Voters Support Research Articles

Mind the Gap: Why Wealthy Voters Support Brexit

Abstract Wealth provides self-insurance against financial risk, reducing risk aversion. We apply this insurance mechanism to electoral behaviour, arguing that a voter who desires a change to the status quo and who is wealthy is more likely to vote for change than a voter who lacks the same self-insurance. We apply this argument to the case of Brexit in the UK, which has been widely characterized as a vote by the ‘economically left-behind’. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU, explaining why so many Brexit voters were wealthy, in terms of their property wealth. We corroborate our theory using two panel surveys, accounting for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, and by using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the potential broader role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behaviour and for understanding the Brexit case.

Weapons of Clients: Why Do Voters Support Bad Patrons? Ethnographic Evidence from Rural Brazil

ABSTRACTCurrent approaches to voting behavior in clientelist contexts either predict that clients leave their preferences aside for fear of having their benefits cut off or voluntarily support politicians they perceive to be reliable patrons. These two approaches cannot account for clients’ vote choices in the Sertão of Bahia, Brazil, where voters were free to choose among competing candidates but supported patrons they knew were unreliable. This article argues that clients voluntarily voted for bad patrons as a strategy to gain symbolic power in their negotiations with politicians. By explaining clients’ paradoxical choices in the Sertão, this article reveals how clientelism can persist without monitoring mechanisms or positive attitudes toward patrons. In addition, this study shows the importance of incorporating voters’ perspectives and their everyday survival strategies to better account for clients’ political behavior.

Sympathy for the devil? Voter support for illiberal politicians

AbstractMany democracies are witnessing the rise and continuing success of parties and politicians who oppose fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Recent research finds that voters support illiberal politicians, because they trade off policy congruence against attitudes toward liberal democracy. Other studies, however, suggest that authoritarian and populist voters might actually have a preference to vote for illiberal candidates. We argue that both factors interact: Authoritarian and populist voters are more willing to trade off policy representation against support for liberal democracy. To test this mechanism, we rely on a survey experiment conducted in Germany. The results clearly demonstrate that voters indeed trade off policy congruence against liberal democracy. Moreover, this effect is particularly strong for populist and authoritarian voters. Overall, the results have important implications for understanding when and which voters support or oppose liberal democracy.

Do Voters Support Austerity Measures in Times of Economic Crisis? For Many Voters, the Answer is Yes

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The current state of the nationalization of the party systems in the Slovak Republic and Ukraine

The paper assesses the current state of the nationalization of the party systems in the Slovak Republic and Ukraine based on the results of the latest parliamentary elections. By using formalized methods, the authors of the paper analyzed the composition of the party systems at the empirical level. The results of the conducted research show that the party landscape of the Ukrainian Parliament has changed in the direction of electoral preferences in favour of new participants of the political process. The analysis with the use of the Nagayama triangle showed that the electoral advantage of one political party was provided in most of the regions of Ukraine (the political party «Servant of the People»). Under the M. Jones’ and S. Mainwaring’s technique, a high level of the party system nationalization (0.70) was established while conducting the research. According to the methodology by G. Golosov, a Russian scientist, the nationalization index in 2019 was equal to 0.56. It was proved that the factors of presidentialism, socio-political delimitations of the political regime, forms of government, the entry barrier, and regionalization have impacted nationalization of the party system. Six political parties entered the Slovak Parliament. With the opposition center-right conservative political force «Ordinary People and Independent Individuals» being the leader of this election campaign. Parliament’s The assessment of the Slovak Parliament with the use of the Nagayama triangle shows that in most parts of Slovakia, no political force has been formed as a result of the elections, which would dominate the level of voters support and that competition provides a minimum gap between the two political forces. The analysis indicated that the nationalization of the party system of the Slovak Republic is 0.89 (the high value) according to the Jones and Mainwaring method and 0.67 (the above-average value) with regard to the Golosov method, being a higher value compared to a relatively similar indicator for Ukraine. It should be emphasized that the main factors impacting the actual state of the studied indicator were the entry barrier and the political regime in the country. The predominance in the level of nationalization of the party system of Slovakia, if compared with the relevant indicator in Ukraine is due to the fact that all political forces that entered the National Council of the Slovak Republic are stable and participate in electoral cycles.

Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa

Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, corrupt politicians frequently get elected for public office in mass elections. In this a...

Mind the Gap: Why Wealthy Voters Support Brexit

Does insurance alter voters' decisions to support the status-quo? Since wealth provides a cushion against financial risk, which in turn decreases risk-aversion, wealth increases support for a change to the status quo. This is because a wealthy, less risk averse individual places a lower weight on costs than on benefits. We apply these insights to referendums where voters weigh perceived costs, benefits and also risks, and test our theory in the case of Brexit, which has been characterized as a vote by economically left-behind voters. Our results show that individuals who lacked wealth are less likely to support leaving the EU; they are more biased to the status quo. We corroborate our theory using two separate panel surveys, accounting for unobserved individual level heterogeneity, and using a survey experiment. The findings have implications for the role of wealth-as-insurance in electoral behavior and important implications for understanding the Brexit case.

Weapons of Clients: Why do Voters Support Bad patrons? Ethnographic Evidence from Rural Brazil

Weapons of Clients: Why do Voters Support Bad patrons? Ethnographic Evidence from Rural Brazil

The rise and fall of the Dutch referendum law (2015–2018): initiation, use, and abolition of the corrective, citizen-initiated, and non-binding referendum

In 2018, the Netherlands became the first democratic country to abolish its national referendum legislation. The Dutch referendum law of 2015–2018 allowed facultative, citizen-initiated, corrective, non-binding referendums, to veto specific types of laws passed by parliament. The referendum law included an ill-suited turnout threshold that created a strategic dilemma and a psychological side effect among voters. In the three years between introduction and abolition, two referendums were triggered. After the first referendum—a treaty between the EU and Ukraine, rejected by Dutch voters—support for referendums soured among centrist politicians and highly educated, progressive voters. Despite positive experiences with the second referendum, the legislation was abolished as part of the coalition agreement by the new government. This article provides a thick description of the Dutch referendum legislation trajectory (instigation, design, implementation, and abolition) to an international audience as well as a theoretical explanation of its comparatively late introduction and remarkably swift abolition. We discuss the roles of public opinion and coalition politics in the face of constitutional rigidity. Ultimately, we draw three broader theoretical lessons from the Dutch referendum experience.

ABUNDANT MONEY IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF GETTING ELECTED (A STUDY ON MONEY IN POLITICS DURING 2015 SOUTH KONAWE REGIONAL ELECTION)

The object of this research was the simultaneous election of Konsel. Candidates for regional heads' indirect election mechanism must spend extra effort in gaining support and votes. Various ways were carried out to influence voters by giving them money, gifts, souvenirs, road construction, establishing places for religious practices, development in education, health services, and increasing the standard of income to obtain voters’ support. the research took place in South Konawe, a region that was purposively selected based on two considerations. The result of this research showed that some candidates used money in political practices as a strategy to approach the voters in an election, to form a reciprocal relationship between the giver and the recipient. The occurrence of this practice is influenced by the level of social welfare, education level, permissive political regulation, patron-client relationship, individual-based electoral design, and weak legal sanctions. Fortunately, some voters would not sell their votes. In another word, uncertainty occurs as voters might have different perceptions of the money distributed by candidates. The continuous practice of money in politics raises irony in democracy. Election monitoring committees such as Panwaslu should be given stronger authority to prevent the practices from occurring in breeder scope. However, supervisors seem to have resigned with this condition. The originality of this research is on the investigation of money in politics practices in a regional election in Indonesia.

Will Voters Support Higher Taxes to Fund Universal Health Care? Oregon, 2019.

Will Voters Support Higher Taxes to Fund Universal Health Care? Oregon, 2019.

Do Voters Support Local Commitments for Climate Change Mitigation in Italy?

There is a growing interest in voluntary programmes for climate change mitigation, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments. This paper gauges evidence on the support of citizens for climate change mitigation programmes at the local level, analysing voting behaviour. A quasi-experimental set-up is offered by the EU Covenant of Mayors (CoM) initiative, which is the mainstream European movement for local authorities voluntarily committing to meet and exceed the European Union 20% GHG emission reduction target by 2020. The electoral impact of the participation of Italian municipalities to the CoM is estimated, using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Mayors committing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their municipality appear not to lose electoral support at subsequent elections; this is contrary to what would be implied by a simple (biased) ordinary least squares regression. Moreover, IV point estimates are positive, albeit insignificant at standard levels; this could be due to the possibility of some support of citizens for emission reduction commitments. Finally, strong heterogeneity in socio-economic and demographic characteristics is found, with support of the CoM being more pronounced in wealthier and younger cities.

When Do Voters Support the European Union’s Involvement in Gay Rights?

Commitment to the European Union’s gay rights standards remains weak in new EU members and countries applying for EU membership. If the EU’s standards have minimal consequences, then when do voters support the EU’s involvement in gay rights? The existing research misses a comparison of opinions between those who identify with gay people, and those who do not. Sexuality-based marginalization carried out by state institutions (political homophobia) motivates those who identify with gay people to support alternatives to their state’s authority. Using an original survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I find that those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to support transferring control of gay rights to the EU. Using twenty-one surveys of EU member states, I find that in countries with high levels of political homophobia, those who report discrimination on the basis of sexuality exhibit higher levels of support for the EU.

Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Table of Contents

AbstractLawmakers Embark on National Tour to Promote Comprehensive Parity BillAnalysis Indicates North Carolina Reform Has Considerable Way to GoCampaign for Equal Coverage of Mental Illness Will Hit Major CitiesOklahoma Prison Program Provides Support for Inmates with MIMHA Survey Reveals Majority of Voters Support MH ParityMHA Survey Reveals Americans Want to End Insurance DiscriminationN.C. May Consider Waiver Changes in Wake of '06 Payment ChaosSAMHSA Releases New Resources on Mental HealthBriefly NotedState WatchNames in the NewsComing up

Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection

Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection