There is no doubt that some sentences are vague. For instance, 'Bruce Willis is bald', 'Jones is on Mt. Everest', and 'Tibbles (my shaggy cat) weighs more than fifteen pounds' are, or at least can be, vague, lacking definite truth values. Naturally, then, questions arise about the nature of vagueness; in particular, the question about wherein vagueness lies. There have been three views. The most popular view, the linguistic view, places vagueness in language, specifically, in reference relations between words and their referents (or in havingas-the-extension relations between predicates and their extensions-but in what follows this will often be omitted for the sake of simplicity). According to this view, vagueness is a form of referential indeterminacy: a vague term is a term that has more than one candidate referent, none of which the term exclusively refers to. One minority view of vagueness is what may be called the worldly view (or the objective, metaphysical, or ontic view). According to this view, vagueness is in the world, in objects and properties themselves, and not just in language. In the above examples, the property of baldness, the geographical area Mt. Everest, and the cat Tibbles are themselves vague,