On the assumptions of inferential contextualism

Abstract

The text argues in favor of the thesis that inferential contextualism is the most successful form of epistemic contextualism. To support this claim, the opposing stance of conversational contextualism and the critique of the inferential version of contextualism by Thomas Grundmann will be presented. Conversational contextualism will be scrutinized through criticism from Michael Williams, the foremost representative of inferential contextualism. It will be claimed that Williams? criticisms expose the untenability of conversational contextualism. Subsequently, Grundmann?s critique of Williams? inferential contextualism, asserting that Williams?s position implies epistemic realism, will be examined. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that Grundmann?s critique does not undermine Williams?s theory. The externalism that Grundmann associates with epistemic realism is argued not to align with the externalism within the framework of Williams?s inferential contextualism. In conclusion, it will be asserted that inferential contextualism emerges as the most plausible version of this position.