Theory Of Warfare Research Articles

On War in Space

Earth orbital space is a militarily and economically critical arena to the U.S. While space has never been forcibly contested to date, this initial period of coincidental quiescence is coming to an end. A growing number of states are developing the means with which not merely to access and exploit space, but to conduct space warfare as well. The time has thus arrived to address the issue of war in space, driving the need for a conceptual framework with which to approach the defense of U.S. space assets and related military and economic security. This paper focuses on developing a theory of space warfare, as distinct from most other treatises in this field, which focus on space power theory. It accomplishes this via a deductive process, exploring some of the current thinking on military theories in general, and examining their applications to space warfare specifically. The result of this analysis is a set of theoretical principles summarizing and describing the nature and needs of war in space. It is hoped that these principles will prove useful in future to the processes of designing weapon systems as well as planning, deploying, training, and conducting space combat strategies and operations.

Is Africa Seeing Fourth Generation Warfare, or is the Model Flawed?

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis. Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1

Milton, Grotius, and the Law of War: A Reading of Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes

Milton, Grotius, and the Law of War:A Reading of Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes Elizabeth Oldman "Most true is the saying that all things are uncertainthe moment men depart from the Law." —Hugo Grotius, "Prolegomena" to De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) What caused Milton to suggest the inevitability of war, to emphasize martial strife as a metaphor or as a subject of pedagogy, and to describe battle with a formidable array of authentic trappings? From his earliest gunpowder poems to his employment as Secretary for Foreign Tongues to the Council of State, where he witnessed crucial decision-making concerning the preparations for and conduct of warfare such as funding and strategy debate, the poet worked and lived consumed by war. The majority of scholars have concluded that Milton was unreservedly opposed to military discord. Foremost Miltonists such as Stella Purce Revard and James A. Freeman, for example,1 maintain that Milton's work illustrates that battle cripples man physically and spiritually—that war exists as his most barbarous error. In contrast with this prevailing perspective, my study seeks to show that the poet's sustained depiction of war's violence is predicated on his optimism that the parameters of battle may be kept within reasonable juristic limits. By aligning the poet's lengthy engagement with warfare, both in life and art, with the development of legal theories of warfare in the European [End Page 340] seventeenth century, this essay questions the characterization of Milton either as a militarist or a pacifist, a ferocious "warfaring Christian" or an opponent to the use of violence in any form.2 Integral to Milton's emphasis upon natural law in relation to martial theory is his profound affiliation with leading Dutch naturalist writer Hugo Grotius. I argue that Milton endorses Grotian themes such as the social nature of man, the moral foundations of waging just battle to protect rights, and prohibition against property usurpation as a shore against his increasing pessimism. Grotianism enables Milton to eschew the increasing reality and greatest trepidation that the English Civil War—his efforts in it and hopes he had for it—was without meaning. This article is divided into three sections. Section one frames its discussion of Milton and Grotius with an overview of war during the Renaissance and proceeds in section two to demonstrate why the Dutch scholar's concept of natural law was endemic to Milton's portrayal of martial strife. The third and final section includes a Grotian reading of Paradise Regained (1671) and Samson Agonistes (1671). The poet's devotion to Grotian principles in these companion pieces enables his confidence in the limits of justice to establish whether battle is just or criminal. Milton shows us how law may be manifested in relation to the people in the organization of statehood and community. Consistent with Grotian sociability, he seeks to establish that the foundation of the jus gentium (law of nations) lies in the natural law and has its basis in appetitus societatis (desire for society). I The portrayal of a resolutely anti-militaristic Milton is compelling, it seems to me, when we consider him in reference to twenty-first century standards of battle, in the context of our age of mass destruction that has the potential to use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Compared to the sophisticated technology and complex tactics of modern day globalized warfare, military efforts during the Renaissance involved a great deal more flexibility and realism and inspired a much more tangible dialectic of just versus criminal warfare. Though involving myriad human and economic costs, as do all wars, weaponry buildup was comparatively contained and finite during this earlier period due to technological constraints. Firearms signaled the spirit of [End Page 341] human advancement and inquiry, but they also increased the loss of life. For the most part, developments toward the codification of international law were made to include considerations of armed strife in order to address, clarify, and delineate these limitations. During war's ascendancy in Renaissance Europe, battle was increasingly professionalized, and the efficiency of state armies was augmented. Efforts revolved around rendering martial endeavors more productive. As J. R. Hale observes, "on the battlefield...

A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking (review)

Reviewed by: A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking Jeremy E. Henkel A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking. By François Jullien, translated by Janet Lloyd. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. x + 202. $22.00. In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking François Jullien argues that the different ways Chinese and Western thinkers have dealt with warfare and diplomacy reflect important differences in how the two cultures understand human action in the world. When Chinese texts such as the Sunzi and the Guiguzi are set up as counterpoints to the Europeans Clausewitz and Machiavelli, Jullien argues that the Aristotelian inheritance of the latter pair is shown to be the cause of their inability to provide clean theories with the consistent predictive power they desired. Chinese strategists, by contrast, meet with no such limitations in the realm of human interaction. The basic difference between Western and Chinese thought that Jullien seeks to demonstrate is that "one constructs a model that is then projected onto the situation, which implies that the situation is momentarily 'frozen.' The other relies on the situation as on a disposition that is known to be constantly evolving" (p. 189; italics in original). Jullien's regular use of the generic terms "Western" and "Chinese" in constructing his comparison will likely give many comparative philosophers pause. But this [End Page 347] need not be a source of worry, as he is careful not to essentialize the two world-views. While he is pointing out patterns and tendencies in the thinking of Europe and China, he is not positing an essential incommensurable difference between them. Rather, he is pointing out that "what remains underdeveloped in the one context is more developed in the other" (p. 145). He goes on to say, "The purpose of our foray into China is not to imagine-let alone fabricate-other 'mentalities'. . . . It is simply to make use of other possible sources of intelligibility" (ibid.). Jullien begins by showing that Western thought regards human action as something that imposes itself on the world in order to bring about a predetermined goal. This is a natural consequence of the belief that the world is created: belief in creation implies something existing outside that creation, thus an intention behind that creation, and thus a transcendent norm toward which things within that creation aim. This two-leveled ontology of creator and creation yields a distinction between theory and practice, wherein practice always aims-and ultimately fails-at implementing an ideal that is established by theory. This worldview has led to demonstrable success in the sciences but meets with frequent frustration in the arena of human interaction. This limitation has been recognized by strategists in the West but has never been successfully resolved. Aristotle was the first to identify and try to resolve this problem. He posited phronesis as the skill that enables an individual to apply a model to the world successfully. For Aristotle such successful action consists of first identifying one's desired end and then reasoning back to one's present situation in order to establish the best means to achieve that end. Jullien's analysis shows that Clausewitz was working with the same model more than two thousand years later. Clausewitz believed that earlier attempts at creating a general theory of warfare had failed to achieve their goal-namely, to provide a model of warfare that a general could use to ensure victory-because the opponent's actions are unpredictable. The system that the military strategist is dealing with, then, is not mechanistic, and consequently plans are easily frustrated by ever-changing circumstances. But Clausewitz was unable to conceive of strategy as based on anything other than plans. For Clausewitz, warfare is composed of distinct engagements, separate moments in time where an army seeks to impose a plan on the world. Seeing warfare as composed of distinct moments means that time is an opponent, for time brings with it change and uncertainty and thus a greater chance that one's plans will be frustrated. Opportunity, then, is something unexpected-a chance happening at a specific moment that can be taken advantage of only...

Medieval warfare: theory and practice of war in Europe, 300-1500

Warfare in medieval times was never static or predictable - although there were ideals and conventions to follow, in the field commanders had to use their initiative and adapt to the needs of the moment. In this concise, wide-ranging study, Helen Nicholson provides the essential introductory guide to a fascinating subject. Medieval Warfare - surveys and summarises current debates and modern research into warfare throughout the whole of the medieval period across Europe - sets medieval warfare theory and practice firmly into context as a continuation and adaptation of practice under the Roman Empire, tracing its change and development across more than a millennium - considers military personnel, buildings and equipment, as well as the practice of warfare by land and sea

Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare

Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. A turning point appeared in mid-October 2003 when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's memo on the future of Iraqi operations surfaced. His musings about whether US forces were ready for protracted guerrilla warfare sparked widespread debate about US planning for counterinsurgency operations. Little attention has been paid to the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare in mainstream strategic studies journals. Discussions of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and RMA-associated technologies for battlefield surveillance and precision targeting dominated defense planning discourse in the 1990s. Nation-building and peacekeeping discussions rarely addressed counterinsurgency warfare, perhaps because nation-building operations during the 1990s did not confront a determined, violent insurgency. Meanwhile, with knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare waning among policymakers, resurgent terrorism scholarship and counterterrorism policy initiatives avoided the issue of a strategic terrorist campaign to destabilize nation-building. More recently, vague historical references and misplaced analogies to Vietnam have muddled discussions of the Iraqi counterinsurgency effort. Lessons and insights from past low-intensity wars deserve revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context for what may be a defining period for the American war on terrorism. What lessons from past counterinsurgencies can inform current efforts? What theoretical and operational issues are available to aid Coalition activities? This exploration of why counterinsurgencies fail avoids the American experience in Vietnam, a subject that continues to evoke images and arguments that could possibly overshadow the central purpose--that is, discussing the lessons of previous counterinsurgencies and their applicability to US strategy in Iraq. Avoiding the US experience in Vietnam also shifts attention to historical cases that may be more applicable to Iraq than was the US war in Southeast Asia. Revisiting Modern War Those seeking historical insights into counterinsurgency warfare will find Roger Trinquier's classic Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency disturbingly current. First published in 1961 and one of the best-selling post-World War II books in France, Trinquier influenced a generation of counterinsurgency scholarship. He succeeded in describing the true face of what current observers also label war. Nearly 40 years later, for example, Mark Bowden subtitled his bestseller Black Hawk Down, the story of a US Special Forces operation in Somalia gone awry, A Story of Modern War. (1) Despite important differences between Somalia and the colonial independence conflicts Trinquier participated in, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect many of the nonlinear, unconventional elements of what Trinquier labeled modern war to distinguish between armored battles between nation-states and counterinsurgencies pitting nation-builders against organizations using terrorist tactics. Trinquier was introduced to counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina before being assigned to Algeria in 1957 as a Lieutenant Colonel with the French 10th Parachute Division. Decades of service conditioned his views. Algeria inspired his writings on modern war, including a penetrating testimony to the central tenet of counterinsurgency: winning the allegiance of the indigenous population. A systematic approach is needed. Counterinsurgencies require an interlocking system of actions--political, economic, psychological, military--that aims at the [insurgents' intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. …

Stochastic aspects of Lanchester's theory of warfare

A Markov chain model for a battle between two opposing forces is formulated, which is a stochastic version of one studied by F. W. Lanchester. Solutions of the backward equations for the final state yield martingales and stopping identities, but a more powerful technique is a time-reversal analogue of a known method for studying urn models. A general version of a remarkable result of Williams and McIlroy (1998) is proved.

Stochastic aspects of Lanchester's theory of warfare

A Markov chain model for a battle between two opposing forces is formulated, which is a stochastic version of one studied by F. W. Lanchester. Solutions of the backward equations for the final state yield martingales and stopping identities, but a more powerful technique is a time-reversal analogue of a known method for studying urn models. A general version of a remarkable result of Williams and McIlroy (1998) is proved.

The Kosovo War: Kosovar Insurrection, Serbian Retribution and NATO Intervention

This article analyses the triangular strategic interaction between the Kosovar Albanians, the Serbs and NATO in the Kosovo War. The focus is first on the origins and nature of the armed conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs in 1998, the strategy of which is analysed in terms of guerrilla warfare theory applied to the political and geostrategic context of Kosovo. An assessment follows of the reasons that led the Milosevic regime to its policy of a mass expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, taking into account political and demographic factors. The second half of the paper analyses the strategic interaction between Serbia and NATO in the spring of 1999 that determined the course and outcome of the culminating phase of the Kosovo War.

A Bioarchaeological Perspective on the History of Violence

▪ Abstract Traumatic injuries in ancient human skeletal remains are a direct source of evidence for testing theories of warfare and violence that are not subject to the interpretative difficulties posed by literary creations such as historical records and ethnographic reports. Bioarchaeological research shows that throughout the history of our species, interpersonal violence, especially among men, has been prevalent. Cannibalism seems to have been widespread, and mass killings, homicides, and assault injuries are also well documented in both the Old and New Worlds. No form of social organization, mode of production, or environmental setting appears to have remained free from interpersonal violence for long.

A Critique of the Boyd Theory - Is it Relevant to the Army?

Abstract : Col. John Boyd, USAF (Ret), famous for developing the OODA (Observe-Orient- Decide-Act) loop model, spent most of his adult life trying to convince the U.S. military establishment of the merits of his theory for maneuver warfare later called the Boyd Theory. With the exception of the Marine Corps, his message found only limited appeal. Most of the services incorporated his four-step model into their doctrine simply to help describe the military command and control process. In contrast, the Marine Corps accepted his completed thoughts as a theory of warfare and adopted it as the basis for their capstone operational philosophy. This paper explores the complete theory espoused by Col. John Boyd in an aftempt to uncover the true meanings behind the famous model. The intent is to determine what it is and whether it has any utility to Army operational philosophy. This monograph begins with an exploration of the first question-what is the Boyd Theory? To many it is simply the OODA loop depicting the human behavioral cycle of decision-making. To others it is a description of command and control. To true believers, it is a profound theory of warfare. To answer this question, this study begins with a review of several primary source documents including Boyd's 1976 unpublished essay entitled Destruction and Creation to discern the basic elements of his theory. Building on this, the study explores the remaining unpublished primary source writings (slide presentations) that Boyd developed over a period of approximately 10 years to understand the completed form of his theory. After establishing a base knowledge of his theory, the study measures Boyd's ideas against those of several recent critics. The monograph concludes that the Boyd Theory is primarily a conception of human interaction in conflict. As such, his ideas encompass both the process of command and control and the ideas behind maneuver warfare.

How Scholarship Defames the Native Voice. .. and Why

he examination of Indian-white relations in America by academics in the disciplines has always been a contentious matter. But for a few brief decades of this century, from 1960 to 1990, there seemed to be an empathetic and mutually supporting relationship between publishers and scholars and Indians who had begun to provoke reassessments in the emerging postcolonial debates. In the midsixties, as an early example of mutual interest and respect, Black Elk Speaks, the story of an Oglala holy man told by a University of Nebraska poet, John Niehardt, became an international bestseller. In the early eighties, I, Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala (London: Verso, 1984), a life story translated by Ann Wright and edited by Elisabeth Burgos (an anthropologist in Paris and the wife of Regis Debray, the French philosopher who popularized Cuban theories of guerilla warfare), also became a best-seller and won a Nobel Peace Prize for its Guatemalan Indian subject. In these years also, a young Kiowa professor of literature from Oklahoma, N. Scott Momaday, won a Pulitzer for his novel about the relocation period of contemporary s 79 American Indian history, House Made of Dawn, and he has been acclaimed ever since as the preeminent literary voice of Native America. These are just a few of the examples of postcolonial work by Indian scholars who during those years began to wage a battle against what they alleged was a practice in academia to disbelieve or to blame or to damage their efforts to become a part of the American intellectual voice.

A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology

In this brief history of warfare research, I identify four major periods: Foundation Period, Classical Period, Golden Age, and Recent Period. The myth of the peaceful savage arose in the Classical Period rather than in the later periods, as argued by Lawrence Keeley. The myth has its origins in an early evolutionary approach as well as in cultural relativism. It continues to play a major role in warfare research with some anthropologists arguing for the peaceable nature of man, while others argue that man has engaged in warfare from the beginning of prehistory, [war, theories of warfare, history of warfare research, myth of peaceful savage]

Unification, Deduction, and History: A Reply to Steel

Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropological theory of Yanomami warfare but that a unification theory of explanation cannot. I argue that a unification theory can explain such an account, in a manner similar to Hempel's view of explanation in history. I go on to argue that the unification theory allows for different explanations of specific and general social circumstances.

The past as prologue: Assessing theories of future warfare

(1998). The past as prologue: Assessing theories of future warfare. Security Studies: Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-74.

The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War

How has war shaped modern society and vice versa? How has it changed over the centuries between the introduction of firearms and the invention of the atom bomb? How is war waged today? This excitingly illustrated book examines the techniques, technology, and theory of warfare from the 'military revolution' of the seventeenth century to the present day. The expert contributors explore major developments and themes, including the extraordinary achievements of Napoleon's armies; the role of nationalism in battlegrounds as various as the American Civil War and the former Yugoslavia; colonial wars; the concept and reality of 'total war'; guerrilla warfare and 'people's wars'. The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War offers a comprehensive overview of military conflict over several centuries, with fascinating thematic chapters covering air and sea warfare, combat experience, technology, and even opposition to war. Contributors...; Jeremy Black, University of Exeter; John Bourne, University of Birmingham; John Childs, University of Leeds; Jean Bethke Elshtain, University of Chicago; Alan Forrest, University of York; David French, University College London; John B. Hattendorf, Naval War College, Rhode Island; Richard Holmes, Cranfield University; Richard Overy, King's College London; Douglas Porch, US Postgraduate Naval School, Monterey, California; Adam Roberts, University of Oxford; Mark Roseman, Keele University; Philip Towle, University of Cambridge; Charles Townshend, Keele University; Martin van Creveld, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

In pursuit of military excellence: the evolution of operational theory

certainly the most important work of military theory in recent years. foriegn Affairs Mar/Apr 1998 RUSI Journal - October 1998 - Reviewed By Lieutenant General Scott Grant is perhaps not surprising that Navez, in his book In Pursuit of Military Excellence, considers the evolution of the operational theory of warfare with such a rare combination of intellectual rigour and military expertise. ..he has, in my opinion, written an important book.. ..quality of his analysis nor the deepth of his research.. Suffice to say that this is a very good book indeed: it should be required reading for every serious soldier. Cambridge Review of International Affairs - Reviewed by Andrew Coller Shimon Navehs book is both readable and a valuable exposition of the Russian experience and thought which, even now, remains difficult for Western readers to access easily. also provides clear insight into the mistakes of the past through a critique of commanders who have held blindly to a philosophy of war that was grounded in a mistaken assumption about how to achieve a strategic aim - the battle of destruction. His book is neither too technical nor too simplistic and provides the reader with an interesting view on how todays modern Western military doctrine has evolved and has been implemented. SLAVIC REVIEW It is therefore in his explicit and thorough application of systems theory to military theory that the work derives msuch of its novelty. Journal of Military History- mixed review- see file is potentially important, carefully researched, and frequently insightful but it is also distinctly biased, unsoundly argued, and maddeningly composed

Prospects for social democracy in postcolonial societies

Between the two extremes of capitalism and communism, democratic socialism provided a vague ideological comfort to the Afro‐Asian nationalist, vague because democratic socialism allowed the nationalists to produce a fine mismatch of capitalist and communist theories. They rejected the economics of capitalism because it produced great income disparities, but accepted its political ideas of democracy, rule of law, and other liberal benefits. They admired, on the other hand, the communist model of industrial transformation of a socially backward society, but deplored its system of political subjugation. They did not even enquire whether the economic benefits of communism (a belief not challenged until the late 1980s) could be wedded to the political blessings of capitalism. But the possibility of achieving such a mismatch provided great comfort to the Afro‐Asian nationalists, because they could spin out new ideologies without having to explain or substantiate them. Hence, Jawaharlal Nehru of India went about building socialism on the basis of central economic planning and parliamentary sovereignty, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal mixed Negritude with socialism, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana linked scientific socialism with what he blandly coined as “conscientism.” The ease with which such ideologies were cooked up set a fashion among Third World leaders to act as individual political guides for their own people. Unlike the communist theory of class warfare, their ideas were highly eclectic and flexible, and therefore considered less dangerous to the colonial system. Hence, although the communists were suppressed almost everywhere in the colonies, social democrats of various breeds were tolerated and even encouraged by the colonial administrators. In some cases, as in the countries of Commonwealth Africa, British socialists, Fabians, and trade unionists actively disseminated democratic socialist ideas among the African nationalists. In Francophone Africa, after their initial bonhomie with the French communists, most African leaders turned to different socialist groups for intellectual sustenance.

Book Review: Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859–1917

Book Review: Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859–1917

’Small wars’ and ‘imperial policing’: The British army and the theory and practice of colonial warfare in the British empire, 1919–1939

(1996). ’Small wars’ and ‘imperial policing’: The British army and the theory and practice of colonial warfare in the British empire, 1919–1939. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 19, Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice, pp. 105-131.