Version Of Contextualism Research Articles

Lewis, the lottery and the preface

Context-dependence is commonly believed to be a widespread phenomenon in natural language. In a context where the standards of precision are very demanding (say, a rocket launch), an utterance of ‘It’s 3 pm’ said at 3.01 will be reckoned false. Reduce the standards of precision and an utterance of the same sentence at the same time will be reckoned true. Semanticists habitually accommodate phenomena of this type by allowing that utterances of the same sentence type express different propositions on different occasions of use, owing to variations along contextual parameters that are not explicitly marked in the surface structure of the sentence itself. Contextualists in epistemology hold that the verb ‘know’ provides yet another case of context-dependence, expressing diverse relations on different occasions of use owing to shifting standards for its application. In Lewis’s particular version of contextualism, the key contextual parameter is the divide between the possible worlds that are being properly ignored by the ascriber and those that are not. He offers the following definition:

A test for theories of belief ascription

If publication rates are an accurate guide to popularity, then the two currently most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former rules out ordinary Frege cases such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Kent flies. The latter approach, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which standard uses of belief reports of the form 'A believes that a is F' and 'A believes that b is F', where 'a' and 'b' are coreferential proper names or general terms, may differ in truth-value even though the proposition that a is F is identical to the proposition that b is F. For those who enthusiastically concur with current conventional wisdom, the primary argument of this essay, centring on a puzzle about belief reports, is modest; for those who don't buy the fashionable views, the argument is challenging. Facts about the puzzle case and commonsensical principles about belief entail that one of the two approaches must be correct, although the puzzle is perhaps best thought of as a test case for all theories of belief ascription. If one thinks that any version of either Millianism or Contextualism must flout important intuitive principles regarding belief, then one is left with the conclusion that any adequate theory of belief ascription will have to be significantly revisionary with regard to semantic intuitions. If so, then we can forget about letting those intuitions have the weight that they are commonly accorded in theory construction for belief ascription (and, as a consequence, belief). I present the argument by altering, elaborating and examining a puzzle that I introduced in a rough-and-ready way in earlier papers (1998, 1999). If the reader has had enough of puzzles about belief or belief ascription, I

Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic

G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying extents, this Moorean thesis. On the one hand, there are those who endorse an externalist version of contextualism, such as Keith DeRose, who have claimed that there must be some contexts in which Moore is right. More radically still, Ernest Sosa has expanded on this externalist thesis by arguing that, contra DeRose's contextualism, Moore may be right in all contexts. In this paper I evaluate these claims and argue that, suitably modified, one can resurrect the main elements of the Moorean anti-sceptical thesis.

Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism

Morality Without Foundations investigates fundamental metaethical questions about the meaning, truth, and justification of moral thought and discourse. Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. He argues instead that a correct metaethical theory should embrace some version of non-descriptivism. Timmons defends what he calls assertoric non-descriptivism which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions. In defending this view, he exploits contextual semantics, providing him with the semantic flexibility to develop an irrealist account of moral discourse. Timmons goes on to support a contextualist moral epistemology, completing his overall version of contextualism in ethics. Like his foundationalist rivals, Timmons recognizes that there are moral beliefs that are epistemically basic in providing a basis for the justification of non-basic moral beliefs. Yet, he agrees with the coherentist in maintaining that there are no intrinsically justified beliefs that can serve as a single foundation for a system of moral knowledge. Timmons ultimately finds that regresses of justification of moral belief end with contextually basic beliefs-moral beliefs which, in the relevant context, are responsibly held, but in other contexts might not be suitable as regress stoppers. Timmons' novel defense of morality without foundations offers provocative reading for philosophers working in the areas of ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Yet, written with the student in mind, his lucid presentation of difficult ideas makes this book accessible to students and newcomers to the field of metaethics.

Contextualism and Skepticism

In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain argued that our reasons for believing propositions in that domain were not good enough to give us knowledge; opponents of skepticism argued that they were. The different conclusions drawn by skeptics and non-skeptics could come either from differences in their views about the standards or conditions we had to satisfy in order to have knowledge or from differences in their assessments of the quality or character of the reasons we have. In recent years, discussions of skepticism have often focused on three anti-skeptical responses that don't directly address the questions about reasons or evidence that used to be considered fundamental. These anti-skeptical responses are: 1) content externalism, as proposed by Hilary Putnam1; 2) the denial of closure, as proposed by Robert Nozick2; and 3) contextualism about knowledge attributions, as proposed by Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, and David Lewis3. I believe that these recent responses to skepticism characteristically avoid the central epistemological issues raised by skepticism and often concede to skeptics far more than is warranted. In this paper I will examine some contextualist responses to skepticism. In Section I I describe the general idea of contextualism and its application to skepticism. In Section II I describe and briefly discuss some particular versions of contextualism. In Section III I argue that even if it is true that sentences attributing knowledge have contextually variable truth conditions, this fact does not provide the basis for a satisfactory response to skepticism. This is because the central issue raised by skepticism is whether we satisfy the standards for knowledge in place in ordinary contexts, not whether we satisfy some allegedly higher standards which, according to contextualists, are in place in some epistemological contexts. In effect, this paper is part of an argument for a return to the good old days.

Contextualism and Skepticism

In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain argued that our reasons for believing propositions in that domain were not good enough to give us knowledge; opponents of skepticism argued that they were. The different conclusions drawn by skeptics and non-skeptics could come either from differences in their views about the standards or conditions we had to satisfy in order to have knowledge or from differences in their assessments of the quality or character of the reasons we have. In recent years, discussions of skepticism have often focused on three anti-skeptical responses that don't directly address the questions about reasons or evidence that used to be considered fundamental. These anti-skeptical responses are: 1) content externalism, as proposed by Hilary Putnam1; 2) the denial of closure, as proposed by Robert Nozick2; and 3) contextualism about knowledge attributions, as proposed by Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, and David Lewis3. I believe that these recent responses to skepticism characteristically avoid the central epistemological issues raised by skepticism and often concede to skeptics far more than is warranted. In this paper I will examine some contextualist responses to skepticism. In Section I I describe the general idea of contextualism and its application to skepticism. In Section II I describe and briefly discuss some particular versions of contextualism. In Section III I argue that even if it is true that sentences attributing knowledge have contextually variable truth conditions, this fact does not provide the basis for a satisfactory response to skepticism. This is because the central issue raised by skepticism is whether we satisfy the standards for knowledge in place in ordinary contexts, not whether we satisfy some allegedly higher standards which, according to contextualists, are in place in some epistemological contexts. In effect, this paper is part of an argument for a return to the good old days.

Should the behavioral sciences become more pragmatic? The case for functional contextualism in research on human behavior

Although societal need for behavioral science research is enormous, current research practices seem to be inefficient vehicles for producing knowledge that guides practical action. Many of our most popular theories provide little direct guidance for application. They focus on the development of models of the relationships among organismic events such as attitudes, self-efficacy expectations, and behavior, but pay little or no attention to the contextual influences on behavior. Such research is in keeping with a long-standing mechanistic tradition in psychology. We propose a version of contextualism as an alternative paradigm for the behavioral sciences. According to this paradigm, theories and research are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the prediction and influence of behavior. Basic research organized to pursue this goal has a direct bearing on how behavioral phenomena can be changed for practical purposes. Conversely, applied research contributes to basic understanding of the determinants of psychological phenomena.

Intergenerational Discourse: Contextual Versions of Ageing and Elderliness

ABSTRACTMicro-analyses of talk in context can expose people's activation and evaluation of age categorisations, as personal and social identities, during interactional exchanges. In this paper, we briefly overview our own discourse analytic research, which has been concerned with the management of age and health identities in across- and within- generation talk. In the body of the paper, we then document the operation of identity-management processes in a single-case analysis, from a video-recorded corpus. We focus on one elderly woman's participation in two conversations, in the course of which vividly contrasting age identities are constructed for and by her, conversationally. This qualitative perspective on real-time interaction offers clear evidence of social practices (here, simply talk) being constitutive of ageing itself.

World views and the concept of development: A reply to Lerner and Kauffman

I reply here to the argument of R. M. Lerner and M. B. Kauffman (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 309–333) that an adequate concept of human development is incompatible with a mechanist “world view” but rests instead on a principled integration of contextualist and organicist “world views.” I review how each of these metatheoretical positions is described by the philosopher who proposed them and conclude that the version of contextualism and organicism presented by Lerner and Kauffman is so diluted as to lose the essence of their original meaning. In consequence, the concept of development they propose, which includes the notion of integrative levels, causal variables that interact differently at different times in the course of ontogeny, and probabilistic outcomes is more compatible with the mechanistic metatheory they eschew than with the contextualist and organismic ones they ostensibly espouse.