IT IS THE contention of those who oppose democracy as a method of government that a democracy is so cumbersome that it cannot mobilize for quick action to meet the exigencies of war. It is also maintained that a democracy cannot control or discipline its people sufficiently to carry through a program requiring a high degree of mobilization of national resources. The main contention is that authority is not sufficiently centralized and the people not adequately schooled in obedience to provide quick and decisive action on a national scale. Some of our experiences in the present war are useful in assessing whether a democracy is capable of a high degree of mobilization, and if so, what methods it employs. Probably the most pertinent example would be the methods used by the United States to control manpower and to channel it into the most urgent wartime needs. This article is not intended as a comprehensive analysis of our wartime manpower program. It will deal primarily with the system of local committees set up to apportion labor to the most urgent needs. However, some background of the general manpower situation is necessary to view these committees in their proper perspective. We entered the war with a problem of unemployment which had never been solved since the depression years. Therefore, in the early stages of war production, manpower was not a serious shortage problem. Later, as munitions industries mushroomed and the demands for a large number of workers quickly materialized, the workers were recruited largely through offering high wage levels for munitions industries and depending on migration to supplement labor forces within the localities. By 1943 it became apparent that we had reached a stage in the war at which a lack of sufficient manpower of the right skills in the proper places was one of the most serious drawbacks to full production. It became more and more apparent that voluntary methods of recruitment and dependence on competitive factors in allocating the labor force were inadequate to channel labor into war needs and to hold it there. The first program for meeting the situation was the beginning of the employment stabilization program of the War Manpower Commission. There was instituted, first on the West Coast and later throughout the nation, a system of requiring certificates of availability if a worker wanted to leave an essential industry and to go into other work. This program still fell short of solving a serious shortage of workers in the aircraft industries on the West Coast because it was intended only to prevent turnover, and because there were so many ways of evading it. Since the possibility of migration, or interregional recruitment, as it was called by the War Manpower Commission, to the West Coast was no longer practical because of the crowded living conditions and the lack of sources for recruitment, it was decided that the time had come to examine the allocation of labor within labor market areas. Studies were made, therefore, of the major West Coast cities in which labor shortages for aircraft and shipbuilding were most serious. It was discovered that sufficient labor was available in non-essential industries within the area to fill the demands if they could be transferred into the war plants. Two steps were necessary before this transfer could be accomplished. First, by some means it had to be decided which were the industries of high urgency; and second, a method of channeling workers into these industries had to be devised. Early attempts were made to accomplish both these ends through action from the
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