Baumol (1979), denying the general feasibility of pricing everything at marginal cost, presents a counterexample in which such pricing is clearly infeasible. He draws the following conclusions: Generally, the best that any set of fixed prices can achieve is the Ramsey solution constrained by Walras's law. resulting welfare loss is the price society must pay for using a price system to allocate resources (p. 578). It will be argued here that the loss results not from use of a price system but from nonoptimal population density and that a remedy for the latter is to extend the price system into the area of population policy. Baumol's counterexample (pp. 581-86) would seem to allow more generality than necessary, for it is general enough to permit optimal population to be infinite. He has one consumer, one resource (labor/ leisure), one product, and continually increasing returns to labor. Utility, an increasing function of leisure and product, is to be maximized. consumer pays the firm labor for product. The firm and the government are operated by (nonhuman) agents who do not consume anything themselves (p. 581). Marginal cost pricing yields the firm a deficit. Lump-sum payments are held to be impossible, and so the budget cannot be balanced. If the model permitted entry of consumers identical to the first consumer, then under Ramsey pricing the utility of any current member of the society would rise every time another consumer entered, ad infinitum. argument that the welfare loss stems from nonoptimal population will run as follows. I assume that a second resource-landexists and is jointly owned. Some of it is used in production and the rest is leased by society to individuals as residential space. In an efficient society the ratio of labor to leisure will be optimal, as well as that of per capita residential land to per capita leisure. Given these optimal ratios, per capita levels of residential land and leisure are