Violence In Africa Research Articles

Agricultural windfalls and the seasonality of political violence in Africa

AbstractWhen the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997–2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year‐on‐year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest‐time spike in violence by militias in areas where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly 10% increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups—the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest‐related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.

Introducing the African Peace Processes (APP) dataset: Negotiations and mediation in interstate, intrastate and non-state conflicts in Africa

This data feature introduces a new dataset to study peace processes to end organized armed violence in Africa: the African Peace Processes (APP) dataset. The APP dataset includes observations on both mediated and unmediated rounds of negotiations in state-based and non-state conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2019 and builds on conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The APP dataset covers peacemaking efforts in both active and inactive conflicts. Moreover, the start and end month and year of each observation are specified, giving researchers some flexibility with regard to the temporal unit of analysis they use. In addition to discussing the rationale behind the creation of the APP dataset, we explain the data collection process and show some patterns based on the data. We also illustrate how the data could be used by looking at the association between the no. of peacekeepers deployed and the onset of mediated negotiations in intrastate and non-state conflicts. We find that high no. of peacekeepers are associated with a higher likelihood of negotiations in non-state conflicts, but not in intrastate conflicts. A plausible explanation for this finding is that security concerns play a more important role in the decision to initiate negotiations in non-state conflicts than in intrastate conflicts. Our short analysis thus illustrates the value of having data on both intrastate and non-state conflicts.

Interfaith mediation centre in promoting peace in Bauchi State, Nigeria

One of the main obstacles across the globe is a conflict between social groupings. Conflicts over religion, ethnicity, and post-election violence in Africa, and notably Nigeria, harm people's lives and livelihoods. Conflicts occurred in Kaduna, Plateau, and the Bauchi State over a period of time. There has been a public uproar due to the escalating crisis in Bauchi State. To promote peace-building in Bauchi State, Nigeria, this article attempts to investigate the causes that led to the formation of the Interfaith Mediation Centre. The John Paul Lederach theory of peace building served as the basis for this investigation. The study used a descriptive approach. Qualitative research design was employed. The main informants were chosen by the researcher from among Interfaith Mediation Centre personnel, religious leaders, and government officials using a purposive sample technique. Data were extracted from both primary and secondary sources of data collecting. Thematic content analysis was used for analysing the data. The results of the study showed that although the Interfaith Mediation Centre was founded in 1995 to address the problems of persistent ethno religious violence affecting Bauchi state, its main goal was to put an end the conflicts. Another research result supported the idea that IMC fosters peaceful communities in Bauchi and elsewhere through various forms of strategic involvement and mediation. Accordingly, the study concluded that the organization offers training materials to boost and develop peace-building ability, promote religious tolerance, ethnic unity, and the empowerment of women to inculcate the culture of peace. The study recommended that the Interfaith Mediation Centre should keep promoting dialogue among Muslims and Christians, and also promote peace education in the state.

Does polygyny cause intergroup conflict? Re-examining Koos and Neupert-Wentz (2020)

An article recently published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by Koos and Nuepert-Wentz finds an association between geographically proximate polygynous ethnic groups and rural violence in Africa. This study applies several empirical adjustments to their analysis. The association between rural violence and polygynous neighbors loses significance when replacing violent events with fatalities in both ACLED and UCDP-GED data or converting event counts to binary. Subsetting Afrobarometer data by urban and rural respondents shows that rural respondents from polygynous groups are not significantly more likely to feel violence is justified. Moreover, there is no evidence the conflicts leading to the most rural violence in ACLED, farmer-herder clashes, or UCDP-GED, violence during the apartheid transition in South Africa, are related to “excess men.” Both conflicts suggest broader violations in the assumptions made in hypothesizing why polygynous neighbors lead to rural violence. The re-analysis calls the claim that polygyny is associated with rural violence into question and suggests researchers use broader approaches to measuring violence than just event counts.

Armed and dangerous: Legacies of incumbent-military ties and electoral violence in Africa

While a growing literature explores the danger that authoritarian military legacies pose for regime break-down, there is little research on the effects of similar legacies in the context of multiparty politics. This is an important gap in the literature since in many cases the introduction of formal democratic institutions has led to neither democratic consolidation nor regime breakdown. We start exploring this lacuna by developing a theory that links the use of violent electoral tactics to the ties of the executive with the authoritarian era's military. We argue that incumbents with close ties to the authoritarian regime's military are more likely to instigate election violence. Empirical tests on a sample of 230 elections in 39 African countries since 1974 show that election violence is more prevalent in countries where such ties exist. These findings speak to several areas of study, including those on election violence, and on military legacies.

Political violence in Africa and the search for an ideal democracy model

ABSTRACT What could be a more compelling model of democracy for countries in Africa if they are to work towards avoiding the vice of political violence, which has been blamed on the operations of majoritarian democracy? After showing that majoritarian democracy that has been touted as an ideal model for countries in Africa and other geopolitical centres has been associated with elections-related political violence in the conduct of political parties, Kwasi Wiredu’s idea of consensual democracy is invoked highlighting its deliberative nature and how it treats occasions of diverse and divergent views among parties. Thereafter, it is shown that despite opposition to its utility in present times, consensual democracy could overcome political violence in some countries in Africa if its opposition to intolerance and adversarial confrontation are taken seriously.

Violence in Africa: Further Reflections on the Causes

This is not the first time that ESEAT has written on violence in Africa. In Fact, in 1999 a whole volume was devoted to violence. In 2010 I reviewed this volume. However, despite all these efforts, we see that inter and intra-state violence continues in many countries in Africa, including environmental violence. In this paper, while referring to what has already been written about, I try to reflect on what could have been left out in our search for causes of violence on the African continent. On the theoretical plane, I suggest that we should emphasise the fact that when theologising, we use and are influenced by our historical and cultural context. This comes out when we examine the root cause of environmental violence, where we argue that it is mainly to be explained by how the West has understood the bible, especially the creation story. Furthermore, I note that while looking for the root causes on the Africa continent, we have to revisit the way we conceive causality. Rather than limiting ourselves to the immediate and visible causes, we should also include remote and invisible causes in a way that we come to what I call cumulative causality, meaning that the different factors contributing to the phenomenon must be taken together. On the practical level, I refer to how Africa has been successively invaded since the 17th century BC. I argue that these invasions have negatively impacted Africa. I end by making suggestions on how to deal with this violence, by proposing the following: the importance of putting in place mechanisms and strictures for promoting justice; the importance of using the African worldview, including appropriate rituals, while working on the causes of violence; and cooperating with well-wishers from outside Africa in fighting the causes of violence

Are former rebel parties more likely to engage in electoral violence in Africa?

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine whether former rebel parties are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other parties. Using an original data set of 236 parties in 18 countries in Sub Saharan Africa (of which 47 were former rebel groups) from 1990-2018, we find that former rebel parties in Africa are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other political parties. Further, we do find, after conducting an analysis of the Burundian case, that former rebel parties that possess “violence capital” are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other rebel groups that have less or no violence capital. We discuss the implications of these findings regarding the impact of rebel party inclusion on the post-conflict political process.

Overcoming Ethnic Violence in Africa: A Christian Philosophical Reflection

Ethnic violence in Africa has a number of underlying causes but at root the author identifies a lack of subjectivity as the common denominator between them. Ethnic conflict is dependent upon the crowd mentality which gives rise to a fear of the other. The crowd may be understood as undifferentiated individuals, lacking a personal subjectivity and who seek identity by referring to group norms and values in an uncritical way. These norms demand the objectification of those who are outside the group, and it is this objectification which validates acts of violence against outsiders. In arguing that it is this lack of subjectivity that is at the root of the problem, the author has also proposed that the solution is informed by the insights regarding subjectivity offered by Kierkegaard. This solution offers an approach to education in the widest sense that permits the space for reflection and an encouragement to reflect subjectively with the aim of allowing the development of moral, independent, reflective individuals, who are free to exercise choice and unafraid to question and evaluate the worth of group social values and norms and to work for change where this is warranted

Towards an evaluation of the nexus between unfettered, unregulated capitalism, donor aid and debt relief inconsistencies, and the problem of post-election violence in Kenya

ABSTRACT Although internal structural factors in emerging democracies and factors related to the electoral process and contest remain indispensable in understanding post-election violence, they are not sufficient in an era of full-fledged neoliberal globalisation, enshrined in the Washington Consensus and the productivist development model enforced by the World Bank. Accordingly, this paper approaches electoral violence in Africa through the lens of unfettered, unregulated capitalism. Based on insights from Belgian historian Éric Toussaint, it assumes the posture that violent contestation of state power, in Kenya, is also indicative of the insatiable pursuit of profit, by global capitalists. Grounded in historical data from Human Rights Watch annual reports (1991–2008), it tests, through Kenya’s first four multiparty elections conducted during the Moi and Kibaki eras, covering the period 1992–2007, the hypothesis that ‘Aid and debt relief inconsistencies by donors and international financial institutions have emboldened the Kenyan government to disregard human rights, leading to impunity, which has yielded post-election violence’. It finds, partly, that ‘donors seem willing to countenance harassment and intimidation of the Kenyan government’s critics as long as the government continues to liberalize the economy and retain a multiparty system in name’, an element that could also explain post-election violence.

War and Intimate Partner Violence in Africa

This paper evaluates the impacts of armed conflict on intimate partner violence against women in Africa. Exploiting both spatial and temporal variations in the number of battles proxying for armed conflict intensity, we find that women residing in conflict-affected areas are prone to suffering intimate partner violence. In particular, a 1SD increase in the number of battles (equivalent to the increase by 4.8 battles) raises the composite indices of less severe violence, more severe violence, emotional abuse, and sexual abuse against women by 8.74%, 10.34%, 10.64%, and 7.14% relative to the sample averages, respectively. Given the long-term consequences of intimate partner violence, our findings call for expanding efforts in the prevention and mitigation of armed conflict.

Predicting Escalating and De-Escalating Violence in Africa Using Markov Models

This contribution to the ViEWS prediction competition 2020 proposes using Markov modeling to model the change in the logarithm of battle-related deaths between two points in time in a country. The predictions are made using two ensembles of observed and hidden Markov models, where the covariate sets for the ensembles are drawn from the ViEWS country month constituent models. The weights for the individual models in the ensembles were obtained using a genetic algorithm optimizing the fit on the TADDA-score in a calibration set. The weighted ensembles of visible and hidden Markov models outperform the ViEWS prediction competition benchmark models on the TADDA score in the test period of January 2017 to December 2019 for all time steps. Forecasts until March 2021 predict increased violence primarily in Algeria, Libya, Tchad, Niger, and Angola, and decreased or unchanged levels of violence in most of the remaining countries in Africa. An analysis of the model weights in the ensembles shows that the conflict history constituent model provided by ViEWS was dominant in the ensembles. Esta contribución a la competencia de predicciones 2020 del Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) propone utilizar la modelización de Márkov para elaborar un modelo del cambio en el logaritmo de las muertes relacionadas con batallas entre dos puntos temporales en un país. Las predicciones se elaboran con dos conjuntos de modelos observados y ocultos de Márkov, en los que los grupos de covariables de los conjuntos se obtienen de los modelos constituyentes mensuales de los países del ViEWS. La relevancia de los modelos individuales en los conjuntos se obtuvo mediante un algoritmo genético que optimiza el ajuste de la puntuación TADDA en un grupo de calibración. Los conjuntos ponderados de los modelos visibles y ocultos de Márkov superan los modelos de referencia de la competencia de predicciones del ViEWS en relación con la puntuación TADDA (Distancia absoluta orientada con aumento de dirección) en el período de prueba de enero de 2017 a diciembre de 2019 para todos los intervalos de tiempo. Las predicciones hasta marzo de 2021 pronostican un aumento en la violencia principalmente en Argelia, Libia, Chad, Níger y Angola, y niveles de violencia disminuidos o sin variaciones en la mayoría de los países restantes en África. Un análisis de la relevancia de los modelos en los conjuntos demuestra que los modelos constituyentes de la historia de conflictos que proporciona el ViEWS fueron dominantes en dichos conjuntos. Cette contribution au concours de prévision ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) 2020 propose d’utiliser la modélisation de Markov pour modéliser l’évolution du logarithme des décès liés aux conflits entre deux moments de l’histoire d’un pays. Les prédictions sont effectuées à l’aide de deux ensembles de modèles de Markov cachés et de modèles de Markov observés, et les jeux de covariables de ces ensembles sont tirés des modèles constituants par mois et pays du système ViEWS. Les pondérations des modèles individuels des ensembles ont été obtenues en utilisant un algorithme génétique optimisant l’ajustement sur le score TADDA (Distance absolue ciblée avec augmentation de direction) dans un jeu de calibration. Les ensembles pondérés de modèles de Markov visibles et cachés sont plus performants que les modèles de référence du concours de prédiction ViEWS pour ce qui est du score TADDA de la période de test de janvier 2017 à décembre 2019, et ce pour tous les pas de temps. Les prévisions jusqu’à mars 2021 ont permis de prédire une augmentation de la violence principalement en Algérie, en Libye, au Tchad, au Niger et en Angola, et une diminution ou un maintien des niveaux de violence dans la plupart des autres pays d’Afrique. Une analyse des pondérations des modèles dans les ensembles montre que le modèle constituant basé sur l’histoire des conflits fourni par ViEWS serait dominant dans les ensembles.

Silencing the guns to end gender-based violence in Africa: an analysis of article 10(3) of the Maputo Protocol

ABSTRACT:
 One of the objectives of the African Union’s (AU) 2020 theme ‘Silencing the guns: creating conducive conditions for Africa’s development’ is to end gender-based violence. Since the campaign is to create a conflict-free Africa, it is estimated that the types of gender-based violence referred to here are those that occur during conflict situations. Existing documents for the practical implementation of the theme mention article 10(3) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) which obligates states parties to ‘take the necessary measures to reduce military expenditure significantly in favour of spending on social development in general, and the promotion of women in particular’. Article 10(3) therefore has specific instructions for states to reduce their military expenditure and to re-invest the resources in social development, including elimination of gender-based violence. This article presents article 10(3) of the Maputo Protocol as a legally binding provision to assist the implementation of the AU 2020 theme, and analyses the challenges in its implementation. It also highlights the role of the judicial and human rights institutions of the AU in ensuring that article 10(3) becomes a means to implement the AU 2020 theme. The crux of the findings is that although there are challenges in the implementation of article 10(3) of the Maputo Protocol, this provision can be a legal tool in the hands of the AU in ensuring that African countries implement the AU 2020 theme of silencing the guns to eradicate gender-based violence.
 
 TITRE ET RÉSUMÉ EN FRANCAIS:
 Faire taire les armes pour mettre fin aux violences basées sur le genre en Afrique: évaluation de l’article 10(3) du Protocole de Maputo
 RÉSUMÉ:
 L’un des objectifs du thème que l’Union africaine (UA) a retenu pour l’année 2020 «Faire taire les armes: créer des conditions propices au développement de l’Afrique» est de mettre fin aux violences basées sur le genre. Comme la campagne rêve d’une Afrique sans conflit, on estime que les types de violences basées sur le genre dont il est fait référence sont celles qui ont lieu durant les situations de conflit. Les textes disponibles relatifs à la mise en œuvre pratique du thème de l’année ne mentionnent pas l’article 10(3) du Protocole à la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples relatif aux droits de la femme en Afrique (Protocole de Maputo) qui oblige les États parties à «prendre les mesures nécessaires pour réduire de manière significative les dépenses militaires en faveur de dépenses pour le développement social en général, et la promotion des femmes en particulier». L’article 10(3) contient donc des directives spécifiques pour que les États réduisent leurs dépenses militaires et réinvestissent les ressources dans le développement social, y compris l’élimination de violences basées sur le genre. La présente contribution présente l’article 10(3) du Protocole de Maputo comme une disposition juridiquement contraignante pour renforcer la mise en œuvre du thème que l’UA a retenu pour l’année 2020, et analyse les défis de sa mise en œuvre. Il met en relief le rôle que les institutions judiciaires et des droits de l’homme de l’UA peuvent jouer pour concrétiser le pouvoir normatif de l’article 10(3) dans la mise en œuvre du thème de l’année. Cette contribution note que, bien que la mise en œuvre de l’article 10(3) du Protocole de Maputo est parsemée d’embuches, la disposition constitue un levier juridique à la disposition de l’UA pour s’assurer que les pays africains mettent en œuvre le thème qu’elle a retenu pour l’année 2020, à savoir faire taire les armes pour mettre fin aux violences basées sur le genre.

Legal Implications of Post-Electoral Violence in Africa: The Nigerian Experience

Legal Implications of Post-Electoral Violence in Africa: The Nigerian Experience

Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Violence in Africa: Biblical, Pastoral and Ethical Perspectives, edited by Marius J. Nel, Dion A. Forster, and Christo H. Thesnaar

Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Violence in Africa: Biblical, Pastoral and Ethical Perspectives, edited by Marius J. Nel, Dion A. Forster, and Christo H. Thesnaar

Robust electoral violence prevention: An example from Ghana

Abstract Existing electoral violence prevention programming does not sufficiently account for the incentives that compel political actors to use violence. When Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo defeated Ghana’s incumbent President, John Dramani Mahama, in December 2016, the transition was lauded for its orderliness and credited with furthering Ghana’s democratization. Many attributed the peaceful transfer of power to significant reforms undertaken by the electoral commission and the democratic values internalized by the candidates. However, we find that the reforms and personal attributes of the political actors were inadequate for resolving impasses that could have worsened the electoral environment. Our analysis reveals that interventions to prevent electoral violence must mitigate political actors’ incentives to use or tolerate violence in furtherance of their objectives. In Ghana, we find that back channel negotiations—coupled with identifying potential hotspots, early monitoring and observation, and conflict resolution mechanisms—created a robust electoral violence prevention framework that reduced tensions and produced a relatively peaceful political transition. Our findings advance existing theories and practices for preventing electoral violence, which emphasize capacity building, institutional reforms, and other technical approaches to managing elections. We conclude that directly engaging political actors is a critical component of preventing electoral violence in Africa.

Does natural resource influence conflict in Africa? Evidence from panel nonlinear relationship

This paper examines the influence of natural resources on conflict over the 2010–2019 period in 54 African countries using a novel quadratic regression model and threshold estimation. The choice of the study's time period was based on violence vulnerability and data availability. The threshold technique and quadratic regression were used as natural resources are theorized to have a U-shape relationship with conflict. The empirical findings show that indicators of natural resources have significant positive effect on violence in Africa at 0.01 significant level. To maintain a conflict-free economy, low unemployment and decreased population growth rates are crucial to resolving the threat of conflict. Thus, policies targeted at reducing the conflict should focus on eliminating or reducing unemployment and control population growth rate. Policies should further ensure that natural resources exploitation and revenue sharing from the resource should be equitable, which can greatly mitigate conflict.

Why do youth participate in violence in Africa? A review of evidence

ABSTRACT This paper systematically maps the field of scholarly works on the theme of youth and violent conflict in Africa. It reviews the evidentiary base of the nexus between youth and violent conflicts in Africa by interrogating the conceptual, methodological, and empirical foundations of the different explanations adduced for why and how youth participate in armed conflicts. It observes that the evidence base linking youth vulnerability and exclusion with violence is generally mixed across the board; each extant perspective offers some useful insights within its narrow conceptual and methodological contours. In addition, the social agency of youth and the power context of society are crucial to understanding the link between youth and violence, and the risk of violence in Africa. Social agency speaks to why and how youth encounter, process, interpret and act on social phenomena, including violence. It highlights the need for further research into the dynamic nature of how youth identities interact with new trends in violence and insecurity such as violent riots and protests and post-election violence, among others.

Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Violence in Africa: Biblical, Pastoral and Ethical Perspectives.

There is no shortage of scholarly contributions grappling with the key concepts of “reconciliation” and “forgiveness” as it pertains to the African and more poignantly the South African context. These notions have a longstanding, yet, contested history and evokes an array of responses ranging from cheering enthusiasm to utter despondency. This contestation has to be understood in relation to the various forms of historical violence inflicted on the peoples of Africa as well as ongoing debates concerning the need to come to terms with the systemic nature of such violence. For the most part, reconciliation and forgiveness and its seemingly contradictory relationship with violence elicit further debates. The question thus remains: at the intersection of ethics and theology, how does one engage such complexity in a way that is distinct from what we have seen and heard before?

Sexual violence and associated factors among female night college students after joining the college in Debre Markos town, North West Ethiopia, 2019

BackgroundViolence against women is a significant public health problem as well as a fundamental violation of women's human rights. The magnitude of sexual violence in Africa is higher than in other regions and mostly occurs in school. However, data were limited on sexual violence against female night college students in Ethiopia at large. MethodInstitutional based cross-sectional study was conducted among 422 participants in December 2019. Data were collected using pre-tested, self-administered questionnaire and simple random sampling technique. Each collected data were coded, cleaned and entered into EPI info version 7 and exported into SPSS version 20 for analysis. AOR with 95%CI and p-value of<0.05 were considered for the significant reports. ResultsThis research revealed that sexual violence in their lifetime, after joining the college and in the past 12 months were 27.1% (95%CI: 22.8, 31.1), 21.3% (95%CI: 17.4, 25.1) and 17.2% (95%CI: 13.8, 20.8) respectively. Residence being urban [AOR = 1.92 (95%CI: 1.03, 3.60)], more than 20 min taking to reach at the college [AOR = 1.82 (95% CI: 1.07, 3.07)], parents living condition separately [AOR = 1.89(95%CI: 1.08, 3.32)],Witnessed inter partner violence as a childhood [AOR = 2.55(95%CI:1.37,4.75)], alcohol intake sometimes [AOR = 3.24(95%CI:1.04,10.10)] and having multiple sexual partner [AOR: 6.42 (95CI: 2.27,18.16)] were positive predictors for sexual violence. ConclusionThe prevalence of sexual violence after joining the college among female night college students in Debre Markos town was high. Community awareness creation may be important to reduce the problem.