Veto Threats Research Articles

Try, Try Again: Repeat Veto Threats in Presidential-Congressional Bargaining

Presidents use veto threats to bargain over legislation with Congress. While presidents may fail if Congress passes legislation over their veto threat, they also lose some power if they must repeatedly “go public” in bargaining over one bill. This article examines “repeat” veto threats: multiple veto threats issued to the same bill. Using data on all veto threats issued from 1985 through 2022, I find that presidents issue fewer repeat veto threats during unified government and when majority control of the two congressional chambers is divided. Presidents with higher approval ratings also tend to issue more repeat veto threats. Presidents avoid repeatedly “going public” when they can but more popular presidents do so if they must. I also find evidence of more repeat veto threats on spending bills, which suggests that presidential bargaining and “going public” operate differently across the authorization and appropriations processes.

Ungarn, der EU-Rechtstaatlichkeitsmechanismus und Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine: die politische Geiselnahme außenpolitischer Entscheidungen

The European Union’s (EU) as well as NATO’s internal cohesion and their capacity to act is crucial to meet the security challenges due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The article discusses Hungary’s threats to veto vital EU sanctions against Russia as well as NATO enlargement. In particular, we focus on how Hungary has resorted to hostage-taking strategies in the field of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy as well as NATO to gain EU concessions in unrelated policy areas like the Article 7 procedure or the COVID recovery funds. In doing so, Hungary aims to articulate its veto threat in a credible way, but at the same time it is trying to minimise the associated loss of reputation. To date, Hungary has succeeded in obtaining selective concessions from the other EU member states without derailing the sanctions policies against Russia or the NATO enlargement process.

Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy

Presidents routinely employ Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) to inform Congress about the executive's thoughts and position on pending legislation. Such statements are used for a variety of purposes, including bill promotion, suggesting changes, issuing veto threats, and addressing perceived threats to traditional powers. While SAPs have been identified as an important vehicle for interbranch communication and a key source of insight into presidential preferences, many questions remain as to how presidents make use of SAPs' full range of potential. Using a novel data set of over 4,600 SAPs across multiple administrations, we explore the content of these interbranch communications to uncover how, when, and why presidents use such statements over time. Ultimately, we demonstrate the many ways that presidential use of SAPs is strategic based on political contexts.

Informal and Private: Bargaining and Veto Threats over the Freedom of Information Act

The president’s formal role in lawmaking comes through the veto power, although Neustadt noted the informal power of persuasion through bargaining. Building from Azari and Smith’s work on information institutions, this research demonstrates how bargaining and veto threats function as an informal institution operating within the formal rules and constraints of the legislative development process, as there are no formal rules to govern presidential bargaining with Congress. The president’s power to persuade becomes contextual and situational to the issue, individual, and moment in time. Using the development of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the first amendment to the bill, I examine how and why presidents will choose to employ a private versus public bargaining strategy based on the context in which they find themselves. Using the same policy issue across three administrations – Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford - provides consistency in the political contexts allowing for an in-depth examination of a single policy issue. The informal nature of presidential engagement on legislation highlights the motivations and constraints presidents face in choosing a private or public strategy. Original archival research was conducted to provide the context-rich examination of the internal White House conversations along with the conversations between the president and Congress.

Veto Threat Bargaining with a Bicameral Congress

According to the conventional view, presidents are largely bereft of influence with an opposition-controlled Congress. Congress sends them legislation with a “take it or leave it” choice that maximizes the preferences of the opposition majority while minimizing presidents’ preferences. To extricate themselves from this bind, presidents threaten vetoes. Past research suggests that their efforts largely fail, however, for two model-driven reasons: first, veto threats amount to minimally informative “cheap talk,” and second, Congress is a unitary actor with firm control over its agenda. We relax both assumptions, bringing veto rhetoric into a setting more closely resembling real-world conditions. Presidents transmit credible veto threats to a heterogeneous, bicameral Congress where chamber rules enable the minority party to wield some influence over legislation. Examining the legislative histories of all veto-threatened bills passed between 1985 and 2016, we confirm that veto threats ward off about half of veto-targeted legislative provisions—a far greater share than for comparable unthreatened provisions. The House of Representatives is more likely to introduce and pass legislation objectionable to presidents and the Senate is more likely to accommodate presidents, findings consistent with the textbook description of the modern bicameral Congress.

Inter-institutional cooperation and intergroup unity in the shadow of veto: the construction of the EP’s institutional role in the Brexit negotiations

ABSTRACT From its initially limited role under Article 50 in the withdrawal negotiations, the EP has constructed a central role for itself in the process. How was the EP able to shape the rules to its advantage? As instruments to enhance its own role, the EP combined the unconcealed brandishing of its veto threat with the promotion of strong internal unity and supporting the Commission’s role as central negotiator. The EP was able to exploit interpretative ambiguities in the incomplete contract which is the EU Lisbon Treaty to reinforce its institutional position.

The European Parliament as a budgetary extractor since the Lisbon Treaty

ABSTRACTAfter the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the European Parliament has seen its powers over the negotiations of the European Union’s annual budget reduced. This article shows that, despite initial setbacks and a position of relative weakness in the budgetary negotiations, the Parliament can extract, through threat of veto, significant concessions in the three pillars of the budget: annual expenditure; long-term expenditure; and the revenue side. Through process tracing and interviews with key actors, the article evaluates the Parliament’s successes and failures in negotiating the 2013 budget package and the circumstances under which the Parliament can maximise its limited power.

Presidents’ Vetoes and Audience Costs

Veto threats may offer presidents bargaining leverage, but such leverage will be diminished if they and those with whom they transact business view a veto as hurting the president’s approval rating and his party’s prospects in the next election. How concerned must presidents be about the audience costs associated with a veto? Political science research suggests that they should be in that the public does not like vetoes and punishes presidents when they exercise this authority. In this article, we test this argument with survey responses during times after presidents have issued a veto threat but before an actual veto. While, on average, respondents register opposition to a veto, this preference varies greatly with the specific policy in question and with respondents’ party identification and presidential approval. The results suggest that opposition to a veto comes disproportionately, may be limited to politically distant respondents, and thus may not be as costly as the net negative numbers suggest.

Underneath the culture of consensus: Transparency, credible commitments and voting in the Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers rarely records negative individual votes, much less rejected proposals. The literature explains this high level of support by the Council’s ‘culture of consensus’ and the few negative votes are explained as signalling to the domestic audience. I introduce an alternative explanation for ministers’ explicit disagreement: during the negotiations preceding the final vote, ministers issue veto threats. To remain credible in the future, they must be prepared to carry through with their threats if their demands are not met. To test this argument, I specify domestic level conditions that enable the minister to issue credible, strategic threats in the first place. Furthermore, I introduce domestic level scrutiny as a proxy for the transparency of EU level negotiations. I find that the effect of strategic threats is strong for those cases which are not under domestic level scrutiny (low transparency). By contrast, I find no effect of strategic threats for cases which are under domestic level scrutiny (high transparency).

The Issue Politics of Presidential Veto Threats

The heart of agenda setting lies in defining public problems and setting governmental priorities. Veto threats represent conflict between Congress and the president over how to shape policy, yet we know little about the issues on which veto politics take place or longitudinal changes to these dynamics. When a president threatens to veto a bill, he raises its visibility and scope and thus helps shape the federal government's issue agenda. This article examines the issue dynamics of veto threats from 1985 to 2014. When presidents threaten to veto legislation they do so on public priorities and where their threats may be more credible, while divided government leads presidents to try to protect their own issue priorities on spending bills.

The effects of federalism reform on the legislative process in Germany

ABSTRACTWhen the reform of German federalism was enacted in 2006, the right of the second chamber, Bundesrat, to veto large parts of national legislation had long been identified as a dysfunctional element of the federal system. The need to compromise with an often opposition-controlled Bundesrat was perceived as hurting democratic principles and worsening Germany’s policy performance. Hence, a variety of constitutional amendments was adopted in 2006 to curb the veto threat. This paper sketches how the expansion of the Bundesrat veto emerged and how the reform tried to reduce it. Covering all federal legislation between 1978 and 2016 this paper then analyses the actual effects of the reform. It is shown that the veto threat has been reduced by around 17% but that it remains unchanged at around 65% in the area of tax law.

The Politics of Credit in Presidential Signing Statements

The separation of powers often makes it difficult to understand who is responsible for legislative outcomes. Both members of Congress and presidents seek to shape perceptions of policy responsibility to their advantage. Yet, the relative size of the president's rhetorical stage gives him disproportionate influence in molding these discussions at critical moments. Given these circumstances, how, when, and why, do presidents claim credit for themselves and attribute credit to members of Congress for legislation? Using an original dataset based upon a content analysis of all presidential signing statements from 1985–2008, we find that presidential strategies to claim and attribute credit for laws are greatly impacted by both political context (approval, divided government, midterm elections, and party power) and bill-specific attributes (appropriations, salience, and veto threats). The theory and results highlight the importance of taking multiple institutions into account when thinking about credit.

Oil and Darfur's Blood: China's Thirst for Sudan's Oil

China, a rising super power and one of the fast growing economies in the world is showing unparalleled interest in Sudan. This interest plays itself out at the UN Security Council as well as inside Sudan. On numerous occasions, China has defied the United Nations Security Council and the international community by it usage or threat of veto to block several UN resolutions and sanctions on Khartoum’s regime and those accused of war crimes in Darfur. All these make China-Sudan relation more complex as well as interesting topic for an exploration. In this paper, focus is on China’s roles at the UN, China’s oil imports from Sudan and its arms ‘trades with Sudanese regime and how this complex relationship affects the Darfur conflict. Finally, the paper explores ways that China can help UN with the rest of the world to bring a lasting political settlement to Sudan’s region of Darfur.

Did Chirac Say ‘Non’? Revisiting UN Diplomacy on Iraq, 2002-03

THE STANDOFF BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES and France leading up to the 2003 Iraq War probably “led to the most serious deterioration of transatlantic relations in recent memory.”1 According to a prominent view first advanced by American and British officials and subsequently taken up by academic analysts, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair made an all-out effort to secure United Nations (UN) approval before invading Iraq, but French president Jacques Chirac's public veto threat on 10 March 2003 doomed that effort to failure.2 Put differently, France's determination to use the UN Security Council (henceforth SC or UNSC) as an instrument for “soft balancing” American power made UN approval unattainable.3 This article challenges that conclusion. Chirac only threatened to veto the particular draft resolution then on the table, leaving open the possibility of a future French abstention on the use of force in case the UN weapons inspectors determined that Iraq had clearly failed to cooperate. Building on this insight, I develop a counterfactual thought experiment using new evidence from declassified documents and more than a dozen interviews that I conducted with senior American, British, and French officials. What emerges from this evidence is that the Bush administration would have stood a good chance of securing a French abstention and ultimate UN approval for the use of force—had it been willing to postpone the start of military operations by up to six weeks and endorse a set of demanding (and, we know now, virtually impossible to achieve) benchmarks for Iraqi compliance, as proposed by Britain and several nonpermanent members of the SC. In short, there are strong indications that President Bush failed to secure UN approval primarily because he was unwilling to make even tactical concessions to his SC partners and deviate from a timetable for war set months in advance.

House approves EPA 'secret science' bills despite White House veto threat

House approves EPA 'secret science' bills despite White House veto threat

Russia and International Law – Welcoming the Great Bear to the WTO Club

In July 2012 – the WTO announced that Russia had ratified legislations clearing the country’s path to become the 156th member of the club of trading nations on August 22, 2012. Russia’s entry into the WTO had been a long and arduous journey that traversed cold war trade legislations legacies such as Jackson-Vanik Agreement, former Soviet state threat of veto, gas supply to Europe, intellectual property rights, among a host of others. Though in retrospect, the accession talks has been unfair to the Russian Federation – it is nevertheless a welcome relief that the world’s largest country is now a member in the club of nations and will effectively shape the current trends in international law in the post war era of 1945.

To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending Approaches to the Union’s Diplomatic Objectives and Representation

Summary The strengthened Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the new European External Action Service (EEAS) presuppose a set of interests and/or values that the European Union (EU) wishes to pursue on the world stage. But what are those interests and/or values and how does the EU reach agreement on them? Rather than simply ‘cutting and pasting’ from EU treaties and strategy papers, this article identifies seven distinct theoretical models of how the EU and its member states arrive collectively at a definition of their diplomatic objectives. The seven models include intergovernmentalist models of veto threats and log-rolling, normative institutionalist models of cooperative bargaining and entrapment, and constructivist and sociological institutionalist models of elite socialization, Europeanization and collective identity formation. The article identifies the logics of each model and notes their implications for the role of the EU’s new foreign policy institutions.

Eisenhower's Veto Threats: Full of Nothing, Signifying Sound and Fury

The veto is one of the few formal powers accorded to the president of the United States, yet it plays a central role in many theories of the executive branch and in theories of congressional action as well. To be more precise, the threat of a future veto is generally held to be the important component. However, there have been few empirical or theoretical studies of veto threats. This article presents new systematic data on the veto “threats” of President Dwight Eisenhower. These data are analyzed to test novel theories regarding the relation of future veto threats to the outcomes of past veto threats. Specifically, this theory extends concepts of credibility of threat to include information that is specific to both the president in question and that president's then-current history of congressional interactions. Support is found for the theory that a president who “cries wolf” and fails to carry out threats will find Congress less responsive to future threats, unless and until the president's credibility is reestablished.

The Power of the Texas Governor: Connally to Bush (review)

2010Book Reviews421 cerns of public accessibility, natural degradation of the resources, and adequate and dynamic interpretation. One aspect ofthe book diat will be particularly appreciated by public historians is the inclusion of information on the contributions of park staff members over the years. Their selfless work for the common good too often goes unnoticed, but as the author observes and clearly understands, dedicated staff members are often the best means of ensuring a positive visitor experience , regardless of the budget or current park management philosophy. Dinosaur Highway is a worthy companion for those visiting Dinosaur Valley State Park for the first time or for those returning to seek new perspectives on the ancient past. My recommendation would be to find your perfect spot in the park, be it campsite, scenic overlook, backcountry trail, or river's edge, and spend some quality time connecting with the unique state park and its equally unique history. PflugervilleDan K. Utley TL· Power oftL· Texas Governor: Connally to Bush. By Brian McCaIl, foreword by William P. Hobbyjr. (Austin: University ofTexas Press, 2009. Pp. 172. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 978o2g27i8g82, $24^5 cloth.) The author sets out to examine the use of power, in a supposedly weak office, on the part of the seven governors who served from ig63 to iggg. McCaIl establishes that Texas's resourceful governors wield considerable power through lineitem veto threats and appointing some two thousand individuals to various boards and commissions. John Connally purportedly changed the Texas governorship, taking office at a time when the state ranked woefully low in per capita income and public education . He brought in businessmen to serve on panels to study the state's educational needs, knowing that he would be soliciting their approval to raise taxes to pay for the needed reforms. What is not mentioned is that Texas's rankings did not change under Connally, and the business community was not asked to bear any of the tax burden in the bill that passed. Preston Smith is depicted as the master of pork-barrel politics and not having much on his mind except boosting higher education in Lubbock. Dolph Briscoe is also perceived as a caretaker, who was able to levy no new taxes because of the rising tax revenues of the booming ig70S. Bill Clements, the first Republican governor in 105 years, was most successful in building a two-party system, especially through his appointments of several hundred Republican judges across the state. The booming economy and inflation allowed Briscoe and Clements in particular to boost public education expenditures. The author isjudicious in his descriptions of these three governorships. Mark White initiated, or signed onto, a host of reforms. The author mentions the major reforms in utility regulation, mental health, parks and wildlife, prisons , criminaljustice, industrial development, and state water planning. And there were the educational reforms, two ofwhich—teacher literacy tests and no-pass-noplay —backfired against him. There were others the author does not mention— state-funded kindergartens, accident and unemployment compensation for farm 422Southwestern Historical QuarterlyJanuary workers, tougher pesticide regulations, health insurance for retired teachers, the extension of insurance policies for widowed or divorced spouses, higher nursing home standards, and several more. Ann Richards strengthened environmental and ethics laws, brought running water to the colonias in the Rio Grande Valley, appointed a host of women and minorities to office, and put through comprehensive insurance reform. A day before a court order would have shut down Texas schools, she signed the legislature 's "Robin Hood" bill that compelled rich school districts to subsidize poor ones. The state's financial needs seemed so dire that Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock proposed that Texas adopt a personal income tax. Richards flady rejected it, as the author notes. But that refusal to even consider taxing wealdiy individuals (as forty-three other states did) guaranteed that Texans would continue to depend on the inequitable combination of the business franchise tax, uneven property taxes, and the ever-growing burden of regressive sales taxes. George Bush was successful in passing bills allowing Texans to carry concealed handguns, limiting damages that injured people could collect, and toughening criminaljustice practices. He put through the largest tax cuts in Texas...

Assessing Presidential Power

Presidents have a wide array of strategies to influence legislation. One area that has seen less emphasis in the literature is the executive's unilateral ability to issue signing statements and their role in shaping policy. We develop a spatial model illustrating how the president's bargaining power with Congress can be expanded when the veto threat is coordinated with signing statements. The analysis suggests that signing statements, although underappreciated, may potentially be a valuable presidential tool in the veto bargaining process. The analysis also shows that veto threats are a key factor explaining the president's use of the constitutional signing statement. We infer that veto threats and signing statements are linked together as part of a larger coordinated strategy to exert presidential power in the legislative realm.