Walter Chatton on the Connection of the Virtues

Abstract

Is it possible to enjoy good character in some respects while being deficient in others? For example, can one be temperate or just without being brave? Furthermore, does our moral character affect our ability to make good decisions concerning our lives and is such an ability a prerequisite for developing our character? In other words, are the moral virtues and prudence connected? None of the medieval thinkers deny that such connections exist at some level. They disagree, however, on whether or not the moral virtues are co-dependent, and whether or not the interdependency of moral virtues and prudence is mutual. In addition, they differ regarding the degree of connection at specific levels of moral development. The point on which they most readily agree is that some kind of prudence is required in order to enjoy the moral virtues. The most significant point of disagreement, however, is the reverse question: Can a person be prudent without being virtuous? The answers to these questions, particularly the last one, reveal not only the thinkers’ conceptions of the nature and role of prudence in ethics, but more fundamentally their conceptions of reason, will, and the passions, and of their role in moral development. Thus the study of this problem tends to yield a fruitful insight into particular moral theories and into general intellectual tendencies of a certain time. While this topic has been surveyed with respect to many thirteenth century authors, the studies of fourteenth century accounts are still limited to a few «major» thinkers, such as Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Gerald Odonis, and John Buridan1. Walter Chatton’s treatment of this problem, which is the object of this