Weapons Acquisition Process Research Articles

Future WARFARE and Artificial Intelligence Applications in the ROK Military: Problems and Alternatives

Purpose: This article explores the most likely impacts of Artificial Intelligence(AI) on the character of future warfare, focuses on how AI will change just about the way we fight in the battlefield, analyzes the current status and problems of AI applications in the ROK military, and then suggests several policy alternatives with regard to future development of the ROK military’s war-fighting capabilities with AI and autonomous systems (i.e., robots). Method: This article uses a literature review method that collects and analyzes data through existing research results or literatures. In order to understand the research trends of AI-driven warfare, professional military papers related to future operational concepts and doctrines are analyzed. In addition, data published by the Army, Navy, and Air Force Headquarters is referenced for the current state and problems of AI application of the ROK military. In particular, the latest data is mainly reflected in order not to miss important issues related to the rapidly changing military application of AI. Results: AI-driven future warfare will have three broad trends, that is, the acceleration of multi-domain battle, the generalization of cognitive-centered operations, and the Acceleration of Human-machine Fusion and increased ambiguity of blurring distinction between combatants and non-combatants. AI applications in the ROK military, however, is somewhat behind advanced countries, and currently stays at the conceptual level and exists mostly on paper. It still does not act to convert AI technology for military use, and not adapt it for operational concepts and acquisition process of weapons systems. For this reason, the ROK military needs to actively pursue various AI technology development strategies that can be used in conducting complex war-fighting within the full spectrum of conflicts. Conclusion: The ROK military needs to discard ineffective legacy weapons systems and prioritize investment in advanced technologies including AI, and streamline its cumbersome weapons acquisition and sustainment process and procedure as a means to win the AI race with other countries. With AI, the ROK military will be ableto create more agile, flexible and lethal war-fighting capabilities in strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions.

Another Nakba: Weapons Availability and the Transformation of the Palestinian National Struggle, 1987-2007

Violent clashes of June 2007 saw Hamas ousting Fatah from the Gaza Strip, thereby making patent the existence of a deep politico-military split within the Palestinian national movement. This article sheds light on the present face of the conflict in the Palestinian territories by adopting a historical-analytical perspective that emphasizes the role played by the availability of small arms and light weapons, as one of the many structural factors that underlie the transformation of the Palestinian struggle. Aware of the essentially contestable and reductionist nature of this endeavor, the authors examine the way in which the weapons acquisition process has changed in the time period from the beginning of the first Intifada in 1987 to the Gaza take-over by Hamas, 20 years later. In doing this, they extend the applicability of existing theories about the correspondence between access to weapons and the changing nature of insurgency, so to better understand a complex case where a national struggle has been spiralling into internecine violence and splintering, in what we may call “another Palestinian Nakba.”

Reforming Defense Procurement: Lessons from France

Is it possible to generate more efficient outcomes with respect to public procurement in general and defense acquisition in particular? Or are cost overruns inevitable when it comes to major engineering projects, like the development of modern weaponry? In this article, we draw on a unique data set of nearly 50 French armaments contracts in order to examine how one government has reformed its defense acquisition process over the past twenty years. Beginning in the early 1990s, France embarked on a series of policy reforms that enabled the state to contain skyrocketing weapons costs. We emphasize three, inter-related aspects of the defense acquisition environment in France that favored cost containment: first, hard budget constraints; second, the great technical capacity that the French government brought to bear on the weapons acquisition process, coupled with its iterative relationship with a small number of suppliers; and third, the use of contracting techniques that empowered project managers.

The British warfare state and the challenge of Americanisation of Western defence1

This article examines the response of British policy-makers to American thinking on how to organise Western defence following the formation of the Western military alliance in 1949. As part of their vision, American policy-makers argued for the integration of Western European armed forces and defence production. As the British defence production base had largely survived the war unscathed, the British warfare state was better placed than other Western European governments to resist this American vision for Western defence. Seeing Britain as a major power, British policy-makers remained committed to an independent defence posture within the alliance, ignoring the disapproval of American military leaders. Convinced that its defence industry could produce technologically advanced military weapons equal to those developed in the United States, the British Government continued to maintain an independent armaments production capability rather than participate in the Western European armaments cooperation in the 1950s. When serious problems affected several military aircraft projects in the mid-1950s, the British Government nevertheless looked to the United States for models of how to improve the efficiency of its weapons acquisition process. This article argues that while never Americanised, Britain's participation in Western defence cooperation undermined the British warfare state as a techno-nationalist project from the late 1940s.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

An historical case study of planning and control under uncertainty: The weapons acquisition process for the U.S. ironclad Monitor

Military necessity has long forced decision-makers to act when critical information is still either unreliable or insufficient. Using the Defense Department's current model of the major systems acquisition process, this article examines how information was used for decision-making, planning, and control in the acquisition process for the Civil War ironclad, Monitor. Chosen because time and cost estimates, technological feasibility, performance characteristics, and alternatives were all unknown when acquisition decisions had to be made, the contracting process for the Monitor reveals important similarities between system acquisition challenges and practices then as well as now. From an accounting perspective, this study focuses on how key participants searched for, developed, and used available information to influence decision-makers as well as plan and control contracting activities. Some public policy issues associated with the Monitor acquisition process are as relevant today as they were during the Civil War. Accessibility to both the government's and the contractor's historical records, combined with less complex technological questions, permit consideration of these issues in a more richly documented and more easily understandable context than might be obtainable using a modern weapons system as the illustrative case.

Equipping the Armed Forces

Since World War II we have felt compelled for the first time in our history to maintain large standing forces. It is technology though, not numbers, that provides our edge in the continuing military competition with the Soviet Union. Acquiring advanced weapons is a complex process greatly complicated by our governmental system, which intentionally fragments political power. Mechanisms for improving the efficiency of the weapons acquisition process, however, threaten the very values that we seek to protect with our military power.

The Defense Game (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 219 rationality, as elsewhere, attempts to depoliticize issues, making them the subject of rational analysis rather than impassioned struggle. Adam and Moodley point out that in the absence of political participation everything is politicized, as education and union policies become symbols of government repression. The overall analysis, while incisive, has some major problems. Most disturbing is Adam and Moodley's abiding faith in the power of economic growth to eliminate racial divisions. It is true that the development of a diverse, capitalintensive economy has diminished the importance of control over labor— control that historically has been the key to entrenched racial privilege. But only a fraction of the black population is needed to overcome the current shortage of skilled labor that will lead to the marginalization of an increasing number of "surplus laborers." Though there are economic costs to apartheid, whites still benefit from low relative wages and low costs of social reproduction. Apartheid and growth, therefore, are far from incompatible. Further, as Adam and Moodley point out, "embourgeoisement" has not provided more people with a stake in the existing system but with an increased political consciousness, an awareness of their deprivation. Thus a bigger South African pie does not lead inevitably to the elimination of apartheid, nor does it ensure the system's peaceful demise, contrary to the common wisdom of the South African business community. A second problem is the authors' dismissal of ethnic differences among blacks. While modern ethnicity has been primarily defined by the South African state, abolition of that definition cannot eradicate various historical — and therefore cultural — experiences. Adam and Moodley cite religious and territorial commonalities, but they overlook serious differences in language, custom, and, above all, differential access to the state. The Zulu experience in Natal certainly differs from the Tswana experience in Transvaal, to say nothing of variations among the Indian and colored communities. The battle for state control promises to draw heavily on those differences. Finally, the authors' solutions are somewhat disappointing after more than 200 pages of keen political analysis. They propose a system of indirect elections that protect minority rights, accompanied by a massive, "Great Society" war on economic wrongs. The electoral recommendations are as helpful as any, but the authors' attempt to redress centuries of repression with welfare programs seems politically, economically, and symbolically infeasible. Doling out a few benefits to those accustomed to the bottom of the social ladder is not the best way to rebuild a torn nation. The Defense Game. By Richard A. Stubbing with Richard A. Mendel. New York: Harper and Row, 1986. 455 pp. $21.50/cloth. Reviewed by Michael Friend, SAIS M.A. 1986. In this age of $600 toilet seats, $435 hammers, and nuts and bolts worth their weight in gold, it is clear that the United States is not getting sufficient bang 220 SAIS REVIEW for its billions of defense dollars. Why this occurs is less obvious. All too often we tend to assume that the government, in particular the military, is inherently wasteful and let it go at that. Calls for reform come and go, yet the system endures. Richard Stubbing, defense analyst at the Office of Management and Budget for twenty years, has written The Defense Game, a highly readable overview of this system. While he has much to say about the pernicious role played by the military and defense contractors, Congress and the executive branch receive their share of criticism as well. It often has been noted that there seem to be only two stages in the weapons acquisition process: "too soon to tell" and "too late to stop." Once major weapons systems programs pass the research stage, too much is at stake for Pentagon managers to rock the boat, either for the armed services that want weapons or for members of Congress representing their districts' arms contractors. The result is testing that is neither realistic nor rigorous, plus significant cost overruns . Secretary Weinberger's reluctant cancellation of the Army's Division Air Defense (DIVAD) self-propelled computerized antiaircraft gun was the exception that proved the rule. In most cases weapons programs do not fail as dramatically as DIVAD, but huge cost overruns and performance problems...

Competition in the Weapons Acquisition Process: The Case of U.S. Warplanes

Consistent with the recent national trend to dismantle or limit the scope of regulatory agencies and controls, the military services are taking increasing advantage of competition to secure low, realistic prices and costs, as well as improved performance and reliability, for weapons and replacement parts. Using the purchase of combat aircraft and related systems as examples, this article assesses the effects of market structure on competition. Although competition can be effective, the unusual incentives flowing from interservice rivalry and the parochial interests of individual legislators often allow contractors to underbid or “buy in” on early development and production contracts and to “get well” on later contracts. Expanding the role of competition within the present institutional framework holds the potential for some improvement in the procurement process. More fundamental change is necessary to alter the role of Congress and eliminate the influence of undesirable rivalry among the services.

The coordination of arms control policy and the weapons acquisition process: The case of arms control impact statements

The coordination of arms control policy and the weapons acquisition process: The case of arms control impact statements

Deceptive Basing Modes for Strategic Missiles: An Exercise in the Politics of an Ambiguous Nuclear Balance

F THE SALT II agreements are ratified, the United States (and probably also the Soviet Union) will proceed to build a new generation of land-based strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). If SALT II does not go forward, the new missiles most likely will still be built, despite the fact that they will be perceived as excessively vulnerable to a disarming first strike. What do these apparently paradoxical conclusions tell us about the politics of the SALT process and its interactions with the weapons acquisition process? SALT and weapons acquisitions interact in a far-reaching and complex political/military process with consequences often difficult to foresee. Both political and military considerations have dictated that programs already under way not be severely curtailed; and since only some programs have been constrained under the SALT agreements, the normal dynamics of arms races have not been altered, but simply rerouted into intense competition through programs not constrained. A SALT agreement may thus alter priorities and options, and the complex blend of political desires and technological constraints often makes the consequences of the altered priorities and options difficult to predict. Fortunately, however, there are some simplifying analytical techniques, and in this case they lead in a natural way to the predictions which initially appeared paradoxical. The focus of this article is the interaction between the SALT process and the problem of vulnerability, including the proposed solution to that problem through the dispersal of missiles in deceptive basing modes such as multiple aim points (MAP) or multiple protective shelters (MPS), coupled with limitations on the numbers of warheads per missile. The discussion which follows covers (a) the origin of the problem and its proposed solution; (b) consideration of the theoretical nuclear balance in the 1980s, based on a quantitative analysis of the expected outcomes of possible attacks under several alternative scenarios; (c) evaluation of a number of claims that have been made regarding ICBM vulnerability and solutions for it, drawing on the results of the quantitative analysis; and (d) some reflections upon the politics of the SALT process in the light of this case.

TEST AND EVALUATION IN THE 1980s — A WISH LIST

ABSTRACTIn 1970, the Department of Defense issued new policies that revolutionized the management of weapons acquisition programs. As an integral part of the changes that ensued, the function of Test and Evaluation (T&E) came to play a critical role in the weapons acquisition process. T&E results have become a key determinant in the process of program approvals. The Navy had a very difficult challenge to meet in establishing its own policies and procedures to meet the intent of these “try before buy” requirements. It was five yean before the first programs fully structured according to these requirements achieved initial operational capability. It has been, therefore, only within the last three years that our experience base has provided sufficient feedback to allow us to refine our procedures. One lesson learned has been very clear — the new T&E policies have a significant impact on every facet of naval engineering.It is appropriate at this time to assess the results of the new T&E policies and the effectiveness of our practices in implementing them. As could be expected, such a revolutionary change in the way we did business introduced its own inherent problems. This paper traces the T&E policies from the role it played in weapons acquisitions during the 1960s to that of the 1970s. Experience gained to date is used to identify several prime areas where improvements are needed. A “Wish List” of four candidates is presented which, in the view of the Author, offer the most potential for effecting these improvements and maximizing the value of the substantial resources being spent on T&E.

Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process

This review article presents three case studies of the U.S. strategic weapons acquisition process: the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Polaris fleet ballistic missile (FBM), and the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). By considering programs that stretch from the 1950s to the 1970s, the essay provides a record of the changing environment of American weapons choices over the past 25 years. After a description of research methods and major arguments, each study is assessed in terms of bureaucratic politics and of its relevance to contemporary policy. Conclusions are drawn about the most fruitful approach to the study of weapons acquisition, about the lessons of these cases for the development of weapons in an age of arms control, and about the challenges of future studies.

Design and Development of Weapons. Studies in Government and Industrial Organisation.

Journal Article Design and Development of Weapons. Studies in Government and Industrial OrganisationThe Weapons Acquisition Process. Economic Incentives Get access Design and Development of Weapons. Studies in Government and Industrial Organisation. (History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Civil Series.) By M. M. Postan, D. Hay and J. D. Scott. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and Longmans, Green & Co., 1964. Pp. xiv + 579. 63s.) The Weapons Acquisition Process. Economic Incentives. By F. M. Scherer. (Harvard, Mass.:. Harvard Business School (London: Bailey Bros. Ltd.), 1964. Pp. xvii + 445. 67s. 6d.) P. D. Henderson P. D. Henderson Lincoln College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 75, Issue 300, 1 December 1965, Pages 843–847, https://doi.org/10.2307/2229700 Published: 01 December 1965

Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Inventives

Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Inventives

The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Inventives

The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Inventives

The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives

The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives

The weapons acquisition process: An economic analysis

This volume is the first publication resulting from a three-year research project at the Harvard Business School on the development of advanced weapons. It is based upon comprehensive historical case studies of twelve weapon system programs and seven commercial product developments, and upon more limited investigations of several specific research questions.

Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics, The Economic Effects of Disarmament, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, Disarmament, Economic Growth and International Co-operation and The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis

Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics, The Economic Effects of Disarmament, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, Disarmament, Economic Growth and International Co-operation and The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis

Book Reviews

Book Reviews —Frisch, Ragnar. Planning for India: selected explorations in methodology. Bombay and Calcutta: Asia Publishing House and Statistical Publishing Society, 1960, $6.00, 86 pp., double spread flow chart and Sandee, Jan. A demonstration planning model for India. Bombay and Calcutta: Asia Publishing House and Statisical Publishing Society, 1960 $4.75, 60 pp—reviewed by S. K. Ghaswala; —Peck, Merton J. and Scherer, Frederic M. The weapons acquisition process: an economic analysis. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962, $10.00, 736 pp—reviewed by Murray A. Geisler; —Argyris, Chris. Interpersonal competence and organizational effectiveness. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962, $6.50, 292 pp—reviewed by Mason Haire; —Buffa, Elwood S. Modern production management. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961, 636 pp—reviewed by Malcolm H. Gotterer; —Lloyd, David K. and Lipow, Myron. Reliability: management methods, and mathematics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, $11.25, 528 pp—reviewed by Murray A. Geisler; —Batchelor, James H. Operations research, an annotated bibliography. St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis University Press, Vol. I (through 1957), 1959, $10.00, x + 866pp., Vol. II (1958–1959), 1962, $12.50., xi + 628 pp., Vol. III (1960), 1963—reviewed by Robert E. Machol. Books Received