Walter Chatton Research Articles

Walter Chatton on the Connection of the Virtues

Is it possible to enjoy good character in some respects while being deficient in others? For example, can one be temperate or just without being brave? Furthermore, does our moral character affect our ability to make good decisions concerning our lives and is such an ability a prerequisite for developing our character? In other words, are the moral virtues and prudence connected? None of the medieval thinkers deny that such connections exist at some level. They disagree, however, on whether or not the moral virtues are co-dependent, and whether or not the interdependency of moral virtues and prudence is mutual. In addition, they differ regarding the degree of connection at specific levels of moral development. The point on which they most readily agree is that some kind of prudence is required in order to enjoy the moral virtues. The most significant point of disagreement, however, is the reverse question: Can a person be prudent without being virtuous? The answers to these questions, particularly the last one, reveal not only the thinkers’ conceptions of the nature and role of prudence in ethics, but more fundamentally their conceptions of reason, will, and the passions, and of their role in moral development. Thus the study of this problem tends to yield a fruitful insight into particular moral theories and into general intellectual tendencies of a certain time. While this topic has been surveyed with respect to many thirteenth century authors, the studies of fourteenth century accounts are still limited to a few «major» thinkers, such as Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Gerald Odonis, and John Buridan1. Walter Chatton’s treatment of this problem, which is the object of this

Can God Make a Picasso? William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Divine Power and Real Relations

This article focuses on one aspect of the late mediaeval debate over divine power, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). Chatton and Ockham would have agreed, for example, that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso, but they would not agree over wheher it violates God's omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made, for example, the painting Guernica, without using Picasso himself as an intermediate cause. The context of their dispute was a larger debate regarding the ontological status of relations. This article (1) explains how these two issues, omnipotence and relations, became so interestingly tangled together, (2) tries to see which of the two men mentioned above got the better of their exchange, and finally (3) draws out some important consequences for fourteenth-century discussions of causality, occasionalism, and omnipotence.

John Buridan and the Problems of Dualism in the Early Fourteenth Century

In this paper I argue that the famous problems of dualism between mind (soul) and body, that is, the problems of interaction and unification, concerned philosophers already in a medieval Aristotelian tradition. The problems, although traceable earlier, become particularly visible after William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, and in formulating his own position on the animal and human souls I argue that Buridan realized these problems and laid down the only views on the soul he thought to be possible in an Aristotelian framework. His discussion then sets the stage for the following centuries. In presenting the background to Buridan's discussion I treat Aquinas, Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham

The So-Called Res Theory of Walter Chatton

37 Franciscan Studies 61 (2003) The So-Called Res Theory of Walter Chatton I We should start by distinguishing and explaining four important questions in fourteenth-century philosophy of language. (1) What are the truth-bearers for subject-predicate sentences? (2) What are the truth-makers for subject-predicate sentences? (3) What are the significates of subject-predicate sentences? (4) What are the objects of assent? (Acts of assent include knowing, believing, opining, doubting, etc.) (1) The question of truth-bearers asks: What features of reality ultimately bear the properties true and false and so thereby play a role in explaining why certain sentences are true or false? Some possible candidates for the job of truth-bearer are: (a) sentence-tokens themselves, i.e., actual instances of sentences, whether written, spoken, or mental; (b) propositions, which, let us say, are non-physical entities associated with the meanings of declarative sentences; or perhaps (c) complexe significabilia, extra-mental objects which are given by the dicta of declarative sentences. For example, the complexe significabilia associated with “God is three and one” is that God is three and one (in Latin Deum esse trinum et unum or quod Deus est trinus et unus).1 (2) The question of truth-makers asks: What elements of reality are responsible for making true sentences true (and, typically, false sentences false)? Some possible candidates here are: (a) a combination of (i) the passage of time, (ii) change of location, or (iii) the generation 1 The literature on complexe significabilia is fairly large and cannot be usefully summarized in a footnote. A few of the discussions on the topic that I have read and found useful are as follows: Elizabeth Karger, "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief," Vivarium 33, no. 2 (1995): 171-196; Gabriel Nuchelmans, "Adam Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences," Historiographia Linguistica 8 no. 1 and 2 (1980): 177-187 and "The Semantics of Propositions," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Richard Gaskin, "Complexe significabilia and Aristotle's Categories," in J. Baird and I Rossier, eds., Actes du XIIIe Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 2000). RONDO KEELE 38 or corruption of some res;2 (b) exclusively res themselves, i.e., things in the ten Aristotelian categories; (c) complexe significabilia; or in a modern vein, (d) states of affairs. (3) The question of the significates of sentences asks: Which elements of reality does a sentence call to mind? Generally speaking, signification is just that power of language whereby we are caused to think of certain things, viz., the things that the language in question is about. Usually we talk about the signification of simple terms of a language, rather than the signification of whole sentences, but there is no reason why the question of sentential signification cannot be at least raised. Signification of spoken or written signs is conventional, of course, but the signification of mental language has a non-conventional connection to the things it signifies. Moreover, spoken and written signs are subordinate to mental signs in some fashion. Hence we can say that question (3) is best understood as follows: A mental sentence signifies whatever entity or entities it naturally causes me to think about; what are those entities? Some possible candidates are: (a) strictly speaking, nothing, but if we consider loosely the question of the reference of sentences, then loosely they could refer to a restricted class of res, for example, only individual substances and their individual qualities (b) a broader class of res, in particular, the res that the subject term in the mental sentence is about (and possibly the predicate terms in a polyadic predication); or again (c) complexe significabilia. (4) Finally, the question of objects of assent asks: What pieces of reality serve as the termini of our "assertive" mental acts, i.e., those mental acts that relate to claims that can be true or false. Some possible candidates include: (a) mental sentences themselves; (b) res, in particular, the res that the subject term in the mental sentence...

Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure in Hell: Four Franciscan Masters on the Relationship between Love and Pleasure, and Hatred and Displeasure

My aim in this paper is to study the relationship between love and pleasure as understood by the Franciscan masters Peter Aureol, William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham. These masters have treated this relationship in their commentaries on Peter Lombard'sSentences, book 1, distinction 1. The standard subject matter of the first distinction of scholasticSentencescommentaries was the nature of beatific enjoyment (fruitio beatifica). The comparative study of these texts is important, because it sheds some light on the history of fourteenth-century scholastic philosophy of human psychology in general, and on the contribution of Franciscan writers to the philosophical and theological analysis of volition and emotions in particular.

Himmlische Sätze

Abstract In reply to the question whether articles of faith can be demonstrated, William of Ockham articulated a peculiar thesis: Even though it is impossible to prove articles of faith in this life, the blessed in heaven could demonstrate our creditive propositions. In contrast to traditional views, William held that both conclusions drawn in heaven and conclusions drawn in this life are subject to the same criteria. This assumption led to a controversy between William's contemporaries, namely, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham, who discussed whether theories of propositions are applicable to articles of faith. This essay tries to explain why the problem of demonstrating creditive propositions arose and in what way William's answer gave a new meaning to the dispute.

William of Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 493 devenir, est formellement et de mani~re immtdiatement evident principe d'intelligibilitt , ~ moins de reduire l'etre au devenir, et de dire que tout devient historiquement " (my italics). This contrast of a domain of being (with its doctrinal principles) set over against the realm of history makes one wonder if the author is not enmeshed in the very net of "principles" which he so clearly identifies as the problem in Scotism. This is a work of philosophical polemic. By ignoring more recent work on Scotus, Ockham and later medieval philosophy, it conveniently presents the older theses of modern Neo-Thomism, which presented a historiography of philosophy in such a manner as to disenfranchise any philosophy, Franciscan or Augustinian. Even those early modern Thomist philosophers such as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas are seen to be infected with the same Scotist virus. Still, the author does acknowledge that the philosophy of St. Thomas did not dominate the late Middle Ages. The modern dominance of the philosophy of St. Thomas in the Catholic world and in some modern secular treatments of medieval philosophy is largely due to the polemics of the Reformation. One cannot conveniently separate "structures of thought" from historical realizadons of doctrine. That leads to an aprioristic phenomenological ahistorical world of pure essences. While there are many very valuable discussions of philosophy in this volume, the danger is that the complexity of the historically situated medieval debates will be ignored. For example, Gregory of Rimini is not just proto-Luther. And Scotus and Ockham are misread if they are seen as simply preparatory for later Reformation and Counter-Reformation polemics. And that means setting aside preconceived theses, fixed ideas, vague historical schemata. And it also means that one has to take into account the nitty-gritty of science, logic, and metaphysics in order to get a more real sense of the genesis of late medieval thought. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, this work does merit much study. And it should sharpen the present debate on the nature and significance of late medieval philosophy. JEREMIAH HACKETT University of South Carolina Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley, translators. William of Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions. Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, a99a. a vols. Pp. xxviii + 7oa. Cloth, Slot.to. In terms of both quantity and difficulty, an English translation of William of Ockham's Quodlibeta is a daunting enterprise. It is daunting for at least two reasons. It is, first of all, a very technical work. Secondly, it often carries the author's responses to arguments of Walter Chatton, a Franciscan confrere and opponent--arguments which are often not found in Ockham's text and must, therefore, be traced elsewhere (principally to Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. Joseph C. Wey, CSB). Despite these difficulties, however, this translation 494 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:3 JULY I994 is a most welcome work, since it presents to a wider audience the final fruits of Ockham's theological and philosophical career. For those accustomed to using Ock~m: Philosophical Writings, even in its newer version (Boehner-Brown), as their main sourcebook for the thought of the Venerable Inceptor, the comparison of translations at points of overlap will be inevitable. For the most part, both translations of Quod//beta passages are suitable English renditions of Ockham's Latin. There are points, however, where the Freddoso-Kelley rendering seems an improvement. Since in Quodlibet V, q. I Ockham is speaking about two different types of science--theology and natural science--Freddoso's "in different sciences" (399, line 2) seems superior to Boehner's "in different kinds of knowledge" (loo, line 2). Also, in Quodlibet/, q. 13, Freddoso-Kelley's "when a shield seems to change colors as one moves closer and farther away" (67, lines 13-14) seems preferable to Boehner's "when something like a many-coloured shield is viewed from a greater or lesser distance" (31, lines 19-2o). In the same q. 13, Boehner generally translates, somewhat awkwardly, "visio" as "look," while Freddoso-Kelley, somewhat more suitably , employ "vision." A careless reader might imagine...

How it played in the Rue de Fouarre : The Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the Complexe Significable in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century

How it played in the RUE DE FOUARRE: The Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABLE in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century One of the many great contributions made by Fr. Gedeon Gal to medieval philosophical scholarship was his discovery that the theory that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the complexe significabile (i.e., a state of affairs capable of being signified by a proposition), a view traditionally attributed to the Parisian Augustinian, Gregory of Rimini,1 was in fact authored by the English Franciscan Adam Wodeham, who conceived of it ". . . as a via media between the positions of Walter Chatton and William of Ockham."2 As with virtually all of Fr. Gedeon's work (and that of his colleagues at Franciscan Institute, where he has spent most of his later academic career), the consequence of this particular finding is not simply a matter of revising the appropriate chapters in our medieval intellectual biographies. Rather, it introduces at least two new and highly promising avenues of research. First, it shows that the early 14th-century Franciscan debate on the object of scientific 'For the modern source of the misattribution, see Hubert EHe, Le complexe significabile (Paris: Vrin, 1936), 9. Elie's assessment was adopted early and often in subsequent literature on the problem. See, e.g., Julius Weinberg, Nicolaus of Autrecourt: A Study in 14th-Century Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), 236-237; Mario Dal Pra, "La teoria del 'significato totale' della proposizione nel pensiero di Gregorio di Rimini," Rivista critica di storia della filosofía 11 (1956), 287; Ruprecht Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut. Zur Enstehung des Realitätsbegriffs der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft (Berlin: 1970), 198-223; and Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), 227-272. 2Gedeon Gal, O.F.M., "Adam of Wodeham's Question on the 'Complexe Significabile' as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge," Franciscan Studies 37 (1977), 66-102. The text of this Question has since re-appeared as Dist. 1, Quaest. 1 in the critical edition of Wodeham's Lectura Secunda, the work from which it was first edited: Adam de Wodeham, Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gal, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), 180-208. All further references to the text of Wodeham's Question will be to the latter edition. 211 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 212JACKZUPKO knowledge is more sophisticated than has hitherto been imagined, with Wodeham consciously advancing the complexe significabile in response to alternatives defended by Ockham and Chatton.3 Second, it provides further, decisive, evidence for the influence exerted by English thought upon Parisian philosophy and theology in the second quarter of the 14th-century.4 Thus, through a comparative study of texts, Fr. Gedeon concludes not only that "Gregory of Rimini was strongly and directly influenced by Wodeham," but also that although Gregory "made some contribution to the solution of the problem [of scientific knowledge], he gave a mutilated presentation of the great debate between Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham."5 In the present study I shall be concerned with the second avenue suggested by Fr. Gedeon's research, and specifically with the question of how Wodeham's theory of the complexe significabile was transmitted to Arts Masters at the University of Paris in the middle decades of the 14th century. Why should what happened in the Faculty of Arts be of interest here? Well, one of the more interesting measures of doctrinal fallout is the influence a given theory has on spheres of inquiry outside that in which it is first proposed—which, in the case of the complexe significabile, would be outside the Faculty of Theology, in places where the primary philosophical artifacts are not Sentences commentaries but commentaries on the works of Aristotle. I will be able to give only a tiny sample of this fallout here, however, and only by way of conclusion. Most of this study will be devoted to a ground-clearing exercise, i.e., to showing that something absolutely crucial for understanding the epistemological implications of Wodeham...

The Parisian Franciscan Community in 1303

One of the many contributions made by Gedeon Gai in the course of his career has been the precision he has been able to bring to the biographies of numerous English Franciscans, most especially William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham. He achieved this through his deep and extensive knowledge of manuscripts, following in the tradition of Philotheus Boehner and others, but also through his sensitivity to the details of the educational structure of the Franciscan Order in the early fourteenth century. In keeping with that interest, the following piece explores in greater detail a long-known document that throws light both on the resident community at Cordeliers in Paris in June 1303 and on the operation of the Franciscan educational system as it concerned the Paris convent.

The Propositio Famosa Scoti: Duns Scotus and Ockham on the Possibility of a Science of Theology

Duns Scotus's famous proposition was first attacked in a short polemical treatise attributed to Thomas of Sutton. By the time of Ockham, the proposition was known as the propositio famosa, so called by Walter Chatton, Ockham's colleague at Oxford and London, who defended it against Ockham's lengthy critique. At Paris, during the same period, it was called the propositio vulgata and was used approvingly by Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Navarre and Durandus St. Pourçain. This “famous proposition” was so controverted because on it depended the acceptance, with Duns Scotus, or the rejection, with Ockham, of theology as a strict, propter quid science. As its detractors and defenders must have realized, it also struck at the heart of the divergent philosophical outlooks of Duns Scotus and Ockham. For all of this, Duns Scotus's famous proposition and its history have all but escaped notice.

Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham: Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God

I want to discuss today some questions about enjoyment pursued at Oxford in roughly the second quarter of the fourteenth century by Ockham and four other philosophically acute theologians: Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, Robert Holkot, and Thomas Bradwardine. Each of these authors has claims to importance in the history of scholasticism. The numerous footnote references to Chatton in the beautiful new Ockham edition testify to his critical role in the development of his fellow Franciscan’s ideas. Marilyn Adams gives Chatton credit for forcing the Invincible Doctor to change his position on so pivotal a matter as the object of universal concepts. Chatton’s own writings continue this dialogue. Wodeham, also a Franciscan, was a student of Ockham’s and is currently regaining the reputation he once had as a major thinker in his own right.

The Franciscan Institute Medal

CITATION The Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University is privileged to honor as the first recipient of its medal for outstanding contributions to scholarship in Franciscan Studies, the Reverend Joseph C. Wey, C.S.B. Father Wey is a modest and unassuming scholar whose contributions to the critical edition of William of Ockham's Opera Philosophica et Theologica have merited international acclaim. He has been a generous and effective collaborator with the Franciscan Institute since 1973. His dedication and fidelity have served to continue the close and valued historical ties of the Franciscan Institute with the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. We are particularly grateful for his critical editions of Ockham's Quodlibets and the lengthy question On the Interconnectedness of the Virtues, and his edition of Walter Chatton's Sentences Commentaries. Father Wey was Superior General of the Congregation of St. Basil for twelve years and led his congregation through the difficult years of the Second Vatican Council. He enjoys the respect and gratitude of his confreres, his students, and the many research scholars of the Franciscan Institute for his quiet and invaluable assistance and inspiration. Like Saint Bonaventure, Father Wey will always be remembered and esteemed by us as a man who let Divine Wisdom be his guide and goal whether as a scholar or as a religious leader. Joseph C. Wey, C. S. B. Recipient of_the First Franciscan Institute Medal July 15, 1987 THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE MEDAL The silver medallion bears the legend "Scholarship in Franciscan Studies" and the effigies of the four great Franciscan teachers: St. Anthony of Padua, St. Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, the Venerable Inceptor. Completing the circle of the four doctors is the name of the honorée and the year of the award. FRAiVe BON C)TU ANTH JOSEPH C. WEY C.S.B. 1987 ET * VITA SPIRI ^.TUS* ON THE REVERSE SIDE of the medal is the seal of The Franciscan Institute bearing the Tau-cross-signature of St. Francis and the Institute motto, "Spirit and Life." JOSEPH CHARLES WEY, C.S.B. Joseph Charles Wey was born in Hammond, Indiana, on March i8, 1910. The family moved to a farm near Riviera, Texas, in 1913, and thence to Houston in 1917. Father Wey's primary education began at the local parochial school near Riviera in 1916 and was continued at AU Saints Parochial School in Houston, 1917-1925. His secondary education began at Heights Junior High School, Houston, 1923-1924, and was completed at St. Thomas High School in Houston, where he graduated in 1927. In the fall of 1927 he entered St. Basil's Novitiate, Toronto, where he took his first vows in August, 1928. He was appointed to St. Basil's Seminary and began his university studies in the Pass Course at the University of Toronto through St. Michael's College in 1928. In the following year he transferred into the Latin (French or Greek Option) Honour Course and graduated from this course in 1933 with First Class Honours. In the fall of the same year he began his theological studies at St. Basil's Seminary and also began graduate studies in Classics at the University of Toronto. He was awarded the M.A. in Classics in 1936, the same year in which he was ordained to the Priesthood on December 19. Father Wey began teaching in St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, as a member of the Classics staff in 1933. He taught there until 1939. After spending two quarters in graduate study at the University of Chicago in 1939, he was appointed to Assumption College, Windsor, for the year 1939-1940. There he taught Classics as well as Spanish during that academic year. In 1940 he returned to St. Michael's College, Toronto, and continued there as a member of the Classics department until 1947. He was then sent to Cambridge University, England, to pursue studies in medieval literature and in paleography. He returned in 1949 to resume his position on the Classics staff at St. Michael's College and also to begin teaching paleography and medieval Latin at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. In 1952 he was...

I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh of Lawton's Critique of William of Ockham on Mental Language

I CANNOT TELL A LIE: HUGH OF LAWTON'S CRITIQUE OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON MENTAL LANGUAGE The idea that at least some mental activity constitutes a mental language entered the medieval tradition from two ofthe most authoritative of sources: Aristotle and Augustine.1 The concept of mental language had a long history prior to the fourteenth century.2 But with William of Ockham, the history of the concept took a decided turn. Ockham devoted such systematic attention to the idea ofmental language , putting it to new uses, that discussion and controversy erupted among his successors. Discussions of mental language centered around four questions: 1). Does mental language exist? 2). Ifso, what is it like? 3). What is its relation to spoken and written language? and 4). Does postulation ofmental language do any useful philosophical work? Ockham gave a much more detailed answer to the second question than had his predecessors, changed the usual Aristotelian answer to the third question, which not only subordinated spoken language to mental, an idea Ockham maintained, but also proposed that spoken language ' Aristotle, De lnterpretatione 1.16a3—18, and see Norman Kretzman, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention," in Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, ed. John Corcoran, Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations ofAncient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972 (DordrechtHolland : D. Reidel, 1974) 3-21. For Augustine, Sermo 288 (PL XXXVIII, 1304-6), and De Trinitate, lib. 15, cap. 10, n. 19 (CCL L, 486), are the key texts. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, North-Holland Linguistic Series , no. 8 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1973) 192-4, for discussion. 2 Nuchelmans 192-4. 142HESTER GELBER referred to its mental equivalents, an idea Ockham rejected,3 and, in regard to the fourth question, opened the way for an expansion of the sorts of philosophical tasks mental language might perform. Much research lies ahead, both on Ockham himself and on the views of his successors, before the story will finally be told of how Ockham 's fruitful new position on mental language affected his contemporaries . We do know some of the chapters. Ockham is justly famous for having perceived mental as an ideal logical language.4 Also well known are his doubts about the ontological status of mental language and his halting progression from the "fictum" theory in which the constituents of mental language had only objective being to the "intellectio " theory in which they had subjective being.5 And, third, we know how Ockham's views developed in vigorous debate with his fellow Franciscan and critic Walter Chatton. Chatton objected to the "fictum" theory and to Ockham's contention that mental propositions are the objects of knowledge.6 There are more chapters of the story yet to be written, however. Ockham's position on mental language set off an immediate controversy , not just among his fellow Franciscans, but also among the 3 Ockham, Summa Logicae, pars I, c. 1 (OPh I, 7-8), and cf. Aristotles, De lnterpretatione, 1.16a3-9. 4 John Trentman, Ockham on Mental," Mind 79 (1970): 586-90, in arguing against Peter Geach's dismissal of Ockham's distinction between mental and spoken language as hardly more than the elimination of synonymy from mental, pointed out that Ockham treated mental as an ideal language. Cf. Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects (London: Routledge &. Kegan Paul, 1957) 102-4. Also see Paul Vincent Spade's comments on the importance of Ockham's views about mental language in Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles: An Annotated Translation, Synthese Historical Library 19 (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1980) 2-3. 5 Philotheus Boehner, "The Relative Date of Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences," in Collected Articles on Ockham (hereafter CAO) Philosophy Series, no. 12 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958) 96-1 10, and idem, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham" (CAO 168-74). 6 Gedeon Gal, "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham controversia de natura conceptus universalis," Franciscan Studies 27 (1967): 191-9, and E. A. Moody, "A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holkot, O.P. on the Problem ofthe Objects ofKnowledge and ofBelief...

Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace

WALTER CHATTON AND THE CONTROVERSY ON THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF GRACE William of Ockham was summoned to Avignon in 1324,1 presumably in order to be present while a Papal Commission of six theologians, headed by the ex-Chancellor of Oxford, John Lutterel, examined his writings for heresy. The stormy career of this English Franciscan has left a number of unanswered questions in its wake which have been no small cause for wonder to historians of this period. Why, for instance, did Ockham never become Magister regens after formally incepting at Oxford? Who, besides John Lutterel, was instrumental in preventing Ockham's magisterial promotion and, we might add, in having him summoned to Avignon? Why was not Durand of St. Pourçain2 among the signatories of the final version of the Avignon Commission even though he was listed as one of the 1 Cf. J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, 7 (1935), 353-380; 8 (1936), 79-93.' 168-197. 2 Ibid., 8 (1936), 81 et 194. It is very interesting to note that Durandus held an opinion in substantial agreement with Scotus and Ockham. Durandus de S. Porciano , In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1: "Ad esse Deo gratum vel charum non sequitur necessario necessitate absoluta quod homo sit quandoque habiturus gratiam vel •chantatem habitualem sibi formaliter inherentem, quia amare vel diligere aliquem nihil aliud est quam velle ei bonum... Sed Deus potest velle homini bonum, et summum cuius ipse est capax (scilicet beatitudinem) absque hoc quod velit ei dare gratiam habitualem vel charitatem quantum est de potentia absoluta, secundum quam Deus potest dare et homo recipere gloriam vel beatitudinem sine gratia habituali praevia. Ergo ad esse Deo dilectum vel ad esse Deo gratum vel charum non sequitur ex necessitate absoluta quod homo sit quandoque habiturus gratiam vel charitatem habitualem." (ed. Antverpiae, 1566, f. 54vb). It is likewise of considerable historical interest to know that Walter Chatton, as well as John Lutterel, took part in the process against Durandus in September at Avignon; cf. H. Denifle - A. Châtelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis , II, (Paris, 1891), p. 419. Walter Chatton and the Absolute Necessity of Grace33 examining theologians? Historians may one day be able to assemble the puzzle but at present we seem to have more questions than answers. Some of the areas of Ockham's thought which received a great deal of attention from the Avignon examiners were his views on grace and merit, sin and punishment, and their relationship to the life hereafter. These theological views of the Venerable Inceptor are taken up in the first nine articles of the Avignon Commission's final redaction . It is not surprising that the examiners followed the lead of Lutterel's libellus3 against Ockham since we know that the ex-Chancellor of Oxford was seeking preferment at the Papal Court and may well have used the Ockham affaire célebre to further his own ambitions. We might be entitled to be mildly astonished that Ockham is likewise opposed in this area by one of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton. However, to anyone familiar with the Sentence Commentary of Chatton, it is apparent that he is constantly at doctrinal odds with his fellow friar. This is in fact the case in the grace-merit debate where Chatton's views coincide with those of examining theologians. We may well wonder whether or not it was pure coincidence that Walter Chatton eventually found his way to Avignon where, in the twilight of his career, he had the uncommon bad luck of being named bishop to a See which had not yet become vacant.4 In this article, we propose to set the scene for Chatton's views on the grace-merit controversy by sketching its development through Scotus, Aureoli and Ockham. The clue to the history of the debate, as we have outlined it, is given to us by the Venerable Inceptor himself . In question five of the third book of the Sentences, we find a treatment of the grace-merit issue which closely parallels Ockham's Ordinatio, book I, distinction 17, question i5 and may...