Abstract
<p>In this paper I present the philosophical backdrop to Russell's 1923 "Vagueness" paper. I argue that his view of vagueness in 1923 is the result of a rise in the importance of symbolism in his thinking coupled with a new interest in psychology. I show how these new interests are related to concerns he had with his theory of judgment as well as his logicist project. I attend to the two major complaints against his view of vagueness: that all language is vague and his purported conflation of vagueness with generality. I lastly show how Russell's view is distinct from modern approaches to vagueness in so far as he is not concerned with truth-value gaps but instead sees vagueness as applying primarily to what is cognitive and as a transitory position between ignorance and knowledge.</p>
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
