Adelphi explores the structures and politics within NAM, and stresses the potential for greater engagement between NAM members and the West in mitigating many of the most pressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism challenges. Its thorough examination of how NAM business is conducted, along with an analysis of how prominent members or groups of members have sought to dominate it for their own purposes, offers invaluable insight ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and as NAM approaches a possible watershed moment inthe movement's history: the assumption by Iran of the chairmanship in mid-2012.

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement is the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, comprising more than two-thirds of the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet, the movement is often misunderstood by Western scholars and policymakers, who typically fail to appreciate the diversity of views among its 120 members and 17 observer states. This Adelphi explores the structures and politics within NAM, and stresses the potential for greater engagement between NAM members and the West in mitigating many of the most pressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism challenges. Its thorough examination of how NAM business is conducted, along with an analysis of how prominent members or groups of members have sought to dominate it for their own purposes, offers invaluable insight ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and as NAM approaches a possible watershed moment inthe movement's history: the assumption by Iran of the chairmanship in mid-2012.

Conclusion

The Non-Aligned Movement is the largest grouping of states engaged on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, comprising more than two-thirds of the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet, the movement is often misunderstood by Western scholars and policymakers, who typically fail to appreciate the diversity of views among its 120 members and 17 observer states. This Adelphi explores the structures and politics within NAM, and stresses the potential for greater engagement between NAM members and the West in mitigating many of the most pressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism challenges. Its thorough examination of how NAM business is conducted, along with an analysis of how prominent members or groups of members have sought to dominate it for their own purposes, offers invaluable insight ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and as NAM approaches a possible watershed moment inthe movement's history: the assumption by Iran of the chairmanship in mid-2012.

A Shift in Policy? Learning from China’s Environmental Challenges and Successes

Outdoor air pollution in Hong Kong SAR, Beijing, and China’s other major urban centers far exceeds international health-based standards, and the top Chinese environmental regulator has classified more than half the country’s water resources as too polluted for human use. Yet in 2009 China became the world’s number one investor in clean energy technology, investing nearly twice as much as the United States. The situation is emblematic of China’s paradoxical nature: Although this country has routinely pursued policies that promote economic growth at the expense of environmental health, in more recent years it has begun to make commitments to environmental protection, reaching milestones that set examples for U.S. and other Western policy makers [EHP 119(7):893–895; Remais and Zhang]. China has multiple incentives to invest in energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, including the large numbers of premature deaths linked to outdoor and indoor air pollution from highly polluting energy sources. The country has adopted strict national fuel efficiency standards for vehicles that widely exceed U.S. requirements and has paired these standards with tailpipe emissions controls that reduce traffic-related air pollution. In a bid to reduce its reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, China has increased its renewable energy production capacity by 79% since 2005 (compared with a 24% increase in the United States during the same period) and set ambitious targets to produce more than 15% of its electricity supply from renewable sources by 2020. A Chinese worker checks a wind turbine at a plant in Zouping County, Shandong Province. The authors trace China’s recent progress to a surge in investments since 1991 aimed at improving environmental quality. These investments have led to increased enforcement of, and improved compliance with, existing laws governing pollution abatement, resource conservation, and ecological management. Last year, the Chinese National People’s Congress issued a $20-billion plan for new energy technologies, ambitious energy conservation measures, and environmental protection initiatives. But to make a comprehensive environmental protection framework really work in China, the authors contend the country must reassess its position on economic growth as the prime driver behind policy making. China must also address the dual role of the government as both regulator and polluter as well as strive for greater transparency and enforcement in environmental matters. “Progress in these regulatory areas will grant the country greater influence on the world stage,” the authors write. Even now, however, the authors assert China has lessons to offer Western policy makers as global leaders work to limit the serious environmental externalities that accompany reliance on fossil fuels.

Opinion

This article criticizes the way in which the concept of ‘tribalism’ has been used by Western policy-makers and media in post-2003 Iraq. It has been commonplace to see tribalism as yet another symptom of the supposed ‘fragmentation’ of Iraqi society, and there has been a debate about ways in which a tribe-oriented policy might bring about national reintegration and political progress. Using the case of Banū Mālik – the ‘tribe of Prime Minister Nūrī al-Mālikī’ – it is demonstrated that tribalism is a poor predictor of political behaviour in Iraq and that basic ‘bread-and-butter’ issues are of far greater importance to the population of the country, just like in most other countries in the world.

The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’

AbstractFor many commentators the lack of success in international statebuilding efforts has been explained through the critical discourse of ‘liberal peace’, where it is assumed that ‘liberal’ Western interests and assumptions have influenced policymaking leading to counterproductive results. At the core of the critique is the assumption that the liberal peace approach has sought to reproduce and impose Western models: the reconstruction of ‘Westphalian’ frameworks of state sovereignty; the liberal framework of individual rights and winner-takes-all elections; and neo-liberal free market economic programmes. This article challenges this view of Western policymaking and suggests that post-Cold War post-conflict intervention and statebuilding can be better understood as a critique of classical liberal assumptions about the autonomous subject – framed in terms of sovereignty, law, democracy and the market. The conflating of discursive forms with their former liberal content creates the danger that critiques of liberal peace can rewrite post-Cold War intervention in ways that exaggerate the liberal nature of the policy frameworks and act as apologia, excusing policy failure on the basis of the self-flattering view of Western policy elites: that non-Western subjects were not ready for ‘Western’ freedoms.

China in Cyberspace

Over the past four years concern has grown about what is perceived in the West to be an increasingly aggressive cyber threat emanating from China. The overall impression is that China, which now has close to 400 million Internet users, has become something of a cyber superpower. But while it is highly probable that the Chinese state is exploiting Western vulnerabilities in the cyber domain both to collect with minimal risk valuable scientific, technological and commercial intelligence and to explore weaknesses in military and critical infrastructure systems, this is not a one-way street. Beijing too has considerable anxieties and vulnerabilities with regard to the Internet. It is important for Western policymakers to keep in mind such concerns when dealing with the kinds of threats emanating from China.

The Norwegian Government Pension Fund: Ethics Over Efficiency

The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global has an explicit mission to integrate long-term investment return objectives with an ambitious ethical commitment. This approach has drawn praise among Western policymakers. However, we contend that the ethical investment policy of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global presents a paradox, as the manner in which the country applies its ethical criteria to investment management transgresses best practice as we define it. As a result, we believe that Norway has chosen to discount functional efficiency in favor of exerting a “fundamental social perspective”. This may have unfavorable consequences in the long run. Nonetheless, we recognize the current approach is the source of the public and political legitimacy the Fund enjoys today.

Conflict resolution in Western Sahara

This paper examines the democratisation agenda laid out by Western governments for the North African region vis-a-vis their Realpolitik conflict containment approach towards the Western Sahara conflict. Western policymakers conceive the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as a safety net that contains tension in the region and enables geo-strategic and economic partnerships with Algeria and Morocco. This paper underlines that the international community could play a greater role in promoting the long-term stability of the North African region by pursuing innovative policies geared towards addressing the root causes of the Western Sahara conflict.

The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus

TEHRAN—Though from American shores it may seem as if Iran’s recent election tumult speaks of deep divisions in society and politics, there is one policy issue on which public opinion remains nearly unanimous: the nuclear program. Among the Iranian political elite, there is a clear internal consensus—in the run-up to the recent elections, even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reformist challenger, Mir Hossein Moussavi, professed his support for the nascent program. As such, unless this consensus dramatically falls apart, the politics of Iran’s nuclear program will likely continue down the current path, making progress in negotiations with the United States a challenge, but a distinct possibility. In the aftermath of Iran’s post-election drama, some Western observers have argued that the apparent weakening of the Iranian elite’s policy consensus, and also by implication the legitimacy of the incumbent government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will enable the West to acquire leverage vis-a-vis the nuclear issue. In fact, the reality is quite different. Divisions within the Islamic Republic, if they truly exist, will not provide the space for reconsidering the nuclear question. Only when there is an internal consensus among Iran’s elite and the possibility of negotiating from a position of strength will Tehran come to a genuine and definitive agreement with the United States over the nuclear issue. Iran seeks an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” the domestic capacity to produce enriched uranium and plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors for electricity generation. The legitimacy of this civilian goal is almost universally acknowledged, but Western governments have voiced concerns over Iran’s reluctance to allow inspectors to view facilities and over fears that, once a nuclear capability is achieved, producing weapons-grade material is but a few steps away. The Iranian government, for its part, has said it does not intend to pursue this secondary course. Yet, from the perspective of Iran’s elite, any negotiations between Tehran and Washington which might cause Iran to deviate from the long-term project of an independent nuclear fuel cycle would be an untenable strategic mistake. There is little doubt that post-election events have splintered the consensus over issues of foreign policy among the Iranian elite, but such divisions will not severely impact the previous consensus around the nuclear issue as a matter of national and geostrategic pride. Some Western policy makers have suggested it would be unwise to proceed with nuclear negotiations in The Paradox of Iran’s Nuclear Consensus Kayhan Barzegar

Muslims in Western politics

Acknowledgments Note on Transliteration1. An Institutional Approach to the Politics of Western Muslim Minorities, by Adulkader H. Sinno, Indiana University Part 1. Western Muslims and Etablished State-Religion Relations 2. Claiming Space in America's Pluralism: Muslims Enter the Political Maelstrom, by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Georgetown University and Robert Stephen Ricks, Georgetown University 3. The Practice of Their Faith: Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, by J. Christopher Soper, Pepperdine University and Joel S. Fetzer, Pepperdine University 4. Religion, Muslims, and the State in Britain and France: From Westphalia to 9/11, by Jorgen S. Nielsen, University of BirminghamPart 2. Western Muslims and Political Institutions 5. Muslim Underrepresentation in American Politics, by Abdulkader H. Sinno, Indiana University 6. Muslims Representing Muslims in Europe: Parties and Associations after 9/11, by Jytte Klausen, Brandeis University 7. Muslims in UK Institutions: Effective Representation or Tokenism? by Abdulkader H. Sinno, Indiana University and Eren Tatari, Indiana UniversityPart 3. Institutional Underpinnings of Perceptions of Western Muslims 8. How Europe and Its Muslim Populations See Each Other, by Jodie T. Allen, Pew Research Center and Richard Wike, Pew Research Center 9. Public Opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil Liberties and the Role of Religiosity, Ideology, and Media Use, by Erik C. Nisbet, Cornell University, Ronald Ostman, Cornell University,and James Shanahan, Cornell University 10. The Racialization of Muslim Americans, by Amaney Jamal, Princeton UniversityPart 4. Western Muslims, Civil Rights, and Legal Institutions 11. Canadian National Security Policy and Canadian Muslim Communities, by Kent Roach, University of Toronto 12. Counter-Terrorism and the Civil Rights of Muslim Minorities in the European Union, by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Danish Institute for International Studies 13. The Preventive Paradigm and the Rule of Law: How Not to Fight Terrorism, by David Cole, Georgetown University 14. Recommendations for Western Policymakers and Muslim Organizations, by Abdulkader H. Sinno, Indiana UniversityList of Contributors Index

The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue

The Republic of Transnistria is a separatist region of the Southeastern European state of Moldova. While not much has changed in this “frozen conflict” since a 1992 short-lived war, the eastwards expansion of the European Union and NATO are slowly bringing Moldova to the attention of Western policymakers. The cornerstone of the separatist cause is the Russian Federation, which serves as Transnistrias protector. Given the 2008 summer in war in Georgia, another so-called “frozen conflict,” it is necessary to evaluate how a Russia-backed separatist region in Moldova, accussed of human rights violations and weapons trafficking, fits into the wider discussion of European geosecurity and NATO/West-Russian relations for the immediate future.

Reading Russia: The Dying Mutant

Reading RussiaThe Dying Mutant Andrei Piontkovsky (bio) The corporatist kleptocracy that Russian leader Vladimir Putin has erected is profoundly misunderstood in the West. The Putin regime's Western defenders and apologists like to trot out a pet argument that migrates from one publication to another. It goes something like this: "What is most important for Russia right now is not abstract 'democracy,' but the development of capitalism. A growing middle class of property owners with a vested interest in the security of their own property will eventually demand the establishment of liberal institutions." This extremely popular theory totally ignores the actual nature of Russian "capitalism." The right to property in Russia is entirely conditional upon the property owner's loyalty to the Russian government. The system is tending to evolve not in the direction of freedom and a postindustrial society, but rather back toward feudalism, when the sovereign distributed privileges and lands to his vassals and could take them away at any moment. The only difference is that, in today's Russia, the things that Putin is distributing and taking away are not parcels of land, but gas and oil companies. Over the last decade, a mutant has evolved that is neither socialism nor capitalism, but some hitherto unknown creature. Its defining characteristics are the merging of money and political power; the institutionalization of corruption; and the domination of the economy by major corporations, chiefly trading in commodities, which flourish thanks to public resources that these corporations and their political allies have privatized. This is gendarme-bureaucratic capitalism with the Father of the Nation at its head. Such a "petrostate" model cannot deliver consistent economic growth, nor can it overcome the enormous gulf between rich [End Page 52] and poor, or ensure a breakthrough to postindustrial society. This model dooms Russia to economic degradation and marginalization. The current global crisis has made this truth crystal clear. Several days after his inauguration on 7 May 2008, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev spoke at the St. Petersburg economic forum. With thinly disguised glee, he referred to the acute problems of the world economy and declared Russia to be an island of financial stability amid the stormy ocean of a global capitalist system in crisis. At the time of this writing in late February 2009, the Russian stock market had dropped by 80 percent in comparison with the day of Medvedev's St. Petersburg sermon. But this is just one indicator of a crisis that is growing deeper. Much more dangerous for Russia's "rising from its knees" economy are the flight of Western capital and the drop in oil prices, two developments that are unlikely to be reversed any time soon. Without Western capital and high oil revenues, Putinomics is simply not sustainable. Russia's kleptocrats immediately rushed to the rescue of their little bailiwicks—banks that belong to ministers and ex-ministers, state corporations that belong to friends of the president—spending tens of billions of government dollars for this purpose. This set of "anticrisis" measures was so shameless and impudent that even the hyperloyal and hypercareful Russian Union of Manufactures and Entrepreneurs protested. Distrust of Putinomics and its dysfunctions is becoming rampant. The Putin regime, meanwhile, increasingly relies upon its artificially created image of a threatening West (led by the United States) to provide the ideological justification for its model of a corporatist state. Western policy makers will be making a grave mistake if they underestimate or ignore the internal political imperatives that are driving the Kremlin's foreign policy. Those who call on the new U.S. administration to take into account Moscow's "grievances" are in danger of forgetting that these complaints are grievances of choice, hysterically articulated by the Kremlin-controlled media in order to inflame feelings hostile to the United States. If these manufactured grievances are accommodated, the Kremlin will immediately invent a new set of "humiliations" or unleash some new adventures in the post-Soviet space to prove once again to itself and the Russian public the fundamental hostility of the West. Take, for example, two of the most lamented "grievances" or "humiliations" on Moscow's list: The installation of missile defenses in Europe and...

The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West

This essay identifies the nature of Russia’s strategic culture: it is its propensity to use force to achieve strategic objectives. It argues that Western policymakers have consistently misperceived the reasons for Russian foreign policy behavior, as they fail to take into account the enduring nature of Russia’s strategic culture. This article claims that Russia has a strategic culture that is fairly stable, although significant changes occurred after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Most importantly, Russia’s imperial ambitions vanished, along with the desire to spread an ideology. The role of military strength as a source of power declined, while the prominence of economic power increased. In the post-Cold War era, Russia has aimed at restoring its status within a great power order, improving the standard of living for its people, and developing (or revising) its national identity. At the same time, the strategic culture that prevails in Moscow makes Russia particularly sensitive to actions taken by the West. The article concludes by examining opportunities for accommodation and constructive engagement with Russia. To attenuate the tensions that currently exist, the West should react assertively but moderately to rhetorical saber rattling and other provocations, and engage in constructive cooperation on both contemporary security threats and economic issues, including pursuing close cooperation to mitigate the effects of the international financial crisis on Russia. In the near term, the West should focus on working with Russia to develop a new concept for long-term security and stability in Eurasia. Future research should thus focus on forward-looking networked diplomacy approaches that may be suited to overcome a Cold War mindset oriented toward bloc confrontation.

Yugoslav dissidents and the cold war

During the cold war, Eastern Europe dissidents played a high-profile role as an instrument of anti-communist ideological subversion. In contrast, Yugoslav dissidents were relegated to a marginal status due to the extraordinary position of Yugoslavia between two opposing blocs. The expected explosive impact on the Soviet satellites of Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet orbit in 1948, also turned Tito into an internationally famous dissident. After Tito turned his back on the Soviet Union, Yugoslav dissidents were practically of no interest to Western policy makers. They did not wish to antagonize Tito, because he was much more useful than a handful of dissidents who potentially could interfere with his role in the cold war game. The paper focuses on the functions of dissidents in the cold war rather than their self-image, their noble and sincere motives notwithstanding.

United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: The Need for a New Approach*

Since the formation of Kazakhstan's armed forces in the early 1990s, western countries have taken an increasingly active interest in providing military cooperation aimed at enhancing Kazakhstan's defence capabilities. This process was intensified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with Kazakhstan emerging as an important partner within Central Asia in the Global War on Terrorism. The United States, Turkey, U.K. and France have developed security assistance programmes with Kazakhstan, while the latter is also seeking to further diversify its bilateral military cooperation with other western countries as well as deepening its partnership with the NATO alliance.1 1Foreign Military Training In Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004, Volume I, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress, Released June 2004; FY 2002 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, January 2003. A key feature of western security assistance has been to help Kazakhstan strengthen its defence capabilities in the Caspian region in order to provide adequate independent protection for its burgeoning energy interests in the Caspian Sea. These cooperation programmes present significant challenges for Kazakhstan as it seeks to maximise its rewards from western assistance. Similarly, there have been hurdles to overcome by western planning staffs in tailoring this aid to meet Kazakhstan's needs. Western security assistance to Kazakhstan has often neglected or underestimated the close nature of Kazakhstan's security relationship with Russia. Consequently, fears in Moscow that the Caspian is becoming ‘militarised’ are a natural result of western policymakers failing to engage adequately with Russia. Kazakhstan is currently gaining invaluable dividends from western cooperation, but it has not capitalised fully upon these opportunities.

Review: A Shattered Peace

A SHATTERED PEACE Versailles 1919 and Price We Pay Today David A. Andelman Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008. 326pp. US$25.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0-471-78898-0)No peace settlement in modern history has provoked more widespread controversy than Paris peace treaties of 1919. For much ofthe 20th century, historians and policymakers alike have debated extent to which Paris peacemakers of 191 9 should be blamed for subsequent breakdown of international order. The condemnation of Versailles began immediately after signing of treaty. John Maynard Keynes, himself a junior member of British delegation to Paris, famously argued that victors provoked German hostility by pursuing an unnecessarily vindictive settlement, while Woodr ow Wilson's friend and advisor in Paris, Edward Mandell House, admitted in his diary that the treaty is bad and should never have been made.Almost 90 years after conclusion of treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon, matters no longer seem so stark and straightforward. Few people would dispute that treaties were a diplomatic disaster, offending vanquished and many of those smaller aspiring nations that had joined allied war effort in an attempt to gain recognition as independent states. Yet much of literature on Paris peace treaties over last 15 years has complicated picture of western ill will with a heightened recognition of highly limited scope of action that western policymakers had in face of nationalist expectations in their home countries after four years of uninterrupted bloodshed on a historically unprecedented scale. Thanks to inspiring works such as Margaret MacMillan's Peacemakers (2001), Zara Steiner 's The Lights That Failed (2005), and Manfred Boemeke's The Treaty ofVersailles (1998), we know a great deal about obstacles and constraints faced by key policymakers, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau, as well as divergent national war aims and shifting domestic coalitions that shaped final treaty document. Confronted with tough realities of building a new world order from ruins of 19thcentury diplomacy, peace treaties constituted no more and no less than minimal consensus on which key players could agree.At same time, historians have begun to acknowledge that peacemakers' efforts to reconstruct wartorn Europe were not altogether unsuccessful. The League of Nations in particular, often charged with responsibility for failing to prevent rearmament and outbreak of Second World War, certainly made substantial contributions in fields of healthcare, drug control, economic cooperation, labour legislation, and laws to prevent illegal trafficking of women. Its work foreshadowed aspects of European and global cooperation that are usually described as emerging after Second World War, both in terms of policy content and impact that members of League's secretariat had on post- World War II institutions such as United Nations, European Community, World Health Organization, International Court of Justice, and International Labour Organization.David Andelman's new account ofVersailles and its aftermath certainly strikes a more sombre tone. …

THE TRADITIONS OF PLURALISM, ACCOMMODATION, AND ANTI-RADICALISM IN THE PESANTREN COMMUNITY

Western media and Western policy makers sometimes perceive traditional Islamic schools throughout the Islamic world as a source of radicalism. The history of pesantren in Indonesia shows that this is not only mistaken but also a perspective that leads the West away from a potential ally in the efforts to create a world of peaceful coexistence. The mystical traditions of pesantren form a strong basis from which most Indonesians have eschewed radical Islamism. These traditions are rooted in the popular Muslim folklore surrounding the foundation of Islam in Indonesia. This paper argues that more recent history shows the foundations of current debates regarding the establishment of shari`ah as the law of the land as well as some actions of the Suharto regime inadvertently encouraged the growth of radical Islamism. Finally, the paper concludes that, in order to fully understand the current situation and the future, more research is needed. A few starting points are discussed in this paper.