Version Of Contextualism Research Articles

How to Do Without Encroachment

Abstract This paper defends a version of epistemic contextualism that accounts for the ordinary judgements and theoretical principles that motivate pragmatic encroachment. Adopting this contextualist view, we can avoid the counterintuitive consequences of pragmatic encroachment, while still preserving its attractive applications.

On the use of contextual information for machine learning based test case prioritization in continuous integration development

Context:In most software organizations, Continuous Integration (CI) is a common practice usually subject to some budgets. Consequently, prioritizing test cases to be executed in the CI cycle is fundamental. The idea is first to execute test cases with higher failure-proneness to provide rapid feedback and decrease costs. To perform this task approaches in the literature adopt failure history and Machine Learning (ML). However, in addition to the failure history, it is also important to consider information from the CI context of the organizations and the application domain. Objective:For this end, we introduce a contextual information approach for ML algorithms. Such an approach considers information from the testing activity that can be easily collected, such as test case execution time, size, and complexity. We implement the approach by introducing two contextual versions of the algorithms: Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) and Random Forest (RF). Method:Six systems are used to compare both contextual algorithms and to evaluate their performance regarding their corresponding non-contextual versions, considering three different budgets. Results:Contextual algorithms perform better when indicators related to test time reduction are considered, as the contextual information they use is related to execution time. Regarding NAPFD and APFDc, the non-contextual algorithms have better general performance, but both contextual versions obtain competitive results. Conclusions:The contextual versions implemented can capture the desired context information in the prioritization without negatively impacting their performance regarding fault-detection.

On the assumptions of inferential contextualism

The text argues in favor of the thesis that inferential contextualism is the most successful form of epistemic contextualism. To support this claim, the opposing stance of conversational contextualism and the critique of the inferential version of contextualism by Thomas Grundmann will be presented. Conversational contextualism will be scrutinized through criticism from Michael Williams, the foremost representative of inferential contextualism. It will be claimed that Williams? criticisms expose the untenability of conversational contextualism. Subsequently, Grundmann?s critique of Williams? inferential contextualism, asserting that Williams?s position implies epistemic realism, will be examined. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that Grundmann?s critique does not undermine Williams?s theory. The externalism that Grundmann associates with epistemic realism is argued not to align with the externalism within the framework of Williams?s inferential contextualism. In conclusion, it will be asserted that inferential contextualism emerges as the most plausible version of this position.

Explanatory Asymmetry in Non-Causal Explanation

The problem of explanatory asymmetry remains a serious challenge for non-causal accounts of explanation. This paper proposes a novel solution, and it does so by appealing to the theoretical context in which an explanation is offered. The paper develops the problem of explanatory asymmetry for non-causal dependency accounts of explanation, focusing specifically on Alexander Reutlinger’s Counterfactual Theory of Explanation and recent work by Marc Lange and Lina Jansson. It defends the idea that nomological possibility with respect to a global theory is the right constraint on explanation, and it shows how this breaks the apparent symmetry in counterfactual dependence that is the source of the problem. This solution appeals to theoretical context, and the paper develops and defends the version of contextualism in explanation that is required.

Epistemic evaluation and the need for \u2018impure\u2019 epistemic standards

That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

Towards Use of OntoClean for Ontology Contextualization

Ontologies are formal systems of concepts used to describe numerous domains of interest. Ontologies are usually very expressive, but it comes at a price of computationally expensive reasoning over them. In our previous work we discussed the possible performance benefits that can be obtained by decomposing an ontology into contexts. While the benefits are appealing, we discovered that, in our case, the main obstacle against using contextual versions of ontologies was the necessity of performing the costly process of their decomposition with the participation of human experts. In this paper we discuss the possibility of using OntoClean method for streamlining and at least partial automation of suggesting a decomposition of an ontology into contexts. We present a hypothesis about how to build a structure of contexts, and verify this hypothesis against several ontologies used in state-of-the-art research. The ontologies have been obtained by us in the process that uses elements of Systematic Literature Review. The final assessment of the method has been performed by human experts, during interviews, and we present the details of their evaluation in the paper.

Countering the Counter Examples of Stewart Cohen: An Advancement of David Lewis’ Contextualist Solution to Gettier Problem, Lottery Paradox and Sceptical Paradox

The main aim of this paper is to analyse David Lewis’ version of contextualism and his solution to the Gettier problem and the lottery problem through the employment of his Rule of Relevance and Stewart Cohen’s response to these problems. Here I analyse whether Stewart Cohen’s response to David Lewis’ solutions to these problems is on the right track or not. Hence, I try to analyse some concept in David Lewis and Stewart Cohen which has remained unanalysed. Cohen tries to show that when we try to solve some variation of the lottery problem and the Gettier problem by applying Lewis’s Rule of Relevance, then it generates some counterintuitive result. So Cohen gives Lewis some alternatives (which are explained in “The Strategy of Biting the Bullet and the Problem of Interference” and “Biting the Bullet Strategy as a Natural Extension of Contextualist Resolution to the Sceptical Problem and the Pity Poor Bill Variation of the Lottery Problem” sections) to avoid this counterintuitive result; this attempt, however, affects some other presuppositions of the contextual theory of David Lewis. My aim in this paper is to show how without taking these alternatives suggested by Cohen, Lewis can apply his Rules of Relevance to solve the lottery problem and the Gettier problem without any counterintuitive result.

What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity

In The Appearance of Ignorance, Keith DeRose develops a version of epistemic contextualism that combines aspects of both safety and sensitivity theories of knowledge. This paper discusses some potential problems for DeRose’s account stemming from his Rule of Sensitivity, which is meant to model upwards shifts in epistemic standards.

Disagreeing with a Skeptic from a Contextualist Point of View

The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions of contextualism are better suited to account for those phenomena than DeRose’s indexical form of contextualism. Furthermore, I will argue against DeRose’s “single scoreboard” semantics and against his solution of ruling that in a dispute over skepticism, both parties to the conversation are expressing something truth-valueless. At the end, I will briefly address the question of whether DeRose’s contextualism combined with his double-safety account and his rule of sensitivity provide an epistemically satisfying answer to the skeptical challenge. It will be argued that by merely explaining (away) the attractiveness of skeptical arguments, DeRose’s contextualism seems to lack the resources to explain some important epistemic issues, as, for example, the question of what knowledge is and when a true belief turns into knowledge.

Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts

Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn’t exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then propose the view that terms like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology.

Improving the Performance of Ontological Querying by using a Contextual Approach

Abstract In the paper we present the results of experiment we performed to determine whether a contextual approach may be used to increase the performance of querying a knowledge base. For the experiments we have used a unique setting where we put much effort in developing a contextual and a non-contextual ontology which are as much close counterparts as possible. To achieve this we created a contextual version of a non-contextual ontology and reformulated the set of competency questions to reflect the contextual structure of the newly created knowledge base. The results of the experiment strongly suggest that using contexts might be advantageous for improving performance, and also show the further ways of development of the approach.

The Availability Heuristic and Inference to the Best Explanation

This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous "best of a bad lot" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented and defended.

5-HT2a receptor in mPFC influences context-guided reconsolidation of object memory in perirhinal cortex.

Context-dependent memories may guide adaptive behavior relaying in previous experience while updating stored information through reconsolidation. Retrieval can be triggered by partial and shared cues. When the cue is presented, the most relevant memory should be updated. In a contextual version of the object recognition task, we examined the effect of medial PFC (mPFC) serotonin 2a receptor (5-HT2aR) blockade during retrieval in reconsolidation of competing objects memories. We found that mPFC 5-HT2aR controls retrieval and reconsolidation of object memories in the perirhinal cortex (PRH), but not in the dorsal hippocampus in rats. Also, reconsolidation of objects memories in PRH required a functional interaction between the ventral hippocampus and the mPFC. Our results indicate that in the presence of conflicting information at retrieval, mPFC 5-HT2aR may facilitate top-down context-guided control over PRH to control the behavioral response and object memory reconsolidation.

Lewis’s contextual solution to the Lottery paradox and the Gettier problem

The main topic of this paper is conversational contextualism, one of the most dominant versions of epistemic contextualism, endorsed by David Lewis. Proponents of conversational contextualism, including Lewis, argue that the key advantage of this view lies in its unique way of analyzing and solving the most prominent epistemological problems. Among those problems are the skeptical paradox, the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The first part of the paper is concerned with the general features of conversational contextualism. In the second part of the paper the author highlights the main hypotheses of conversational contextualism, proposed by Lewis, as an attempt to solve the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The last part of the paper analyzes the pros and cons of the Lewisian solutions to the aforementioned problems. The key part in that analysis is the Cohen?s criticism of those solutions.

The role of interpretation of existing practice in normative political argument

In political theory concerned with normative evaluations and prescriptions facts can play two roles: (1) Facts can be of importance for the application of general normative principles to particular cases, and (2) facts can be of importance for the justification of normative principles as such. Political realists are critical of the first role, which they take to express a conception of political theory as ‘applied moral philosophy’. The paper investigates how interpretation of existing practices can be part of the second justificatory role, as suggested by proponents of different versions of contextualism and practice-dependence. The paper focuses on Andrea Sangiovanni’s methodological claims about social interpretation to illustrate both how facts can be part of the justification of principles and how interpretation is also faced with a number of problems as a way of justifying normative principles. The paper finally argues that some of these problems can be avoided if one considers the two roles together; what enables interpretation of facts as part of the justification of normative principles precisely is that application and justification are not separate exercises.

The history of international thought and International Relations theory: from context to interpretation

Over the past two decades, historians of international thought have markedly improved our understanding of the disciplinary history of International Relations (IR) and its wider intellectual history. During that period, ‘contextualism’ has become a leading approach in the field, as it has been for half a century in the history of political thought. This article argues that while the application of contextualism in IR has improved our understanding of its disciplinary history, its assumptions about the proper relationship between historians and theorists threaten to marginalise the history of international thought within IR. It argues that unless the inherent weaknesses in contextualism are recognised, the progress made in the field will go unrecognised by a discipline that sees little reason to engage with its history. It suggests that historians of international thought adopt an extensively modified version of contextualism that would allow them to rebuild bridges back into IR, especially IR theory.

Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates

Sentences containing predicates of personal taste exhibit two striking features: (a) whether they are true seems to lie in the eye of the beholder and (b) whether they are true can be—and often is—subject to disagreement. In the last decade, there has been a lively debate about how to account for these two features. In this paper, I shall argue for two claims: first, I shall show that even the most promising approaches so far offered by proponents of so-called indexical contextualism fail to account for the disagreement feature. They might be able to account for some disagreement data, but they have trouble accounting for two kinds of disagreement data that caused the estrangement from indexical contextualism and the migration to relativism in the first place: the denial and the retraction data. Second, I shall show that we still do not have to abandon indexical contextualism, because what I shall call the superiority approach—a new pragmatically extended version of indexical contextualism—can very well account for the data.

Life Stress, Strain, and Deviance Across Schools: Testing the Contextual Version of General Strain Theory in China.

General Strain Theory delineates different types of strain and intervening processes from strain to deviance and crime. In addition to explaining individual strain-crime relationship, a contextualized version of general strain theory, which is called the Macro General Strain Theory, has been used to analyze how aggregate variables influence aggregate and individual deviance and crime. Using a sample of 1,852 students (Level 1) nested in 52 schools (Level 2), the current study tests the Macro General Strain Theory using Chinese data. The results revealed that aggregate life stress and strain have influences on aggregate and individual deviance, and reinforce the individual stress-deviance association. The current study contributes by providing the first Macro General Strain Theory test based on Chinese data and offering empirical evidence for the multilevel intervening processes from strain to deviance. Limitations and future research directions are discussed.

Crosscutting psycho-neural taxonomies: the case of episodic memory

I will begin by proposing a taxonomy of taxonomic positions regarding the mind–brain: localism, globalism, revisionism, and contextualism, and will go on to focus on the last position. Although some versions of contextualism have been defended by various researchers, they largely limit themselves to a version of neural contextualism: different brain regions perform different functions in different neural contexts. I will defend what I call “environmental-etiological contextualism,” according to which the psychological functions carried out by various neural regions can only be identified and individuated against an environmental context or with reference to a causal history. While this idea may seem innocuous enough, it has important implications for a structure-to-function mapping in the mind and brain sciences. It entails that the same neural structures can subserve different psychological functions in different contexts, leading to crosscutting psycho-neural mappings. I will try to illustrate how this can occur with reference to recent research on episodic memory.

Invisible minimalism

AbstractThis essay attempts a rapprochement between Kent Bach’s view on semantic minimalism and the most radical version of contextualism about language on offer: Charles Travis’s occasion-sensitivity. Despite common assumptions held by defenders of semantic literalism – which cast Bach’s proposal as a form of contextualism – Bach rejects all conceivable forms of contextualism. In this paper, I argue that in spite of his systematic rejection of contextualism, Bach’s position bears a striking resemblance to Travis’s occasion-sensitivity. Further, when analyzed in light of the conceptual framework developed by Travis, Bach’s strand of minimalism can be shown to contain a deep-rooted conceptual inconsistency to the extent that he aims to ascribe “pure semantic content” to a linguistic entity that is necessarily pragmatic.