BOOK REVIEWS ~43 I ask any interested reader to see whether Thomas says this. It is correct that Thomas uses intelligere in these passages but that does not mean that the operation is conception. The judicative function is an intelligere, as Julien Peghaire showed in Intellectus et Ratio (1986). For a recent review of this whole problem of the meaning of judgment in Aquinas, I would refer to Benoit Garceau, Judicium, vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal-Paris, 1968). I would not accept all of Garceau's conclusions, but I think his survey of different interpretations is very complete. Doig does not list or use Garceau. The fact of the matter is that Doig approached his task with an obvious preconception. He is dead set against any suggestion that metaphysical esse is expressed or known in the judgment. Gilson and his associates are wrong on this point, in the view of Doig. Indeed, in the course of his discussion Doig disagrees with almost everyone in the Thomist establishment (Fabro, Forest, Geiger, Maritain, Marechal, Owens, Phelan, De Raeymaeker, Van Riet, and Van Steenberghen) except Charles Hart and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange! What is important in Doig's mind is the concept of being, taken both essentially and existentially. His book should stand as an example of how not to interpret a philosophical classic. VERNON J. BoURKE St. Louis University St. Louis, Missouri Human Life: Some Moral Issues. By JoHN F. DEDEK. New York: Sheed & Ward, 197~. Pp. 180. $5.95. Dedek, professor of moral theology at St. Mary of the Lake Seminary in Mundelein, lllinois, offers a discussion of four moral issues profoundly affecting human life: abortion, genetic engineering, euthanasia, and war. His consideration of each of these questions is prefaced by a chapter on methodology, with attention centered on two principles: the sanctity of human life and the principle of double effect. Dedek contends that human life, although sacred and inviolable, is not an absolute value and that man's stewardship over human life implies a practical dominion, at least to the extent that man has the responsibility for making decisions regarding the termination of life. He then reviews some recent efforts at revising the principle of double effect and argues that the position taken by Bruno Schuller seems to be the most reasonable. For Schuller the principle of double effect does not rule out the direct intent to do something physically evil, e. g., killing a man, provided there is a proportionate reason which can serve as a "preference principle." In 244 BOOK REVIEWS such instances, Schuller and Dedek maintain, the evil intended and effected is only physical, not moral. After a chapter on the history of the attitudes of Catholic theologians toward abortion Dedek next surveys the views of contemporary moralists on this issue (e. g., Ramsey, Haring, Mangan) and offers his own view. He believes that the phenomenon of twinning makes it at least doubtful that human life is present until the end of the second or beginning of the third week of pregnancy. He then makes the tentative claim, justified by applying Schuller's preference principle, that " the purposeful destruction of a fetus is not a moral evil in the presence of a proportionate reason." Dedek, turning attention to problems posed by recent and proposed biomedical procedures, rejects artificial insemination by donor and cloning as too destructive of the human. He indicates, however, that artificial insemination by husband, artificial inovulation, the use of surrogate mothers, and artificial placentas may be morally permissible. The chapter on euthanasia gives readers a good survey of the views of men such as Ramsey, Fletcher, Ford, Healy, McFadden. Dedek argues that the distinction between active euthanasia (hastening death) and passive euthanasia (choosing not to use extraordinary means to prolong life) is valid. In a final chapter Dedek defends limited warfare as being morally justifiable, adopting for the most part arguments developed by Paul Ramsey. Dedek's work is an informative survey of current positions; the conclusions Dedek reaches are modestly proposed and defended by reasonable arguments. Nonetheless, in my opinion, Dedek's acceptance of Schuller's preference principle points to a trend current among many Catholic authors today (e. g...