West European Nations Research Articles

Reforming Health Care in Seven European Nations

Prologue: Most health care systems the industrialized world over share a number of common characteristics: they insure virtually all of their citizens, they allow patients to select their own physician, and they also constrain medical expenditures at some level that is deemed broadly acceptable to the polity. They also cope with a common reality: they operate in a state of continuous change, striving to adjust to the economic, political, and social demands of the moment. In this essay, Jeremy Hurst provides a glimpse of the nature of change in the 1980s in seven West European nations, all of which have pretty much stabilized the growth of their health care spending to a level that is commensurate with the growth of their national economies. Hurst is a senior economic adviser in the Department of Health, which oversees Britain's National Health Service. He was one of the early pioneers among a small group of economists, health services researchers, and other analysts who have studied the health care system...

Knowledge transfers in the United States

Spending on research and development is rising throughout the world, driven by the belief that economic growth, competitiveness, and national security increasingly depend on prowess in science and technology. In the last quarter century, the fraction of national income invested in R&D has more than doubled in the major Western European nations. Japan has led a similar surge in the East, and other Pacific Rim nations are following that lead. R&D spending in the U.S. is expected to be about $120 billion in 1987, or about the same as the combined total of the West European nations. In the U.S., funding is divided roughly equally between government and private sources, although most of the work is performed outside the government. Federal spending for R&D has roughly doubled since 1981, rising from about $30 billion to about $60 billion. During this period, the balance of the federal R&D budget has shifted in two principal ways:

Government statistics: The conflict between research and privacy

The production of social statistics has been challenged in certain West European nations by the "privacy issue." Privacy advocates contend that computerized data files containing information about individuals endanger personal privacy and other civil liberties. The privacy issue has taken two forms: anti-census campaigns and data protection systems. Although those responsible for statistical data have traditionally safeguarded their records, they are often drawn into this issue. Increasingly, they have had to deal with the sociopolitical environment through legislative liaisons, lawyers, and advertising agencies. They have also had to revise data collection and processing procedures. In some situations, they have had to suspend censuses and surveys.

Political relations between the United States and Western Europe: their implications for Japan

The term 'US-European relations' is of course an oversimplification. The expression actually covers several sets of relationships: the alliance relationship between the United States and its West European allies in NATO, the relationship between the United States and the European Community, and the bilateral relationships between the United States and the individual West European nations (including the neutral nations, Austria and Switzerland). The United States' subtly differing bilateral relationships with the major West European nations-the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain-affect Japan's diplomacy in varying ways. But despite the vast historical and geographical differences between Western Europe and Japan, the US-European relationship has certain fundamental characteristics in common with the US-Japanese relationship. Both are based on the political concepts of freedom and democracy and on adherence to the market economy system. US-European relations are fundamentally cooperative. We can cite numerous areas of cooperation-joint approaches to the Eastern bloc, cooperation on issues like human rights and terrorism. However, I can think of three areas in which the political interests of the United States and Western Europe may differ and where particular efforts may therefore be required to coordinate national responses. The first area is in approaches to the Soviet Union and its East European allies. From time to time, closer coordination and mutual adjustment are required here on specific approaches to the Eastern bloc. Since the Western countries' economic relations with the East are of great political significance, this also applies to the West's economic and political/economic policies, such as those of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM), the extension of official credits, and subsidized exports. The second area is the defence system and strategy in both nuclear and conventional forces. Here too, better coordination is needed if the present system is to be maintained and improved. One of the areas that needs attention, particularly in the

Political Parties and Political Representation

Political representation in most Western democracies occurs through and by political parties. Based on parallel surveys of voters and party elites in nine West European nations, this article examines how well parties perform their representation role. The opinions of voters and party elites are compared for 40 party dyads. In some cases there is close correspondence between these opinions (e.g., economic and security issues), but in other instances the evidence of voter-party agreement is substantially weaker (e.g., foreign policy). An examination of party characteristics and contextual factors suggests that the clarity of party positions, represented by a centralized party structure and noncentrist ideology, strongly influences the efficiency of the party linkage process.

The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty

By the signing on 4 April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty by their respective secretaries of state for foreign affairs, twelve Western nations agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them would be considered an armed attack against them all. In the event of such an armed attack every nation that had signed the treaty would '. . . assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area'.2 In practice this mutual assistance pledge meant that the United States promised to come to the assistance of the West European signatories to the treaty in the event of an armed attack by the Soviet Union on one or more of them. Now, thirty-four years later, this agreement is still the formal basis of Western defence. According to official NATO historiography, the negotiations that led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty started on 6 July 1948 in Washington.3 However, for a few years it has been known that negotiations on a security treaty between the United States and West European nations had already been conducted before that date. Those negotiations took place at the end of March 1948 in utmost secrecy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada at the in Washington. One of the participants in those secret deliberations refers to 'the crucial (and secret) Pentagon talks in March 1948 during which the North Atlantic Treaty was effectively conceived'.4 The purpose of this contribution is to supplement

Diffusion, Development and Democratization: Enfranchisement in Western Europe

Diffusion, développement et démocratisation: Le processus d'admission au droit de vote en l'Europe de l'ouestL'extension du droit de vote est un point central de la démocratisation. Mais il n'existe aucune explication « systématique » du processus d' admission au droit de vote. Cette etude expose l'amplitude de la reforme du droit de suffrage. Le tableau lustorique de l'admission du droit de vote se percoit comme un besoin pour l'elite dejustifier sa legitimite gouvernementale, cette legitimite provenant du peuple en echange du droit de vote. Le besoin de légitimité de l'elite et le support populaire à cette légitimité sont touchés, en retour, par l'expansion historique du rôle de l'Etat et par l'émergence des espoirs de démocratisation.La validite de l'explication s'établit mathématiquement à travers l'étude des implications analytiques et statistiquement dans la comparaison entre le modèle formel et les expériences de neuf pays de l'Europe de l'ouest. Le résultat principal de ces recherches montre que même si le taux de diffusion (développement) des attentes démocratiques est le même dans ces neufpays de l'échantillon, le processus d'extension du droit de vote dépend des variations dans les conditions initiates de démocratisation.

Dependence in Sociology: An Empirical Study of Asian Countries

AbstractSince the late sixties and seventies, there has been a well articulated concern in Asian countries about the "all pervasive" intellectual influence of Europe and the United States on social sciences in general and sociology in particular (Ashraf 1975; Alatas 1972, 1974; Kothari 1968; Kumar 1978; Goonatilake 1975; Singh 1973). A section of the social science community has suggested that while the diffusion of sociological knowledge-frameworks, paradigms, concepts, theories, methodologies, and substantive findings-from Europe and the United States has undoubtedly laid the foundations of sociology in Asia, it has also contributed to her intellectual dependence in the discipline. As a result of this diffusion process, the parameters of sociological reflection and research in Asia are being largely set by sociologists based in the North American and West European nations. Such a state of affairs, according to this view, stifles the creativity of Asian sociologists and comes in the way of the growth of sociological knowledge relevant to their needs and aspirations. The main purpose of the present paper is to examine with empirical data two questions related to the above concern: first, whether there is any intellectual dependence of sociology in Asia on Western nations, particularly the United States; second, whether this intellectual dependence, if it does exist, is increasing or decreasing over time. Bibliometric reference data from professional journals of six nations have been used to investigate these two questions.

END OF IDEOLOGY? A TREND ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH IN TEN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

During the early 1960s, a number of prominent political and social theorists argued that one of the major results of the pheno menal economic growth of Western after World War II was the deradicalization of politics. Ideology would cease to be a major factor as the radical parties of the left and right responded to a breakdown in traditional class to pursue pragmatic programs of economic reform.1 More recent studies focusing on value changes (Inglehart, 1971) and capital-labor confrontations (Hibbs, 1976) in these countries suggest, however, that ideological politics has not disappeared. This paper examines trends in strength of the communist parties in ten West European nations to determine whether their hypothesized decline as a result of economic development2 has occurred. Communist parties were chosen for the analysis on the basis of two of their characteristics: (1) as revolutionary social move ments they require a great deal of commitment from their members (Kriegel, 1972) and are likely to be more susceptible to membership decline if the new Europe theorists are correct, and (2) they remain important agencies for the mobilization of latent discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages in advanced industrial societies (Hibbs, 1976:1058).

Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy

This study examines postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes associated with left-and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. It argues that the objective economic interests as well as the subjective preferences of lower income and occupational status groups are best served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration, whereas a comparatively high unemployment-low inflation configuration is compatible with the interests and preferences of upper income and occupational status groups. Highly aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in relation to the political orientation of governments in 12 West European and North American nations are analyzed revealing a low unemployment-high inflation configuration in nations regularly governed by the Left and a high unemployment-low inflation pattern in political systems dominated by center and rightist parties. Finally, time-series analyses of quarterly postwar unemployment data for the United States and Great Britain suggests that the unemployment rate has been driven downward by Democratic and Labour administrations and upward by Republican and Conservative governments. The general conclusion is that governments pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies.

Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy

This study examines postwar patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes associated with left-and right-wing governments in capitalist democracies. It argues that the objective economic interests as well as the subjective preferences of lower income and occupational status groups are best served by a relatively low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic configuration, whereas a comparatively high unemployment-low inflation configuration is compatible with the interests and preferences of upper income and occupational status groups. Highly aggregated data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in relation to the political orientation of governments in 12 West European and North American nations are analyzed revealing a low unemployment-high inflation configuration in nations regularly governed by the Left and a high unemployment-low inflation pattern in political systems dominated by center and rightist parties. Finally, time-series analyses of quarterly postwar unemployment data for the United States and Great Britain suggests that the unemployment rate has been driven downward by Democratic and Labour administrations and upward by Republican and Conservative governments. The general conclusion is that governments pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies.

THE POSITION OF SMALL POWERS IN THE WEST EUROPEAN NETWORK OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS*

ABSTRACTThe purpose of the investigation is to explore, by using data on trade structures and multinational corporations, the extent to which the relatively homogeneous group of West European countries is characterized by the existence of dominance relations. The analysis indicates that smaller and not‐so‐rich West European nations tend to be systematically worse‐off, judged on the basis of the premises of the investigation, in the network of trade and investment relations. Furthermore the size dimensions, viz. Gross National Product, tend to have more explanatory power in relation to the position of smaller and not‐so‐rich nations than the level of development variable, viz. GNP/capita. The consequences of this state of affairs are for from clear because of the complexify and the multidimensionality of the dependent variable. In any case it appears to be important to make a distinction between mere growth of national economies ‐ which may be of parasitic nature as the case of Portugal illustrates – and development which implies a given degree of equality and autonomy in the economy concerned. Traditional theories concerning the position and external policy of small powers is of little help in describing and explaining these kinds of phenomena and consequently a reorientation in these theories is needed, if they are to be useful.

Eastern and Western Religiosity

The data from a multiP-national student survey were used to compare religiosity in 6 African and Asian nations with religiosity in 9 North American, West European, and Scandinavian nations. The responses to a "religious" item were correlated with the responses to 99 other variables. It was found that Eastern and Western religiosity shared about 80% of their correlates with each other, so that they were about 80% similar to each other. The shared variables included personal conformity vs. independence, value placed upon the traditional family, religious affiliation, value placed upon private property, nationalism, racialism, opposition to marijuana, and future orientation.

Educational Programs for Socially Disadvantaged Populations: Center for Educational Research and Innovation, OECD (Kristian Antonsen, Head of Project Group)

Abstract The educational concerns of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose headquarters are in Paris, were in the past focused mainly on education in the fields of science and technology, as well as on national planning for the expansion of educational opportunities. The member nations - including the United States, most West European nations, and Japan - collaborated in producing survey studies of national and regional developments in these fields.

De Krimpende Horizon Van De Hollandse Kooplieden: Hollands Welvaren In Het Caribisch Zeegebied (1780-1830)

Summary This study, entitled 'The Narrowing Horizon of Dutch Traders', deals mainly with the development of Dutch Welfare in the Caribbean Area in the period 1780-1830. On the analogy of Means's definition of 'The Spanish Main' the term Caribbean Area here comprises the West-Indian islands and the coastal regions of Venezuela and Central America. In the Introduction some of the most important themes concerning the age of colonisation in America are indicated in brief. Thus attention is paid to the discussion in late-medieval Spain (1492 -1552) about legitimate colonisation and to the critical attitude of 18c England and France towards the colonies in the American world. In the 16th century the West-European nations -in particular the Low Countries -had come to the conviction that the superstitious and tyrannical Spanish Crown was prematurely exhausting the native population and was exploiting the riches of South America purely for its own benefit. The black legend, in which Las Casas appeared. as chief witness for the prosecution, is an expression of this West European sense of superiority with regard to Spain. Moreover in this introduction mercantilism is described as a political and economical programme of great traders and government officials, testifying to their fighting spirit. The hazards of sailing, the defectiveness of international transfer of payment and the competition of neighbouring states made world-commerce a hard struggle. Thanks to their strategic talent European traders knew how to use the American precious metal as a medium of exchange for Asiatic spices, silk and tea. In the 18th century the European sugar-plantations in West Indian islands became very prosperous. For the mercantilists slavetrade, the sugar-plantations in the islands and the trading-posts in North America, which supplied wood and corn, formed the basis of ensured prosperity. In the 18th century England and France succeeded in pushing the Dutch Republic into the background as the confident mediator between nations. In 1780 the Dutch Republic saw itself confronted with the decline of its prosperity, both in Europe and in the West Indies. The North American carriers won for themselves an important key-position as the 'Dutchmen of America'. The North American independence brought about among other things by the English opposition against the natural coalition of French sugar and the commercial energy of the continental colonists -meant a serious interference with the monopolistic relationship between the motherland and 'His Majesty's most opulent sources' in the West Indies (Bryan Edwards). After 1780 the quick growth of the cotton industry led to the rise of the class of self-confident manufacturers. The political economists Adam Smith and Tucker dissociated themselves from the complex policy of the mercantilists. New consuming markets, open to English trade, would make possible a rational exchange of goods. Thus in 1820, with Latin America in mind, Alexander Baring could claim freedom of trade as the birthright of all Britons. In the first part of this study a description is given of these changes with regard to the Caribbean Area...... Zie: Summary

A grand design? a review

1Presidential Address, July 4, 1962, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, reported in the New York Times, July 5, 1962. See also Kennedy's speech before the National Association of Manufacturers on December 6, 1961. 2 See Andre Fontaine (Le Monde, June 3-4, 1962); also (Le Monde, July 6, 8, 1962). 3 See (New York Times, July 5, 1962). more equally. The United States is still sp nding a considerably higher percentage of her national income on defense, foreign aid, and the United Nations than are the West European nations. The shifting of some of these burdens to Europe would allow the United States to eliminate the deficit of its balance of trade and thus terminate the dollar crisis. Greater Euro-

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF POSTWAR JAPAN

t the end of World War II, most Japanese believed that the postwar reA habilitation would be filled v'ith hardships and that it would take many years to attain the prewar level of standard of living. Japan was heavily destroyed by the war and was cut off from the traditional neighbour Asian market. With a national territory reduced to the size of the State of . California, of which not more than 16% is arable, it was considered as an almost impossible task to support her 100.000,000 inhabitants. The postwar revival and expansion was, however, so fast that it astonished the Japanese themselves. In 1953, the per capita real tlational income had reached the average prewar level of 1934-1936, and the rapid economic growth still continued. In 1949 the per capita income was $ 100, in 1959 it was about $300, and in 1961 it reached the $400 mark,1 or about half of that of West European nations but flve times that of Southeast Asian countries. (See Table 1)

The Dollar Gap

To MOST AMERICANS, the news that our dollar was in danger came as a great shock. During the early postwar years, we heard about dollar shortages, and various economic difficulties that other, once prosperous, nations were having; but it seemed incredible that one day we too might be faced with similar difficulties, though on a much smaller scale. The American Government and people, seeing the danger of chaos to the civilized world, started the most generous and ambitious plan to help to rebuild the rest of the world by pouring out billions of dollars. This aid was given in the form of grants and loans of much foodstuffs, raw materials, industrial equipment, and technical assistance. The results were more than rewarding. Any American travelling through Western Europe today, and seeing the thriving economic activity must certainly feel gratified that his hard earned tax money was well spent, and was mostly responsible for this healthy resurgent economy. It is not intended to belittle the tremendous effort made by these nations, and yet everybody will agree that without American aid, these fantastic achievements could never have taken place in so short a time. Most Americans considered the achievements of the West European nations as interesting economic developments, and watched them with sympathy and condescendence. However, a few months ago a very rude awakening came: Gold that had travelled to America during a generation was now running away; thus our dollar was in danger. Although the nation's economists had been mentioning this fact for sometime, the general public was quite unaware of it. The trip of our ex-Secretary of Treasury to Bonn, to reduce our dollar commitments abroad, and former President Eisenhower's directive, now rescinded, to bring the dependents of our servicemen home, to save dollars, shook the man in the street both in the States and abroad.

EURATOM AND A COMMON WEST EUROPEAN MARKET

IN A REPORT on European conditions (C&EN, Oct. 22, 1956, page -5128), based on personal observations and interviews with key people, we suggested the possibility of an economic and financial federation of West European nations being formed some time in the future. We further pointed out that such a union would create a common market representing a total population of some 200 million, millions more than live in the U. S. What we saw in the crystal ball and commented on eight months ago is close to being a reality. We erred only on the timing. Six nations, France, West Germany Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, have acted with much greater speed than we thought possible. The Suez crisis and the general worsening of the Middle East situation have expedited matters. These nations have worked for over a year and a half on their Euratom and common market plans. The ...