Abstract
In 2018, the Netherlands became the first democratic country to abolish its national referendum legislation. The Dutch referendum law of 2015–2018 allowed facultative, citizen-initiated, corrective, non-binding referendums, to veto specific types of laws passed by parliament. The referendum law included an ill-suited turnout threshold that created a strategic dilemma and a psychological side effect among voters. In the three years between introduction and abolition, two referendums were triggered. After the first referendum—a treaty between the EU and Ukraine, rejected by Dutch voters—support for referendums soured among centrist politicians and highly educated, progressive voters. Despite positive experiences with the second referendum, the legislation was abolished as part of the coalition agreement by the new government. This article provides a thick description of the Dutch referendum legislation trajectory (instigation, design, implementation, and abolition) to an international audience as well as a theoretical explanation of its comparatively late introduction and remarkably swift abolition. We discuss the roles of public opinion and coalition politics in the face of constitutional rigidity. Ultimately, we draw three broader theoretical lessons from the Dutch referendum experience.
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