Abstract
Terry Horgan argues that the epistemic view of vagueness implies that some facts about supervenience have no imaginable explanation, a consequence which he rejects as intolerably mysterious. On closer inspection, his objection turns out to threaten the epistemic view only to the extent to which it threatens the view that there are semantic facts. Not only epistemicists should reject his assumptions. It is intuitively plausible that there is no semantic difference without a non-semantic difference. If two possible situations are the same in all non-semantic respects, then they are the same in all semantic respects too.1 Why the supervenience claim should be so plausible is by no means obvious. But it is plausible; I will grant its truth.
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