Reviewed by: Der Erzkanzler im Religionskrieg: Kurfürst Anselm Casimir von Mainz, die geistlichen Fürsten und das Reich, 1629 bis 1647 by Franz Brendle David Parrott Der Erzkanzler im Religionskrieg: Kurfürst Anselm Casimir von Mainz, die geistlichen Fürsten und das Reich, 1629 bis 1647. By Franz Brendle. [Reformationsgeschichtliiche Studien und Texte, Band 156.] (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag. 2011. Pp. xiv, 578. €59,00. ISBN 978-3-402-12802-2.) The career of Anselm Casimir Wambold von Umstadt, archbishop of Mainz from 1629 to 1647, has attracted little historical attention. Yet as highest-ranking of the prince-electors and as Imperial chancellor for a large part of the Thirty Years’ War, he played a distinct role in a key series of political and military events within the Holy Roman Empire. Brendle’s substantial and scholarly biography thus fills a large gap in our knowledge of an important but neglected figure; but the book is no less a significant re-evaluation of the character and stance of the “Catholic Party” within the Empire, which has been all too easily conflated with Bavarian political and military concerns. As Imperial chancellor, Anselm Casimir directed a large part of the Imperial constitutional and legal machinery, was a key figure in coordinating Catholic policy in the Empire, and enjoyed a high degree of influence with the emperor. The new archbishop was elected in the midst of the debate over the forcible re-catholicization of all ecclesiastical territory that had been acquired by Protestant princes since the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Anselm Casimir led the Catholic princes in supporting the initial imposition of the 1629 Edict of Restitution, but soon distinguished himself as a moderate, anxious to compromise over its enforcement and prepared to negotiate with the Protestant Electors (above all, with John George of Saxony) in the hope of achieving a peace settlement in the Empire. This overriding concern to achieve a settlement led Anselm Casimir to join the Electors’ fatal call to dismiss the Imperial generalissimo Wallenstein, and he personally coordinated the pressure on the emperor at the Diet of Regensburg to achieve [End Page 362] this objective. His leading role at the Diet gave him a considerable reputation and allowed him to press for an Imperial settlement, but the Swedish invasion of North Germany radically transformed the situation. Following the victory at Breitenfeld in September 1631, the troops of Gustavus Adolphus spilled out into the Rhineland; Mainz was occupied and became the center of Swedish military operations for the next four years. While his territory was garrisoned and subjected to massive war taxes, the archbishop was driven into exile. From Cologne, Anselm Casimir conducted extended but fruitless negotiations with France in the hope that diplomatic pressure might persuade the Swedes to accept the French “protection” of his bishopric. Following this failure, the archbishop made a final and definitive shift of alliance over to the emperor, bringing both his territorial resources and his constitutional standing with the other Catholic states directly into the emperor’s service. This overt alliance with the Habsburgs weakened his influence as Imperial chancellor in the negotiations for a peace settlement in the Empire at Pirna, then at Prague. The Swedish pulled out of Mainz in 1635, but when France declared war on the Habsburgs, Mainz was again threatened. It was not until January 1636 that Anselm Casimir finally re-entered his episcopal city. The new phase of the war opened by French intervention and the resurgence of Swedish military pressure ensured that the Imperial chancellor remained at the center of political maneuvers within the Empire, but as a virtual client of the emperor. The final, shorter section of Brendle’s study concerns this later period, which Anselm Casimir began as cheerleader for the pre-election of the future Ferdinand III as Holy Roman Emperor in 1636. Although once the Westphalia negotiations opened, he again demonstrated tenacity in arguing against Catholic intransigence and for compromise with both German Protestants and external powers. This did not prevent Mainz being occupied again by the French in 1645, leading to the second exile of the archbishop, who died in Frankfurt in October 1647. This is an excellent and comprehensive study, which...