Abstract
This article analyses the triangular strategic interaction between the Kosovar Albanians, the Serbs and NATO in the Kosovo War. The focus is first on the origins and nature of the armed conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs in 1998, the strategy of which is analysed in terms of guerrilla warfare theory applied to the political and geostrategic context of Kosovo. An assessment follows of the reasons that led the Milosevic regime to its policy of a mass expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, taking into account political and demographic factors. The second half of the paper analyses the strategic interaction between Serbia and NATO in the spring of 1999 that determined the course and outcome of the culminating phase of the Kosovo War.
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